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This thesis explores whether China’s energy security in the era of Hu Jintao underwent 
a policy paradigm transition from going-out energy diplomacy to global energy 
governance. Following China’s rapid economic growth, energy security has become a 
big concern for the country and international cooperation is considered as a strategy to 
enhance it. In order to promote international energy cooperation and investment, in the 
late 1990s China adopted its going-out energy diplomacy strategy, which relied on 
bilateralism. On the other hand, in its two Energy Policy White Papers in 2007 and 
2012, China emphasised global energy governance based on multilateralism as a 
means of maintaining a stable world energy market. While both academia and 
policymakers have criticised China for taking an aggressive energy diplomacy stance 
to increase its power in the international system, the Chinese government purports that 
it will be actively engaged in global energy governance to contribute to global energy 
security. The above discussion has raised the question of the extent to which China is 
willing to adjust its bilateral approach to work within a multilateral system. To explain 
the policy transition, or lack thereof, in China’s energy security strategy during Hu 
Jintao’s era, this thesis applies Hall’s theory of policy paradigm shift to three case 
studies: China’s energy cooperation with Central Asia, Europe, and Africa. This thesis 
argues that despite calls from Chinese authorities for good global energy governance, 
China’s energy security during Hu Jintao’s era has not yet undergone a paradigm shift 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Following China’s rapid economic growth, energy security has become a big concern 
for the country. One strategy to enhance energy security is international energy 
cooperation. Since it became a net oil importer in 1993, China has adopted energy 
diplomacy to gain more secure national control of overseas resources and to diversify 
its import sources. As a response to high oil prices in 2006 and possible instability of 
the energy market, China published China’s Energy Policy (2007) White Paper1 and 
China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper2, which emphasised multilateral approaches 
and global energy governance as a means of enhancing international energy 
cooperation. The above evolution in China’s energy policy, from energy diplomacy to 
global energy governance, has raised the question of whether China is willing to work 
within a multilateral system instead of a bilateral system. To explore this phenomenon 
further, this thesis explains the policy transition, or lack thereof, in China’s energy 
security strategy during Hu Jintao’s era using the policy paradigm shift model. The 
focus of the thesis is the Chinese perspective, with other countries concerned analysed 
only insofar as their policy outcomes shed light on how to study the paradigm shift of 
energy policy. 
 
In this first chapter key elements of the thesis are introduced. This chapter offers a 
background discussion on China’s energy diplomacy and global energy governance. It 
also outlines the rationale for this project and details the research questions and the 
hypothesis to be proven. A summary of the importance and contribution of this thesis is 
then advanced. Finally, the chapter focuses on the methodology to be used and gives 




1.1.1 Energy diplomacy and China 
Energy has been linked with diplomacy or security throughout human history. Energy 
issues are related not only to business, but also to politics and national security. In the 
early 20th century, competition for oil in the Persian Gulf triggered the British–Russian 
                                               
1
 PRC State Council. 2007. 中国的能源状况与政策 [In English: White Paper on China’s Energy 
Situation and Policy]. 
2
 PRC NDRC. 2012. China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper. 
11 
 
conflict. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 19353 and the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 19414 were also linked to the desire for oil. Diplomatic approaches 
regarding energy are more often used in modern international relations. For instance, 
the US has been investing in extensive diplomatic efforts to ensure global oil supplies. 
Washington attempts to “promote a stable global energy supply by engaging diplomatic 
partners and private producers to maintain supply, calm markets, and pursue 
alternative energy options”5. In the new millennium, supply–demand balances both in 
global oil markets and in regional gas markets have tightened again, attracting 
academic attention on energy diplomacy.  
 
To enhance energy security, China has adopted energy diplomacy, which is an 
important part of its “going out” strategy and national development strategy.6 Feng 
argues that energy diplomacy is a logical extension of Chinese national interests, as it 
builds relations with resource-rich countries, develops a favourable environment for 
Chinese companies in the resource field and establishes alliances for energy 
cooperation7. For China, the ultimate goal of energy diplomacy is to secure national 
control of overseas resource supplies, particularly oil and gas, and to diversify its 
import sources. Since the sustainable development of the Chinese economy is closely 
related to the sustainable development of the world economy, the world has started to 
keep an eye on China’s actions.  
 
Although Hu Jintao attempted to project “peaceful development”, the going-out strategy 
has had the opposite effect. Mearsheimer8 and Walt9 argue that China will not have a 
                                               
3
 Ristuccia, C.A. 1997. “1935 Sanctions Against Italy: Would Coal and Crude Oil Have Made a 
Difference.” Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers.  
4
 Crane, K. 2009. Imported Oil and US National Security. Washington: RAND Corporation. 
5
 US DOS. 2012. “Energy Diplomacy in the 21
st
 Century.” Accessed on 6 September 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2012/200637.htm 
6
 State Council of PRC. 2011. “An Overview of ‘Going out’ Strategy.” Accessed on 13 
September 2013.  http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/159/1743.shtml; Xu, Q. 2007. “China’s Energy 
Diplomacy and its Implications for Global Energy Security.” FES Briefing Paper. Accessed on 
13 September 2013. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04763.pdf 
7
 Zhu, F. 2005. “A High Price to Pay: China’s Resource Diplomacy Requires Wisdom.” New 
Finance. 18 May. Accessed on 13 September 2013. 
http://media.163.com/05/0518/10/1K1FC60A00141A16.html. 
8
 Mearsheimer, J. 2006. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History 105(690): 160–162; 
Mearsheimer, J. 2010. “Australians Should Fear the Rise of China.” The Spectator. 
9




peaceful rise, because its growth in power will lead to intense security competition or 
even potential war. China is perceived to be adopting aggressive energy diplomacy, as 
it is purchasing energy resources through bilateral deals from Africa and South 
America instead of buying energy from the open market.10 Since energy “could be a 
catalyst for conflict”11, this could lead to resource competition and even military races. 
This will increase anxiety in East Asia about safe access to overseas sources and sea 
lanes for transporting resources. For instance, Lim claims that “China’s growing 
strategic pressure is beginning to cause Japan to become more anxious about its 
security.”12 Despite the fact that developing countries may see China’s energy hunt as 
a boon, other powers, such as the US and Japan, are concerned about the instability 
and insecurity to which it has led.13 The US, in a national report, suggests that China 
claims to be staying on its peaceful path on the one hand, but on the other acts as if it 
can somehow ‘lock up’ energy supplies or seek to direct markets and support resource-
rich countries without regard to their misbehaviour.14  
 
Although it is generally understood that energy import-dependent states tend to expand 
their influence in the global market by increasing relative and absolute power, and 
China is no exception to this,15 some argue that China’s intention is always to lock up 
                                               
10
 Baghat, G. 2006. “Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities.” International 
Affairs 82(5): 961–975; Yergin, D. 2006. “Ensuring Energy Security.” Foreign Affairs 85(2): 69-
82; Chen, M. & Jaffe, A. M. 2007. “Energy Security: Meeting the Growing Challenge of 
National Oil Companies.” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 9–
21. 
11
 Calder, K. 2006. Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America’s Future in Asia. New York: 
William Morrow & Co. 
12
 Lim, R. 2005. Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium. New York: Routledge. 
13
 Zweig, D. 2009. “A New ‘Trading State’ Meets the Developing World.” Center on China’s 
Transnational Relations 1-26; Zweig, D. & Jianbai, B. 2005. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” 
Foreign Affairs 84:25-38; Zweig, D. & Herberg, M.E. 2010. “China’s Energy Rise, the US, and 
the New Geopolitics of Energy.” Pacific Council on International Policy 1-90. 
14
 The White House. 2006. “The National Strategy.” 
15
 See also Bajpaee, C. 2005. “China Fuels Energy Cold War.” Asia Times, 2 Mar. Accessed on 
13 September 2013. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC02Ad07.html; Karon, T. 2006. 
“Iran Diplomacy: Why Russia and China Won’t Play Ball.” Time, 22 Mar. Accessed on 29 
January 2013. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1175573,00.html; Mufson, S. 
2006. “As China, U.S. Vie for More Oil, Diplomatic Friction May Follow.” Washington Post, 





resources or harm the international energy supply. 16  Indeed, according to the US 
Department of Energy, the effect of China’s vast investment is economically neutral.17 
Instead of asserting power through energy investments, over 50% of China’s overseas 
oil production in 2008 was sold outside China.18 Moreover, Chinese energy companies 
explore energy reserves in regions where no Western powers could or would invest. 
Such an approach increases the world’s available reserves of energy and, hence, 
instead of harming global energy security, China’s energy policy actually enhances it.19 
China’s new energy approach has great implications, not only for its own energy 
security, but also for global energy systems. Yet the question of whether China is 
willing and able to undergo a policy paradigm shift remains. Is it prepared to develop a 
clear policy framework shift from energy diplomacy to global energy governance?   
 
1.1.2 Global energy governance and China 
In the energy arena, the governance of energy issues beyond the national level is 
regarded as global energy governance, which relies on a multilateral approach at both 
global and regional levels.20 Since the late 1970s, the liberalisation of the international 
energy market, particularly the oil market, has marked a starting point for a paradigm of 
global energy governance. More explicitly, the oil shocks in the 1970s changed the 
rules of the game in the international energy market fundamentally.  
 
                                               
16
 Garrison, J. 2009. China and the Energy Equation in Asia: The Determinants of Policy Choice. 
First Forum Press; Langenkamp, D. 2010. “Our Friend, The Dragon.” Accessed on 29 January 
2013. http://207.41.118.84/articles.cfm?aid=3758. 
17
 U.S. Congress House. 2007. “Energy as a Weapon: Implications for U.S. policy.” Washington. 
18
 Dittrick, P. 2010. “Chinese Oil Companies Invest Heavily Abroad.” Oil & Gas Journal 108(5). 
19
 U.S. DOE. 2006. “Energy Policy Act of 2005 Section 1837: National Security Review of 
International Energy Requirements.”  
20
 See Goldthau, A. 2011. “Governing Global Energy: Existing Approaches and Discourses.” 
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 3(4): 213-217; for other studies on global 
energy governance, see Cherp, A., Jewell, J., & Goldthau, A. 2011. “Governing Global Energy: 
Systems, Transitions, Complexity.” Global Policy 2(1): 75-88; Christoffersen, G. 2005. “The 
Dilemmas of China’s Energy Governance: Recentralization and Regional Cooperation.” The 
China and Eurasia Form Quarterly; Dubash, N. K., & Florini, A. 2011. “Mapping Global Energy 
Governance.” Global Policy 2: 6-18; Florini, A. 2011. “The International Energy Agency in 
Global Energy Governance.” Global Policy 2: 40-50; Ghosh, A. 2011. “Seeking Coherence in 
Complexity? The Governance of Energy by Trade and Investment Institutions.” Global Policy 2: 
106-119; van der Hoeven, M. 2012. “IEA vision on international energy governance.” Energy 
Strategy Reviews, 1(2): 73-75. 
14 
 
This is well demonstrated by the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Before the first oil shock in 1973, major Western companies dominated the 
international oil market. These companies had concessions in exporting countries and 
country-to-country deals. Global traded oil was bound up in long-term bilateral 
contracts.21 Consumers found themselves facing tremendous difficulties in replacing oil 
supplies lost as a result of the 1973 embargo and the political turmoil in the Persian 
Gulf region at the end of the decade. As a result, the consumer countries of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created emergency 
sharing mechanisms and combined forces in the IEA.  
 
Since the establishment of the IEA, a number of energy-related international and 
regional institutions have been established, such as the Energy Charter, the IRENA, 
the IEF and the energy working group under the G20. A multilateral approach is carried 
out to deal with energy issues in the form of institutions composed of formal rules, 
informal constraints and enforcement mechanisms. Global energy governance is being 
established, developed and advanced as a new and promising approach that relies on 
governments’ commitment to the paradigm of global energy governance.22  
 
Faced with energy security issues, China has placed more emphasis on bilateral 
approaches, as discussed above. China remains hesitant about joining major 
international energy institutions, because it lacks confidence in the capacity of these 
international frameworks to protect its national interests. China’s Energy Policy (2007) 
White Paper first emphasised the country’s contribution to international energy 
cooperation via bilateral and multilateral approaches, 23  and China’s Energy Policy 
(2012) White Paper further addressed the need for global energy governance. China’s 
top leaders openly called for an effort among countries to tackle energy problems 
collectively and proposed the establishment of an international institute to govern the 
energy market.24 They also claimed that China would actively engage in global energy 
cooperation.25  
                                               
21
 Biolsi, Robert. 1995. “Spot, Options, and Futures Oil Markets.” In The New Global Oil Market: 
Understanding Energy Issues in the World Economy edited by S. Shojai. Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger. 
22
 Goldthau. 2011. op. cit. 
23
 PRC State Council. op. cit.  
24
 PRC NDRC. op. cit. 
25
 UPI. 2012. “China Urges Global Energy Cooperation.” United Press International. 16 Jan. 





There has been a long debate as to whether a country should take a bilateral approach 
to energy security or act within the confines of the multilateral system. All energy 
import-dependent countries seek to increase their relative and absolute power and 
influence in the global marketplace. China is no different in this respect. Both academia 
and policymakers have criticised China’s energy diplomacy for taking an aggressive 
approach26 to increase its absolute and relative power in the international system. By 
contrast, the Chinese government states that it will be actively engaged in global 
energy governance; hence, China is contributing to global energy security instead of 
threatening it. The question is whether China’s strategy is seeking to work within the 
multilateral system as a “responsible stakeholder”27, or outside the system via bilateral 
approaches. The debate refers to the complex terminology of energy security, which is 
difficult to define. More importantly, it also leads to the concept of a paradigm shift in 
China’s energy policy, questioning whether there is a transition from bilateralism to a 
paradigm of global energy governance. 
 
1.2 Hypothesis, questions and rationale 
 
Since this thesis aims to study China’s energy policy decision-making during Hu 
Jintao’s era, the time frame of this research is 2002 to 2012, Hu Jintao’s term of office. 
Data before 2002 are included and studied in this thesis, as they are important for 
understanding the energy policy background of the Hu Jintao era. However, data after 
2013 are not included. Key research questions are as follows: 
 
1. What are the rationales underpinning the two policy paradigms of China’s energy 
security – the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy and the policy paradigm of 
global energy governance – during Hu Jintao’s era? 
2. Is there a profound change in China’s energy security? Can the degree of change 
in energy policy represent a break from the past?  
3. What are the reasons and causes of the policy transition, or lack thereof, in 
China’s energy security? 
 
The principal hypothesis of this thesis is: 
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Despite calls from Chinese authorities for good global energy governance, China’s 
energy security during Hu Jintao’s era did not undergo a paradigm shift away from the 
policy paradigm of energy diplomacy to a policy paradigm of global energy governance.  
 
1.2.1 Why is this thesis important? 
Even though energy is one of the key issues in academic debates, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the transition mechanisms of energy policy. This thesis 
applies Hall’s theory of paradigm shift to energy policy. Several energy scholars have 
addressed energy policy transition,28 but it has mostly been studied in an unsystematic 
way based on particular cases. In existing literature, Hall’s theory is widely applied to a 
range of issues, but seldom to energy. Hall’s theory of paradigm shift potentially helps 
in providing a more dynamic account of how energy security is constructed and how 
energy policy is transformed over time.  
 
The impact of energy use on politics, economy, environment, health and society has 
made a country’s domestic energy policies and consumption habits a concern in 
international studies. Moreover, because of its slippery nature, energy security may 
have different meanings for different countries from one perspective to another over 
time. Hence, case studies considering energy security of different countries or regions 
are important.29 In light of these considerations, energy security should be observed 
empirically in relation to the policies of a particular state. China is chosen as the case in 
this thesis.  
 
The actions of a great power like China are believed to have a more significant 
influence on international, regional and bilateral relations with respect to energy. 
According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2012 Executive Summary, China will be 
                                               
28
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one of the key energy consumers in the next few decades.30 This implies there will be 
more competition and cooperation for energy, where the Chinese means of securing 
energy has an influential role. How China pursues its energy security has profound 
implications for the international energy system and world peace. As such, any 
revisions or transitions of the current Chinese energy policy need to be addressed 
seriously. A large body of research has paid attention to China’s energy security and 
overseas investment, particularly the question of whether China can or will fit into the 
liberal system.31 However, less empirical research has been conducted from a Chinese 
perspective to examine the reasons for and mechanisms behind China’s energy 
policymaking vis-à-vis the choice of bilateral vs. multilateral approaches. This thesis 
aims to fill this gap. 
 
It is also important to analyse China’s international behavior from a Chinese 
perspective. Since China has increasing involvement in international cooperation, and 
competition, with other states, it has already become a key research target. The 
Chinese model, policies, behaviours and actions have been widely studied in academia. 
Yet, Zheng Yongnian points out that China lacks a proper language to explain its own 
international behaviour. Meanwhile, theories of Western experiences are insufficient to 
explain China’s experience. Observation of the Chinese mindset from a Chinese 
perspective is important for understanding China’s international approaches. 32 
Therefore, in order to understand the energy world, in which China plays an important 
role, a case study on Chinese energy security is important.  
 
Understanding China’s behaviour is also important for the field of international relations 
and international political economy. This importance is set to increase with the ongoing 
reconfiguration of the international system, where emerging economies play a crucial 
role. The rise of China during Hu Jintao’s era has drawn global attention. China is 
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becoming a central actor in this increasingly multipolar world, reshaping the geopolitical, 
economic, and diplomatic relationships at both regional and global levels. While 
China’s regional behaviour has influenced the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,33 China on the world level has participated in most of the intergovernmental 
organizations and institutions established after 1945.34 At the same time, China lies at 
the centre of controversy owing to its unique mix of political and economic institutions.35 
Introducing new elements and updates in theoretical discussion, China has become an 
important topic in the field of international relations as well as international political 
economics. 
 
1.2.2 Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis makes two contributions to the existing literature. It is notable that the 
objective of this thesis is not the creation of a new theory. Instead, it applies an existing 
theory through a case study to make an empirical contribution to knowledge. 
 
This research investigates China’s energy security during Hu Jintao’s era via the 
application of Hall’s theory of paradigm shift, which is a relatively new approach in the 
study of Chinese energy. This thesis advances the literature of policy paradigm shift. 
Indeed, Hall’s theory is insufficient to explain the transition mechanism of China’s 
energy security because of two shortcomings. Hall assumes that a policy paradigm 
shift is a rational response to the failure of previous policies and pays too little attention 
to other decisive factors. In addition, his emphasis on ideology neglects implications of 
change in the physical structure of governance, powerful actors, or elite networks with 
the authority to decide the ideology behind political behaviour as well as change in 
policy. As a response to these criticisms, this thesis contributes to the understanding of 
energy security by expanding Hall’s theory, providing reasons for profound policy 
change and a five-level framework 36  of energy aspects for measurement. This 
approach includes an analysis of certain normative transformations in international 
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behaviour as well as a broader institutionalist account of the elements of change and 
continuity over time. The degree to which the former policy paradigm is willing to 
change or is resisting change underpins the central research question of this thesis.  
 
This thesis also advances the literature of Chinese energy policy and security 
empirically. First-hand data are collected via interviews to answer whether China’s 
energy policy has undergone a policy paradigm shift, as well as the reasons and 
causes for this transition mechanism. The data also reflect the rationales, ideology, 
structure, and personnel contributing to the process of Chinese energy policy making. 





A revised version of Hall’s theory of paradigm shift will be used to test the hypothesis 
introduced in section 1.2 of this chapter. The hypothesis provides the basis for 
answering the questions asked in the same section. To test the hypothesis, three 
diverse case studies are used: China–Central Asia energy cooperation, China–EU 
energy cooperation and China–Africa energy cooperation.  
 
The objective of the diverse case analysis is to capture the full range of variation along 
relevant dimensions.37 It requires the selection of a set of cases representing the full 
range of values or a particular combination of causal factors. The logic of this case-
selection strategy follows the logic of typological theorising – “where different 
combinations of variables are assumed to have effects on an outcome that vary across 
types”38. 
 
This case study design is useful for the exploration or confirmation of a theory or model. 
It is chosen to investigate the phenomenon of interest shared among the selected 
cases through observation of the depth and complexity of multiple events.39 While this 
                                               
37
 Gerring, J. 2009. “Case Selection for Case‐Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Techniques.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology edited by J.M. Box-
Steffensmeier, H.E. Brady, and D. Collier. Oxford University Press. 
38
 Ibid., p.649 
39
 Anaf, S., Sheppard, L., & Drummond, C. 2007. “Combining Case Study Research and 
Systems Theory as a Heuristic Model.” Qualitative Health Research 17(10): 1309-1315; Stake, 
R.E. 2000. “Case Studies.” In Handbook of qualitative research edited by N.K. Denzin & Y. S. 
Lincoln. 435-454. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
20 
 
case selection method offers a stronger basis for evaluating hypotheses than a single 
case study method,40 “the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more 
promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases”41. This method 
allows the researcher to “hold certain things constant while examining and accounting 
for observed differences”42.  
 
The diversity of cases used in this thesis is defined by each region’s different 
relationship with China, geographical location and proximity to China, and internal 
economic and sociopolitical structure. Central Asia is a neighbourhood region of China 
and is a key target in China’s energy diplomacy. China–Central Asia energy 
cooperation is typical because of China’s transnational gas pipeline with Central Asian 
countries, which demonstrates a unique possibility for multilateral cooperation via 
transnational infrastructure. Africa is another key target in China’s energy diplomacy 
that involves maritime energy transportation because of geographical location. China–
Africa energy cooperation is typical because of China’s growing scale of investment 
and aid in the region, which is part of China’s going-out strategy. Unlike Central Asia 
and Africa, the EU has almost no oil and gas interdependency with China because of 
geographical distance. However, China–EU energy cooperation is typical in terms of 
energy technology transfer. While China has demonstrated the possibility of 
establishing multilateral energy cooperation with Central Asia, Africa and the EU, its 
energy relations with these regions rely on different policy goals and instruments. 
 
The two data collection methods used in this study are extensive fieldwork and 
intensive desktop research. From 2013 to 2015, 53 open-ended interviews with 
qualified informants were conducted and constituted a major primary source for this 
thesis. The interviews were in an open-ended and semi-structured format. In an open-
ended interview, interviewees can express their viewpoints without being prejudiced by 
possible biases of the interviewer, while in a semi-structured interview, the interviewer 
can design specific questions based on the interviewee’s expertise and compare 
answers to similar questions. 
 
Interviewees include current and former officials, academics and other specialists. The 
53 interviewees came from China, Europe, America and Russia. Chinese participants 
were prioritised because of their direct involvement in or close observation of China’s 
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energy policymaking or energy projects. More explicitly, Chinese interviewees include 
officials and experts from the State Council, National Development and Reform 
Committee, National Energy Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, 
embassies to countries concerned, national oil companies and government-affiliated 
think tanks. Informants also included scholars, journalists and representatives of 
business associations. Foreign energy experts were targeted as well. Due to their 
experience dealing with or working with Chinese government and companies, these 
participants were deemed to have excellent knowledge of Chinese behaviour in 
energy-related sectors. Foreign interviewees included officials and experts from energy 
companies, energy-related departments, embassies (in Beijing), think tanks of 
countries concerned and international energy organisations such as the IEA and the 
Energy Charter. 
 
The actual interviewees were identified by cross-checks via public information (such as 
official websites) and personal referrals. It is notable that most of the interviewees were 
highly wary of accepting interviews because of the sensitive nature of the questions 
asked. Energy information can be politically or commercially sensitive. As a matter of 
fact, it is particularly difficult to access high-ranking officials. In order to increase 
interview success rates and encourage in-depth conversation, anonymity was 
guaranteed. Almost all the interviewees preferred not to disclose their names or 
professional backgrounds. Therefore, interview conversations were anonymised upon 
request. The interviews were not recorded, and handwritten notes were taken instead. 
Under the above protection, interviewees were more willing to converse on sensitive 
topics. 
 
This thesis also relies on intensive desktop research, which refers to qualitative textual 
analysis of a wide range of written primary and secondary sources. Written primary 
sources include official documents, such as policy regulations, white papers, blue 
books, statements, declarations, speeches and internal reports of relevant official 
authorities and international organisations. Official documents were identified as being 
important and were chosen for this research only if they addressed relevant issues and 
were issued by key authorities, such as the PRC State Council, the PRC NEA, the 
PRC MFA, national oil companies and key international energy cooperation platforms. 
They were accessed through the official websites and publications of relevant 
departments. 
 
Secondary sources include academic journal articles, conference papers, books, 
theses, working papers and news on related themes (namely on China’s energy 
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security, energy policy and diplomacy, China and Central Asia, China and the EU, and 
China and Africa). When the above primary sources were unavailable, secondary 
sources, mainly newspaper articles or academic papers quoting Chinese officials or 
analysing their statements, were used. Among the above, statistical data were 
collected from official publications by international organisations (i.e., the WTO and the 
IEA), energy companies and official authorities of the countries concerned.  
 
Due to limited empirical research on the topic, the analysis of the case studies is rooted 
in interviews, official documents, relevant governmental and international organisations 
and NOCs, websites, and media (for example, Bloomberg, Reuters, Xinhua, China 
Daily and major Chinese newspapers). Collected primary and secondary sources 
allowed the researcher to uncover relevant information and further integrate the views 
of all contributors. Interviews are not merely supplementary to the above findings, but 
are critical in understanding the context, process and synergies in China’s energy 
policy and strategy. Collected data are analysed using process tracing, which is used 
to uncover traces of hypothesised causal mechanisms within China’s energy security in 
each case. 
 
A combination of the above data collection methods enables triangulation of findings, 
increasing reliability and validity. Cross-examination and cross-referencing of data 
collected reduce the possibility of bias that using a single source entails. Therefore, 
different sources are used whenever possible in the analysis of this thesis. It is also 
worth noting that Chinese is the official language in China, and most publications of the 
Chinese government, companies and academics are written in Chinese. Sources in 
both English and Chinese (traditional Chinese and simplified Chinese) are studied. 
 
 
1.4 Chapter structure 
 
After the introductory chapter, the second chapter offers a theoretical framework for the 
discussion throughout this thesis. The main notions, including policy paradigm shift and 
an expanded version of policy paradigm shift, are addressed in this chapter. It reviews 
available literature and forms a new theoretical framework. While this framework will be 
a lens through which to view current energy issues, it will also act as a tool to explain 
China’s energy security and to determine the most appropriate policy.  
 
While chapter 2 focuses on the general conceptual framework of energy security, 
chapter 3 discusses energy security from a Chinese perspective. More explicitly, it 
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explores the historical background, governing structure, strategy, policymaking process 
and rationale behind China’s energy security by studying official documents, policy 
papers and individual reports. In addition, this section outlines the ideologies 
underpinning the two policy paradigms of China’s energy security in the early 21st 
century and points out the watershed between the two paradigms. These factual and 
ideological discussions narrow the broader conceptual framework to one with China’s 
characteristics for analysis in the case studies. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates China’s energy security in Central Asia, including where China 
has invested in transnational pipeline projects. China is the largest foreign investor in 
Central Asia, and its investments include refineries, pipelines and other infrastructure. 
This chapter introduces an international organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), as an indication of global governance. The SCO was created in 
2001 as a regional security provider in Central Asia. It also serves as a platform for 
China to fulfil its energy objectives of augmenting energy imports from the region. In 
2004, SCO started to branch out to the energy sphere, followed by joint energy projects 
among member states. This chapter studies whether China’s role in the SCO, as well 
as its cooperation with Central Asia in terms of the transnational pipeline, can reveal a 
change in the country’s overall energy strategy. 
 
Chapter 5 studies Sino-European energy cooperation. As China’s largest trading 
partner, the EU would naturally consider China as a mutually beneficial energy partner, 
and vice versa. Low-carbon sustainable development has become a common ground 
for cooperation on both sides because of issues like climate change, high global 
energy consumption and the volatility of international oil prices. While China does not 
have direct oil and gas trade with Europe, clean-energy technology transfer is the main 
focus in China–EU energy cooperation. In order to promote cooperation, a number of 
China–EU multilateral energy initiatives have been established. A case study on 
China–EU energy cooperation can reveal whether China’s energy strategy towards the 
EU has undergone any change. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on China–Africa energy cooperation. China’s energy investment in 
Africa focuses on major oil-supply countries like Sudan, Angola and Guinea, where 
corruption, poor governance and humanitarian problems often occur. While China 
attempts to increase its energy supply by creating strong ties with Africa, it also 
increases the world’s energy supply, as it approaches countries that the West does not. 
This chapter discusses the function of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) as an indication of China’s global governance in the region. FOCAC also 
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serves as a platform for China to fulfil its energy objectives of augmenting energy 
imports from the region. This case study explores whether China’s investment and 
behaviour via FOCAC could encourage global energy governance or whether it is 
merely a strategy of energy competition. This will determine whether or not China’s 
energy strategy in Africa has undergone any change. 
 
Chapter 7 is a single chapter offering the conclusion. It will apply the conceptual 
framework constructed in chapter 2 to each case study in the empirical section. It 
analyses the change of policy in each case and compares their differences. The 
principal hypothesis will be revisited and key questions will be answered in this chapter. 
The concluding chapter will go through the implications of the findings in this research. 
This will help to refine the understanding of China’s energy policy as well as the 








Chapter 2 - Energy Security and Policy Paradigm Shift 
 
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework through which this thesis will develop 
the analysis of China’s energy security in the 21st century. This chapter commences 
with the definition of energy security with respect to three dimensions: geopolitics, 
economy and science. It then introduces corresponding concepts, including energy 
diplomacy, global energy governance, bilateralism and multilateralism, which underpin 
the rationales for different strategies of energy security. This is followed by Hall’s 
concept of a policy paradigm shift, which includes a five-level framework of energy 
policy against which change can be measured. By doing so, this section outlines the 
theoretical context associated with changes in China’s energy security policy and offers 
a review of current literature on energy security. The purpose of this thesis is to apply a 
theory to explain a phenomenon instead of creating a new theory. Empirical context 
and the structure of China’s energy security are discussed in chapter 3. 
 
2.1 Definition of energy security 
 
2.1.1 What is energy security? 
Energy security is a multidimensional concept “taking on different specificity depending 
on the country, energy source and timeframe”43. Generally speaking, the main interests 
in energy security lie in the notion that an unobstructed supply of energy is crucial for a 
nation’s economy and development.44 While energy-importing countries seek to secure 
energy supply for their national interest,45 energy-exporting countries seek to maintain 
energy demand to generate government revenues. 46  Therefore, energy security is 
closely tied to interruption of supply and blockage of transit routes.47 In this sense, 
energy security can also be viewed as “risk management” that deals with “the risks and 
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consequences of disruptions and adverse long-term market trends” 48  and aims at 
achieving the condition of being “free from (these) serious risks”49 in “the foreseeable 
future” 50 . Energy security is evidently important in policymaking and ubiquitous in 
governmental practice in various domains, including the energy industry, international 
relations, economic activities, climate change and technology innovation. 
 
While the term “energy security” is discussed widely in academia, government and the 
media, there is no consensus among researchers on an explicit definition of the term.51 
Alhajji argues that energy security has “different meanings to different people at 
different moments in time”52 and that “even energy literature has failed to come up with 
a definition that most people can agree on”53. Because of its polysemic nature and 
sporadic focuses, energy security remains a “slippery”54, “vague”, “rather blurry” and 
“inherently difficult” concept. 55  Considering its research timeframe and scope, this 
thesis employs the commonly used UNDP definition of energy security, which is “the 
availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at 
affordable prices”56. 
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2.1.2 Evolution of energy security 
While there is no coherent and uncontested set of measurements and methodologies 
adopted by researchers, the community of energy studies is loosely formed by political 
scientists, economists, engineers, sociologists and geographers. Generally speaking, 
energy security in the 21st century is associated with geopolitics, market and science, 
as explained in this thesis. These three energy concepts underpin much of this 
research, which considers the mechanism and transition of energy security. It is 
notable that the purpose of this section is not to find an approach that integrates the 
above three dimensions in the study of energy security, but to build a profile of issues 
related to energy security. While energy security covers the above three dimensions, a 
particular case of energy security often presents only one or two dimensions instead of 
all three.  
 
Geopolitics 
Energy security has been linked extensively with geopolitics, strategy and international 
relations. In this sense, it focuses on the security of adequate supplies of fuels and 
resources for national energy consumption, such as the military, industry and 
transportation sectors, by looking at external threats, such as embargoes, sabotage, 
malicious market activities or terrorism; the capability to control energy supplies; and 
alternative energy options and suppliers. It also focuses on the interest and power 
relations among actors in the supply system, particularly threats from sources such as 
unreliable suppliers, hostile countries and aggressive energy companies. For example, 
after the British Navy switched from locally produced Welsh coal to imported Middle 
East oil in the early 20
th
century, the importance of energy resource supply and 
transportation routes was accentuated by battles over oilfields in the Middle East, 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia.57  
 
In the post-war era, energy security is important not only to the military, but also to the 
transportation sector and associated industries. While most developed countries have 
to import energy to meet national demand, many developing countries rely on exported 
energy revenues for political stability and development. This global supply system 
becomes insecure when there are external threats. This was well illustrated by the oil 
crisis in the 1970s, when Arab countries cut oil supplies to the US, quadrupling the oil 
price as a protest against its support for Israel. Similarly, in the 2000s the Russian–
Ukrainian gas interruption in cold winters drove EU countries to seek alternative gas 
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transit routes like the North Stream pipeline. Although these are not military actions, 
they are hostile enough to raise international tension. Indeed, the oil embargo in 1973 
and the Russian gas interruption are described as an “oil weapon” 58  and political 
levers59 in some studies.  
 
In addition, notions like “peak oil”, implying energy shortage;60 “oil glut”, referring to 
reductions of energy export revenues;61 and “resource curse”, describing the negative 
effect of over-dependency on energy exports62 and increasing demand from energy 
import countries in Asia have also drawn the attention of energy policy analysts.63 In 
order to cope with energy insecurity, countries look to international actions. These 
include power projections such as the Carter doctrine, which states that “the US would 
use military force if necessary … in the Persian Gulf region” for “the free movement of 
Middle East oil”64, and the establishment of international organisations such as the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), which brings countries together to coordinate 
emergency energy incidents. 
 
Market 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of energy security extended, but did not entirely shift, 
from the source of fuel to the market for energy.65 In contrast to its role in driving the 
modern economy in the post-World War II period, energy is viewed as “just another 
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commodity” associated with economic interests instead of national interests.66 In this 
sense, terms like price, affordability and economic welfare are stressed in certain 
definitions of energy security; for example, Yergin 67  refers to the “availability of 
sufficient supplies at affordable prices”, while Bohi68 talks about “the loss of economic 
welfare … as a result of a change in the price or availability of energy”. Being 
commoditised, energy is traded in an open market where “competition is the rule and 
economics works” 69 . Energy security is privatised, deregulated and depoliticised, 
similar to other energy sectors. 70  Although market failure exists, 71  a market that 
emphasises efficiency, competition, liberalisation, privatisation and transparency is 
believed to be able to ensure security of supply 72  and avoid politically motivated 
disruptions. 
 
The market focus also stresses international cooperation through international 
organisations, bilateral agreements and good global governance to enhance energy 
security.73 For example, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are set up to promote cross-border cooperation 
and to stabilise the energy price. The promotion of international cooperation can 
provide a better environment and positive economic interdependence for the free trade 
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of energy in which no overly powerful actors exist. A free market is believed to be the 
best means of achieving energy security.74 
 
Science 
Science is another important dimension of energy security, related to notions of 
resource limitations, vulnerability of technological systems, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and climate change. Notions of limited resources refer to anxiety 
over whether finite resource supplies, which will be exhausted one day, can meet the 
world demand given the projected growth in population in the coming decades. This 
notion was first presented in a 1972 book, The Limits to Growth, which attempted to 
simulate the consequences of Earth–human interaction.75 Such concerns are widely 
discussed in “peak theory”, which refers to the bell-shaped curve of the oil production 
rate. In any region, the rate of oil production will increase because of source discovery 
and new infrastructure, but will slow down because of resource depletion in the post-
peak stage.76  
 
Vulnerability of technological systems refers to the failure of energy facilities, and 
energy accidents caused by human mistakes or unforeseen incidents. Nuclear 
accidents in the last three decades, notably the Three Mile Island accident in 1979,77 
the Chernobyl accident caused by operation deficiencies in 198678 and the Fukushima 
accident caused by an earthquake in 2011, 79  vividly reflect the vulnerability of 
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technological systems that have long-term environmental, economic and political 
impacts. Such accidents also halted nuclear power development globally. Other than 
nuclear accidents, the vulnerability of technological systems is also manifested in other 
energy systems.80  
 
Energy efficiency and renewable energy are described as “twin pillars of sustainable 
energy policy”81. They are understood to contribute to national energy security. While 
high levels of energy efficiency can lessen the energy used by end users, renewable 
energy can reduce the amount of imported energy. Technology plays an important role 
in the development of these two pillars. Innovation in technology is important to 
increasing energy efficiency.82 Renewable technologies can also improve renewable 
energy facilities, such as solar panels and wind turbines, which are suitable for energy 
production in rural and remote regions.83 These technologies are attractive to countries 
with high demands for energy. For example, China, which has poor energy efficiency, 
wants to cooperate with European countries which have advanced energy 
technology.84  
 
Climate change is the significant change in weather patterns over a long period of time, 
observed by scientists. It is often used to describe global warming, which is caused by 
human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels.85 Global warming is understood to 
have a close link with energy insecurity because of the use of conventional fuel for 
power in modern society. In order to “prevent dangerous human interference of the 
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climate system”86, world leaders convened to discuss climate change via the platform 
of the United Nations 87  and consequently signed the Kyoto Protocol, agreeing to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.88  Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries are 
advised to reduce their use of conventional fuels and shift to renewable energy. Since 
China and India are believed to be responsible for the generation of approximately two-
thirds of the overall increase in greenhouse gas emissions, these countries have to 
“engineer” their development, which relies on “conventional coal-burning technologies”, 
in order to reduce environmental damage.89 As a result, finite energy resources are 
more limited, and advanced energy technologies are more important to energy security. 
 
2.1.3 Integrated dimensions of energy security 
The above three aspects – geopolitics, market and science – are rooted in three 
different disciplines, which are political science, economics and engineering. These 
dimensions can be illustrated by the debate surrounding the rise of China. In terms of 
the political science dimension, key questions would include: will China control the oil in 
Africa with its power projection? Will China go to war to secure its access to resources? 
Or is China able to secure its energy transit route in Southeast Asia, particularly the 
Malacca Strait? In relation to the economics dimension, major questions include: will 
the rise of China affect the oil price? Or will China join international organisations to 
stabilise the energy market? With regard to the engineering dimension, the main 
questions are: how can China enhance energy efficiency? Or how can China develop 
renewable energy as a response to climate change? These questions require advice 
from experts from different fields and lead to different methods in policymaking.  
 
Cherp and Jewell argue that these dimensions increasingly interact with each other in 
contemporary energy security, making an integrated field of studies, instead of 
separate approaches or categorisations being necessary to understand energy 
security. 90  Several studies have attempted to systematically and comprehensively 
capture the complexity of energy security. Different frameworks and indicators are 
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designed for measurements and predictions. Von Hippel and other researchers, for 
example, propose a conceptual framework of 25 indicators associated with 29 energy-
policy issues categorised by six dimensions: energy supply, economic, technological, 
environmental, social-cultural and military-security dimensions.91 Vivoda expands this 
framework to 44 indicators with three more dimensions: human security, international 
policy and policy. 92  Based on these insights, Sovacool further proposes 20 
dimensions93 with 200 indicators.94  
 
Although these measures and indicators look attractive in reflecting how academia 
studies energy security, they merely group energy issues in a more complex way. 
Moreover, since different countries have different energy security concerns and policies 
at different times,95 a checklist of energy concerns makes a limited contribution to 
understanding the policymaking of energy security. Since energy security has a 
slippery definition and is dependent on different countries at different times, what the 
term means for a particular country, China in this thesis, is based on the country’s 
ideas, identity and interactions in the region. Therefore, energy security should be 
studied empirically based on policy concerns. After all, the energy security of a 
particular country may not be inclusive of all of the above dimensions, but a particular 
issue could be regarded as energy security. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, finding an integrated framework to study the universality of 
energy security is not the purpose of this thesis. Different dimensions could be 
presented in different cases of energy security. In other words, energy security, which 
refers to “the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, 
and at affordable prices”, could be applied to different dimensions depending on the 
case in question. Instead, the main focus here is the policy mechanism and policy 
transition of China’s energy security with a focus on the causality of conflict and 
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cooperation in the energy realm. Studying the rationale behind policymaking in Chinese 
international energy cooperation could help explain how China enhances its energy 
security.  
 
In the next section, bilateralism and multilateralism are used as lenses to study China’s 
behaviour in international energy cooperation, particularly energy diplomacy and global 
energy governance. Then, a theoretical framework developed from Hall’s theory of 
paradigm shift is used to analyse whether there has been a change in the Chinese 
approach. 
 
2.2 Energy security and international relations 
 
According to the IEA, there are five basic strategies for ensuring energy security: 
“developing domestic resources to the maximum possible, creating strategic reserves, 
seeking foreign technology and investment, establishing reliable and secure oil trading 
channels, and making strategic investments in upstream production facilities abroad”96. 
These strategies rely on various forms of coordination in international cooperation that 
refer to the concepts of energy diplomacy, bilateralism, multilateralism and global 
energy governance. 
 
2.2.1 Energy diplomacy via bilateralism 
Energy diplomacy is defined as government-involved foreign activities that aim to 
secure an energy resource supply and promote energy business cooperation.97 It also 
refers to the rise of national oil companies (NOCs), which have taken the place of 
private international oil companies as the main actors in international energy markets. 
NOC behaviours are often cited as evidence that countries are attempting to secure 
energy supply and revenue with their diplomatic partners.98 Because of the special 
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nature of the energy market, international energy cooperation has relied heavily on 
bilateral deals. The bilateral strategy is considered to be efficient and flexible. With 
fewer parties involved, coordination costs are lower and clarity of interest is easier to 
attain. Moreover, there are different histories, cultures, domestic politics and economic 
development levels in different regions, which a bilateral approach can address more 
directly.99 
 
Bilateralism refers to the policy coordination between two countries and “differentiates 
relations case-by-case based principally on a priori particularistic grounds or situational 
exigencies”100. This is a broad and straightforward definition, and diplomatic relations or 
economic agreements, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), made by two countries 
are a common example of bilateralism. Since most agreements, including energy 
agreements, are signed with preferential treatment according to the specific conditions 
of the contracting countries, there is no generalised principle in bilateral relations. 
Although multilateral diplomacy101 is not a new concept in the modern world,102 this 
thesis only considers bilateral energy diplomacy. Multilateral forms of energy diplomacy 
are considered as global energy governance, as discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.2 Global energy governance via multilateralism 
Global energy governance can be understood under the concept of global governance, 
which is defined as “the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, 
relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and 
organisations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests on 
the global plane are articulated, duties, obligations and privileges are established, and 
differences are mediated through educated professionals” 103 . In this thesis, global 
energy governance is defined as the designation of all multilateral regulations intended 
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for the management of global energy activities. It focuses not only on energy resources, 
such as oil, gas, coal, renewables and nuclear energy, but also on local and global 
externalities, such as environment, health and habitats.104 Global energy governance is 
“the setting and enforcement of rules and regulations for global collective energy 
interests”105.  
 
In the energy arena, governing energy issues beyond the national level is regarded as 
global energy governance. Global energy governance follows the logic that the creation 
of “a global public good would require the intervention of a global institution”106. In 
recent years, a number of global governance scholars have attempted to explore the 
conceptual frameworks that could be applied to energy in a global context.107 Drawing 
on a global governance framework, scholars can identify cross-border governance and 
market failures that require governance intervention to achieve the objectives of global 
energy governance, covering issues ranging from price stabilisation 108  to climate 
change.109 Global energy governance relies on multilateral cooperation both at the 
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global level, such as through the IEA, the International Energy Forum (IEF), the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and multilateral development banks, 
and at the regional level, such as through the Agreement on ASEAN Energy 
Cooperation, the Energy Charter Treaty and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate. 
 
2.2.3 Multilateralism as an important characteristic in global energy governance 
In this thesis, multilateralism via institutions is an important indicator to examine if the 
energy strategy of China is moving towards global energy governance. The importance 
of multilateralism in global energy governance can be understood via the connection 
between multilateralism and global governance. 
 
Global governance is not a synonym for multilateralism, but it is a form of 
multilateralism. In international relations, multilateralism is the “international 
governance of the ‘many’”110. According to Keohane, multilateralism is “the practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states”111. Similarly, Ikenberry 
defines multilateralism as the “coordination of relations among three or more states 
according to a set of rules or principles … contrasted with interactions based on ad hoc 
bargaining or straightforward power politics”112. Therefore, multilateralism in the energy 
world can be understood as three or more countries working on a given energy issue 
according to a set of rules. 
 
According to Higgott, the reputation of multilateralism is considered to be a principal 
element of global governance.113 Weiss and Wilkinson point out that coordination in 
global governance would be non-hierarchical, or, in other words, multilateral.114 The 
ideology in global governance departs from bilateralism and embraces 
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multilateralism. 115  Global governance could be understood as a revisited form of 
multilateralism. While the old strategies of multilateralism are based on state-
dominated institutions in a top-down approach, new multilateralism strategies 
“reconstitute civil societies and political authorities on a global scale, building a system 
of global governance from the bottom up”116. Global governance enriches the content of 
multilateralism by involving more countries and regions and implementation via 
institutions.117 In short, multilateralism is a key characteristic in global governance.118 
 
While multilateralism is more about the collective trust of “self-binding” major actors 
according to their interests,119 global governance shares the definition of governance in 
political science as a process of interaction and interdependence among social and 
political actors or societies and institutions. 120  Although global governance is not 
entirely the same as multilateralism, or is considered as a reformation of it, 
multilateralism plays an important role in enhancing global governance, because both 
are based on multilateral cooperation.121 In sum, multilateralism is a key component of 
global energy governance. 
 
2.2.4 Tension between multilateralism and regionalism 
A possible criticism lies in the tension between multilateralism and regionalism in case 
studies arguing that China is moving towards multilateralism – for example, SCO in the 
case of China–Central Asia energy cooperation. An obvious criticism is that 
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multilateralism and regionalism are not the same, and that China has moved towards 
regionalism and country-to-region relations rather than multilateralism. 
 
Regionalism refers to the process of the creation and implementation of regional 
institutions with a shared identity and similar goals within a geographic region.122 Nye 
defines regionalism as “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the 
basis of regions”123. Although regionalism or regional cooperation is not global, it does 
not have to be separated from the concept of global energy governance. The definition 
of “global” is flexible in scope, and regionalism could fit in.124 Global governance could 
refer to procedures and practices on either the world or regional level.125 Moreover, 
regionalism is the governance of the “many” in a particular region. Therefore, 
regionalism relies on multilateral approaches as well and could be understood as 
regional multilateralism. Regionalism could be considered to be a part of global energy 
governance. 
 
Although there have been long debates about regionalism and multilateralism and their 
different contributions to globalisation, 126  regionalism and multilateralism are two 
components of the same historical process of global governance of different issues, 
including energy.127 Yu Ye points out that global energy governance does not merely 
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focus on international organisations at the top layer of the world system, but can also 
include regional coordination from the bottom layer. 128  More explicitly, beyond 
mechanisms at the global level, regional coordination can also form the foundation of 
global energy governance. A study by Jokela and Behr 129  points out the potential 
contribution of regionalism to global governance as the world enters a new era of 
multipolarity. Therefore, in principle, multilateralism and regionalism are not exclusive 
under the umbrella of global governance.  
 
Moreover, this thesis examines whether China is moving towards “global energy 
governance” instead of “multilateralism”. As discussed above, global energy 
governance is not equated with multilateralism. Instead, multilateralism is part of global 
governance and is used as an indicator of global energy governance. Again, 
multilateralism is a key component in regionalism, because it is also “the practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states” on a regional level. 
Since regionalism is also part of global energy governance, it is sensible to use 
multilateralism as the indicator to examine whether China is moving towards global 
energy governance via regionalism. 
 
In the case of China–Central Asia relations, one may argue that energy cooperation via 
SCO is merely regionalism, but it could be identified as evidence of a multilateral 
approach to promoting global energy governance. However, if the energy cooperation 
in China–Central Asia relations is in fact based not on multilateralism or a multilateral 
approach in regionalism, but on bilateral approaches, then it does not point to global 
energy governance and remains energy diplomacy. In short, multilateralism is used to 
examine whether the energy strategy of China is moving towards global energy 
governance. 
 
In the context of international relations, the meaning of the terms “bilateralism” and 
“multilateralism” is much more complicated. While bilateralism and multilateralism 
include the participation of two actors and three or more actors respectively, 
multilateralism is the practice of policy coordination “through ad hoc arrangements or 
by means of institutions”130 on the basis of generalised principles of conduct.131 Other 
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than the number of actors, institutions and principles are also important in explaining 
why countries choose to adopt a certain approach.132 Therefore, the observation of 
institutions is important in the analysis of global energy governance, because 
institutionalisation implies the legitimacy and appropriateness of global energy 
governance. 
 
According to Keohane, a change in issue density is the reason why a country moves 
towards the creation of multilateral institutions.133 Martin argues that self-interest will 
lead countries to multilateralism if it can fulfil their purpose, such as to increase 
certainty in handling an issue with other countries.134 On the other hand, comparative 
interests could also force countries to choose bilateralism. In order to explain why 
change occurs, this thesis applies Hall’s concept of policy paradigm shift, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3 Paradigm shift and energy policy 
 
As already noted, energy security is a slippery and multidimensional concept that does 
not deny the possibility of change. Various ways of understanding energy security have 
resulted in a range of changing governance solutions. This section outlines a 
theoretical framework to conceptualise the process of change with reference to Hall’s 
concept of the policy paradigm, which is applied to a growing number of policy studies 
that look at the role of ideas in policymaking.135 This section first explains why paradigm 
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matters in energy policy. Then it presents Hall’s concept of a policy paradigm shift, 
followed by a framework of five levels of energy-policy issues against which change 
can be measured. It also considers the role of narratives in the previously discussed 
dimension catalysts and enablers of change.  
 
2.3.1 Energy policy paradigm 
The term “paradigm” is widely used to address the changing energy world in studies of 
policy and governance, 136  technological innovation, 137  scenario building 138  and risk 
management. 139  Paradigm means the pattern, referring to a “set of assumptions, 
concepts, values, and practices that constitute a way of viewing reality for the 
community that shares them” 140 . It is a heuristic tool used to identify a particular 
process pattern.141 Khun introduced the term as “an accepted model or pattern for a 
                                                                                                                                         
Campbell, J.L. 1998. “Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy.” Theory 
and Society 27(3): 377-409; Schmidt, V. A. 2006. Democracy in Europe: The EU and National 
Polities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
136
 Goldthau, A. 2012. “From the State to the Market and Back: Policy Implications of Changing 
Energy Paradigms.” Global Policy 3(2): 198–210; Tsang, S. & Kolk, A. 2011. The evolution of 
Chinese policies and governance structures on environment, energy and climate: 
Environmental Policy and Governance.; Carson, M., Burns, T., & Calvo, D. 2011. Paradigms 
in Public Policy: Theory and Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU.; Lang, P. et al. 2011. 
“Paradigms, Policy and Governance: The Politics of Energy Regulation in the UK Post-2000.” 
Environmental Policy and Governance. 21(4): 291–302; Kuzemko, C. 2011. UK Energy 
Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Unravelling the Ties that Bind, Warwick University; 
Flavin, C. & Dunn, S. 1999. “A New Energy Paradigm for the 21
st
 Century.” Journal of 
International Affairs 53(1): 167–190. 
137
 Guerrero, J. et al. 2010. “Distributed Generation: Toward a New Energy Paradigm.” Industrial 
Electronics Magazine 4 (1): 52– 64; Reddy, A. K. N. & D’Sa, A. 1995. “Enron and Other 
Similar Deals vs New Energy Paradigm.” Economic and Political Weekly, 30 (24): 1441–1448. 
138
 Nuttall, W. and Manz, D. 2008. “A New Energy Security Paradigm for the Twenty-First 
Century”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 75 (8): 1247–1259; Devezas, T., 
LePoire, D. Matias, J. C. O. and Silva, A. M. P. 2008. ‘Energy Scenarios: Toward a New 
Energy Paradigm’, Futures 40. 
139
 Decker, D. K. and Michel-Kerjan, E. O. 2007. “A New Energy Paradigm: Ensuring Nuclear 
Fuel Supply and Nonproliferation through International Collaboration with Insurance and 
Financial Markets”. Discussion Paper. Belfer: Center for Science and International Affairs. 
140
 Agnes, M. E. (ed.) 2004. Webster’s New World College Dictionary, fourth edition. Cleveland, 
OH: Wiley-Blackwell. 
141
 Stanislaw, J. 2004. “Energy Competition or Co-operation: Shifting the Paradigm”, Economic 
Perspectives 9(2): 17-20; Gonzalez, Pablo Rafael 2006. Running Out: How Global Shortages 
43 
 
given discipline” with reference to scientific studies.142 A paradigm provides guidance or 
common ground with which to interpret the world by locating a given phenomenon 
shared by the community. Yet these interpretations are self-contained and are neither 
“objective” nor universally “true”143.  
 
The term “paradigm shift” is used to describe a profound change in the models of 
science, economy or social science triggered by new scientific evidence, 
groundbreaking ideas and crisis. The most notable example, located in scientific 
evidence, is the Copernican system, which proposed a shift from Ptolemaism to 
Heliocentrism in viewing the universe. On the other hand, liberal philosophy, which 
challenges hereditary social models and divine legitimacy, places importance on the 
individual and led to democratic governance through an idea shift in the 18th century. 
More recent examples of crisis are the 9/11 terror attacks and the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster. While the former sparked the US anti-terrorism campaign to protect its 
homeland, the latter brought about the anti-nuclear agenda and green-energy 
innovation in the Western community. 
 
The above examples present a correlation between paradigms and policy agendas 
across various sectors. For instance, Hall 144  points out that there are several 
“paradigms of politics” in UK economic governance. In the context of policy and 
governance, paradigm is a device to analyse how institutes, which consist of rules and 
practices, structure policymaking. It is “the framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain 
them, but also the very problems they are meant to be addressing”145. Although these 
institutions have no particular legal derivation, they are understood to be more formal 
than social and cultural norms.146 In this sense, Hall147 argues that the UK economic 
policy was not predetermined and was not structured “simply by economic conditions 
but also by a political dynamic”. Policy paradigm is an interpretive framework. Hall 
explains that: 
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“policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. 
This framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers 
communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is 
taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this 
interpretive framework a policy paradigm.”148 
 
These ideas and standards are important to policy analysis in two ways. Firstly, they 
are how political leaders interpret issues, problems and policy decisions. In other words, 
they are the links between context and conduct in policymaking. 149  Knowing the 
connection between ideas – how a problem is addressed and political decisions as 
policy choices – could help explain the characteristics of the energy policy paradigm of 
China. Secondly, Campbell argues that ideas can influence policy decisions in a way 
that the choices of policymakers are constrained by the norms or appropriate 
procedures of a paradigm.150 Hall’s policy paradigm theory suggests that policymakers’ 
actions are informed by a framework of ideas in which they may well believe, whether 
or not they are overtly aware of the framework’s influence.151 
 
In this sense, a paradigm is a form of elite policy prescription that reflects the specific 
course of a political action accurately. While policy paradigms are often applied to 
analysis of macroeconomic policy, they are also used in other complex policy areas,152 
such as energy. Hall 153  argues that in energy or other policy areas that involve 
specialist knowledge and technical issues, policy paradigms are a relatively strong tool 
for analysis. 
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As mentioned,154 energy, which is put at the top of domestic and foreign policy agendas, 
is often observed using a paradigm lens and is subject to paradigm shift. Helms studies 
how paradigm trends in international energy markets influence the policy of energy 
security. 155  Similarly, Mitchell uses the paradigm concept to study patterns of UK 
energy policy, arguing that these patterns can reflect the overall socioeconomic 
paradigm.156 Discussion related implicitly to paradigm shift also appears in government 
documents. For instance, political elites have argued that the UK energy governance 
on energy policy was undergoing “profound change”157 and has been “in transition”158. 
Goldthau concludes that there have been three main energy policy paradigms in 
contemporary politics. Energy politics, in general, were in a statist paradigm in the 
1970s, shifting to a liberalist paradigm in the 1980s. The current paradigm has shifted 
to interventionism, where state control has again emerged in energy governance 
patterns. While different energy policy paradigms share a common objective of 
securing energy supply for national interests, they involve different coordinating policy 
arrangements.  
 
Resonating with the changing definition of energy security dependent on different 
political leaders, the above energy paradigms are not necessarily universal. In light of 
the broad application of paradigm in energy studies, paradigm is considered to be 
fundamental to understanding the policy of China’s energy security. Paradigm does not 
merely provide a device for viewing China’s energy governance; it also serves as a 
starting point for examining policy change. As discussed in Section 2.1, energy security 
is a multidimensional concept “taking on different specificity depending on the country, 
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energy source and timeframe” 159 . Therefore, it is sensible to investigate the most 
suitable paradigm to use to view Chinese energy policy, as set out in Chapter 3. 
 
2.3.2 Policy paradigm shift 
According to Hall, “policy paradigm shift” is an ideational change in policy. Since a 
paradigm is a set of ideas and standards associated with policy, a paradigm shift is “a 
dramatic departure in policy goals, based on a new theoretical and ideological 
framework”160. A paradigm shift can be understood as “the emergence of an alternative 
framework of common and shared analysis”161. 
 
Hall162 further identifies three kinds of change: first order, second order and third order 
change. First order change refers to changes in “levels (or settings) of the basic 
instruments of (public) policy”. Second order change means that changes in the “basic 
techniques used to attain (policy goals are) altered”. Yet these two kinds of change are 
just “process(es) that adjust policy without challenging the overall terms of a given 
policy paradigm, much like ‘normal science’”163. What leads to a fundamental change or 
a “paradigm shift” in policy is third order change, which includes changes in “the 
hierarchy of goals behind policy”, reflecting “a very different process, marked by the 
radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse”164. It is essential that 
goals and ideas of a policy are changed. If only instruments of the policy are changed, 
this is not considered to be a third order change. In light of Hall’s definition, a policy 
paradigm shift consists not merely of a change in policy mechanism or a policy 
instrument replacement, but of a change in the ideas and rationales behind the policy, 
with adjustment in policy goals and techniques in response to new perspectives and 
past experience. In other words, a policy paradigm shift has taken place when all 
variables of policymaking have changed.  
 
Yet Coleman points out that without a fundamental shift in the third order, an 
incremental policy change in the context of the first and second orders could also lead 
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to a broader shift in policy paradigm. Hall165 argues that a paradigm has to be shared 
among crucial social actors to have a significant impact; hence, he describes the 
process of a paradigm shift as “social learning”. Similar to historical change in scientific 
disciplines, in this process it is “often impossible for the advocates of different 
paradigms to agree on a common body of data against which a technical judgment in 
favour of one paradigm over another might be made”166. The implications of a process 
of “social learning” are that policy paradigm shift tends to be a sociological process, 
that disputes over who is identified as the authoritative group of policy experts are likely 
to happen during the shift and that past policy experience is influential to the success of 
a policy paradigm.167 
 
2.3.3 Why profound change occurs 
Scholars point out that change is considered as diachronic, taking place over a period 
of time. While some consider change as a revolutionary process, others view it as an 
evolutionary process. The difference between them is the continuity, pace and degree 
of change. It is notable that, in the long term, an evolutionary change is considered to 
be able to lead to as profound a change as revolutionary change.168 Both types of 
change are relevant in paradigm shifts, although the degree of relevance differs across 
countries. 
 
The notion of change has been associated with periods of crisis in literatures ranging 
from economics to sociology to human biology, drawing distinctions in regard to the 
formation of new institutions, social transformations, new economic behaviour or 
biological adaptation between moments. 169  A common understanding about human 
behaviour among these applications of crisis is that change can come about when 
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everyday life is perceived as being disrupted. A crisis could be an abrupt change in 
external circumstance, new scientific evidence found in mainstream knowledge or the 
emergence of revolutionary ideas.  
 
The understanding of crisis here is not merely as an external condition, but as a 
moment that could lead to “decisive intervention”170. A crisis in which agency decisively 
acts against structure could arise in different ways, representing shock or insecurity.171 
In short, crisis causes change when “the historical context changes to a sufficient 
degree, making it increasingly hard to reconcile the existing mindset of policymakers, 
with the evidence leading eventually to new objectives and new policy instruments”172. 
Therefore, Hay argues that large-scale policy change could occur during a crisis.173 
 
A consistent perception across energy security, covering different moments in different 
countries, is that energy has entered a period of crisis. The Chernobyl disaster and the 
Fukushima incident have triggered a paradigm shift from pro-nuclear to anti-nuclear in 
most developed countries. The abrupt cutting of the Russian gas supply to Europe in 
the mid-2000s took geopolitics back to the discussion of energy, which was dominated 
by market principles at that time. Scientific proofs of the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change have triggered a shift to green energy.  
 
Philip Andrews-Speed examines transitions in paradigms or institutions 174  with an 
institutionalist lens and argues that there are two drivers of change in energy policy: 
exogenous and endogenous.175 Exogenous drivers refer to actors, either individuals or 
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organisations, that seek to change institutions in order to favour their own interests in 
reaction to changing environments, prices, assets, power or the emergence of new 
actors. Endogenous drivers refer to changes in long-term trends in a society, such as 
population, wealth distribution and economic structure. On top of these drivers, 
Andrews-Speed also highlights the importance of ideas in transition, as they provide 
the framework for governance and underpin the behaviours of actors in policymaking 
processes. 
 
Scholars from the Copenhagen School have also worked on the connection between 
crises (security threats) and policy action with the theory of securitisation. They 
question how an actor can transform a certain matter into a crisis or an issue of 
security in order to act beyond normal political practices to tackle the problem.176 When 
a subject is securitised as a threat to national security, it is politicised and politicians 
become more involved.177 An important idea is that the fear of insecurity can generate a 
sense among policymakers that something has gone wrong and that a counter-
measure is needed.178 This implies that crisis or insecurity is the point at which change 
is triggered.  
 
Scholars argue that crisis is not a self-existent phenomenon and requires further 
narrative or explanation. 179  One has to demonstrate the existence of crisis before 
linking it with change.180 In other words, narratives, or explanations of an event, are 
important in understanding crisis and change. For a narrative to prevail, it has to be 
able to appeal to norms and values in a cognitively convincing way.181 Narratives have 
two roles in the process of profound change. The first relates to the forming of the idea 
that a crisis or policy failure exists in the political community. The second relates to the 
explanatory power of the narratives. These two roles imply that, for a profound change 
to occur, an idea must be able to identify the crisis, provide evidence of policy failure 
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and diagnose the required actions. Such an idea can offer a normative critique of 
current policy and a blueprint for future policy.182  
 
In response to changing context, a policy paradigm shift requires a change in ideas.183 
An important factor here is that there is a perception of an existing alternative policy 
choice that is based on an entirely different set of ideas addressing the narratives of 
crisis; hence, it is important to look at the discussion and debates about policy 
preceding a paradigm shift. For instance, the re-emergence of the peak-oil debate held 
a wide appeal, spreading fear of energy supply insecurity, and is understood to have 
contributed to the dominance of geopolitical understandings of energy.184  
 
Indeed, another reason why narrative is important in understanding energy policy is 
that energy security has a multidimensional definition that keeps changing. In order to 
understand what energy security means to a specific country, it is necessary to analyse 
how the political elites of that country perceive it. However, unlike discourse analysis, 
which tends to emphasise the strategic role of narrative in achieving political ends,185 
this thesis understands narratives in a more ideological sense – as being populated by 
sets of ideas believed by political elites. In other words, what is important for profound 
change in Chinese energy governance is not merely the events that have occurred, but 
how they are interpreted by Chinese political elites. 
 
2.3.4 Five levels of policy paradigm analysis 
Although there might be different policy paradigms leading to different governing 
methods, Hall points out that the policymaking process is made up of several common 
variables, which are “overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the 
techniques or policy instruments used to attain these goals, and the precise setting of 
these instruments”186.  
 
Taking Chinese energy diplomacy as an example, the goal of China’s energy 
diplomacy in Africa is to secure a sufficient and diversified supply of oil. The techniques 
or policy instruments adopted to achieve this object were centred initially on the “going 
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out” strategy and establishment of bilateral relations with the oil-rich countries in Africa. 
The precise setting is carried out by national oil companies that deal with the overseas 
investments in Africa.  
 
However, there are at least two criticisms pointing to fundamental problems with Hall’s 
paradigm shift. Firstly, Hay argues that, in the social learning process, policy failure 
does not always produce learning, and governments are not always able to revise their 
policy goals in response to failure. For instance, Zha Daojiong points out that the 
Chinese government has failed to identify policy problems in decision-making on 
energy conservation policy, and that although the need for a fuel tax was endorsed by 
government-controlled media in 1996, China is still discussing the opportune time to 
set such a tax after nearly a decade of discussion with academia and the public. This 
reveals that Hall’s social learning approach neglects contestation and consensus-
making in the policy process. Instead, it assumes that policymakers are always rational 
and that policy paradigm shift is a rational process of failure identification, deliberation 
and reaction.  
 
Secondly, as discussed above, Hall emphasises ideas, policy goals and policy 
instruments in policy paradigms, but this approach does not place enough emphasis on 
the physical structure of governance, such as institutions, powerful actors, property 
controllers or informal elite networks. These governance institutions or actors reinforce 
ideas in a policy paradigm and limit the entry of new ideas. These actors can “set the 
parameters of what people talk about as well as of who talks to whom in the process of 
policy-making”187, thereby allowing or restricting “the access of social groups to political 
leaders and bureaucratic officials” 188 . These actors are important in understanding 
policymaking in the sense that they have the authority to reinforce and decide upon the 
appropriate ideas or rationales behind a policy. Their influence could be even more 
significant if changes in structure occur. In short, Hall’s concept has failed to address 
the reason for change and the authority to decide what to change.  
 
The above two criticisms reveal the weakness of Hall’s concept, which is refined in this 
thesis accordingly. In response to the first criticism, this thesis emphasises the political 
dimensions of why profound change occurs. In relation to the second criticism, this 
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thesis takes the physical structure of governance into account in analysing the 
policymaking process, because it represents the appropriation or legitimacy of ideas. 
 
Based on the above variables suggested by Hall, Kuzemko argues that it is possible to 
separate the policymaking process into five levels:189  
 
Ideas about energy;  
Ideas about energy security;  
Goal of energy policy; 
Policy instrument; 
Physical structure of energy policy.  
 
In this five-level framework, each level is considered to be important in understanding 
how the energy policy paradigm operates, and this thesis follows such treatment. Ideas, 
goal of energy policy and policy instruments are the three variables that Hall suggests, 
as discussed above. Physical structure of energy policy is added as a new level, 
because, as discussed above, it represents the appropriation or legitimacy of ideas. A 
change in physical structure could alter the ideas in the policy paradigm. These 
structures are important in the sense that they identify the power actors in China’s 
energy governance who are understood to have the authority to reinforce which ideas 
are legitimate or appropriate. It is notable that variables regarding ideas about energy 
and energy security are essential in examining profound change, as changes in them 
could lead to third order change. They make up the interpretive framework about 
energy itself, energy security and how these should be governed. These two levels are 
understood to be highly influential to the other three levels: goal of policy, policy 
instrument and physical structure of energy policy.  
 
This set of levels of different variables, including ideas, goals and instruments as well 
as the addition of physical structure, offers an accurate method of measuring change. 
These levels are adopted in this thesis to analyse change in China’s energy security. 
The following chapters measure changes against the five levels of variables of China’s 
energy security in different case studies. Taking the case of Central Asia as an 
example, this thesis studies China’s energy security approach towards Central Asia by 
separating it into two paradigms: the energy diplomacy paradigm and the global energy 
governance paradigm. The energy policy practice in these two paradigms is analysed 
and compared to measure change against the five levels of variables. A profound 
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change from previous policy practice is required at each level for the case study to 
claim a policy paradigm shift in China’s energy security approach towards Central Asia. 
In other words, other than first- and second order change in policy instruments and 
goals, a third order change in ideas informing policy and change in physical 
governance structure is necessary for a paradigm shift to occur.  
 
A notable point is that it is unrealistic to expect a government to entirely rely on or rule 
out a particular approach. It is normal for particular bilateral approaches to exist in the 
global energy governance paradigm, and such a finding is not strong enough to 
discount a paradigm change. Instead, a policy paradigm shift from energy diplomacy to 
global energy governance is more about how China’s top leaders understand global 
energy governance and include multilateral approaches in the country’s energy security 
strategy. Therefore, if evidence of a multilateral approach is obvious in the paradigm of 
global energy governance, the existence of a bilateral approach does not negate the 
possibility of a profound change in policy, unless it remains the key approach. 
 
If there are changes in the basic instruments or techniques of Chinese energy policy 
towards Central Asia, for example from bilateral diplomatic approaches to multilateral 
collaboration approaches, these are considered first order or second order changes. 
Nevertheless, the most important change is the change in ideas. How China’s top 
authorities change their views on China’s energy policy goals reflects the radical 
changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse. If there is a change in the ideas 
and goals of China’s authorities which is reflected in its energy policy towards Central 
Asia – for example, an ideological change from bilateralism to multilateralism – this is 
considered to be third order change and it could be claimed that there has been a 
policy paradigm shift in China’s energy policy approach towards Central Asia. In 
additional, if China attempts to handle its energy issues in Central Asia via multilateral 
organisations, this is considered a change in the physical structure of governance, 
which reflects the appropriation and legitimacy of new ideas. In the contrary, if no 
obvious changes occur in the above variables, especially in the ideas, goals and 
physical structure of governance, then it could not be claimed that there has been a 
policy paradigm shift. 
 
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework for this thesis’ analysis of China’s 
energy security in the 21st century. In short, energy security is “the availability of energy 
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at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at affordable prices”190 and can 
be understood with respect to three different dimensions, which are geopolitics, 
economics and science. International energy cooperation is an approach to enhance 
energy security and refers to the concepts of energy diplomacy, bilateralism, 
multilateralism and global energy governance. The difference between energy 
diplomacy  (a bilateral approach) and global energy governance (a multilateral 
approach) is not only the number of actors involved, but also the institutions and 
principles in policy coordination. There has been a long debate as to whether China 
has a tendency to move from bilateralism to multilateralism.  
 
To analyse the change of ideas regarding Chinese energy security, this chapter 
suggests applying Hall’s concept of a policy paradigm shift and a framework of five 
levels of variables against which change can be measured, including ideas, policy 
goals, policy instruments and physical governance structures. In this framework, while 
the narratives among political elites are studied to understand ideas behind policies as 
well as the reasons for a profound change, the physical structure of Chinese energy 
governance is included. In the context of Hall’s concept, a policy paradigm shift could 
occur when there is crisis, but can only be claimed if there is more than first and 
second order change in policy instruments: a third order change in ideas and policy 
goals as well as in the physical governance structure must also occur. The purpose of 
this thesis is to apply a paradigm shift approach to explain a phenomenon instead of 
creating a new theory. By discussing the ideas, rationale and characteristics of China’s 
energy policy, the next chapter goes on to investigate the energy policy paradigm with 
a focus on China’s energy policy. The physical structure of and key players in China’s 
energy governance are also discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 - Changes in China’s energy security paradigm 
 
Chapter 3 will review Chinese energy security policy in different periods. Through a 
historical overview of China’s energy security, this chapter will analyse the 
characteristics, ideology and rationale behind China’s energy policy. As explained in 
Chapter 1, the analysis in this chapter is based on data from official documents, 
communications and interviews with senior experts in the Chinese energy field. While 
publicly available data are collected from official documents and communications, new 
primary data are gathered from interviews with senior Chinese energy experts who are 
involved in the planning or implementation of China’s energy security. The data 
collected to analyse Chinese energy security in this chapter are original and depart 
from existing works. The chapter begins with a discussion of the energy governance 
structure in China, which is important for understanding the logic and key players in 
China’s energy policy-making. The chapter goes on to review the historical background 
of energy development in China and the concepts behind China’s energy security 
policy in different periods. Although the main focus of this thesis is the 2000s, when 
China adopted a “going out” strategy, it is also important to look into its energy security 
strategy from the 1950s to the 1990s, which has influenced the ideas of Chinese 
leaders in more recent times. Finally, the chapter discusses Chinese energy security in 
different paradigms that lay the foundation for discussion in the empirical chapters. 
 
3.1 The structure of China’s energy governance 
 
Before discussing Chinese energy security and policy, it is important to explain the 
energy governing structure of China. Without a clear grasp of China’s governance 
structure in relation to energy, it is difficult to understand the logic behind and key 
players in its energy policy-making. China’s energy governance structure, particularly 
its fragmented nature, determines how energy policy decisions are made and helps 
explain China’s attitude and approach towards multilateralism in regard to energy 
cooperation.  
 
China has been trying to figure out a proper institutional framework to manage its 
energy sector but no advanced development has been achieved after a number of 
reformations. In China, there is no single body that governs the energy sector or 
shapes energy policy as a whole at the national level. Involving a number of ministries 
and government agencies in the governance of the energy sector results in overlapping 




3.1.1 The reformation of China’s bureaucratic energy sector 
China has experienced several rounds of reform in the energy sector since its 
establishment.191 In the early period from 1949 to the 1980s, key energy institutes in 
China’s energy governance included the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the State 
Energy Commission, the State Planning Commission and the State Economic 
Commission. 
 
Table 3.1 Evolution of energy institutions between 1949 and 1982 
Year Key event 
1949 The Ministry of Fuel Industry is established. 
1950 The Bureau of Petroleum Administration was established under the 
Ministry of Fuel Industry. China Chemical Import and Export Company 
(SinoChem) was established under the Ministry of Trade. 
1955 The Ministry of Fuel Industry was divided into the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry, the Ministry of Coal Industry and the Ministry of Electrical 
Power. 
1970 The above three Ministries were combined into the Ministry of Fuel and 
Chemical Industry. 
1975 The Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industry was divided into the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical Industry and the Ministry of Coal 
Industry. 
1978 The Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical Industry was divided into the 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry. 
1980 The State Energy Commission was established to manage the above 
three Ministries. 
1982 The State Energy Commission and the Energy Bureau were placed 
under the State Economic Commission. The State Council took over 
the role of managing the three Ministries. 
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3.1.1.1 Restructure in 1983 – Chinese national oil companies and the Ministries 
In the early 1980s, because of increased oil demand and the need for a modernized 
institutional framework, China restructured its energy sector. The energy industry was 
divided into upstream and downstream business193 and state-owned energy companies 
were established. 194  Chinese national oil companies (CNOCs), particularly China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec Group (Sinopec) and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), took over the business functions of the Ministry of 
Petroleum Industry from that point. These CNOCs had a governmental origin; for 
example, CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC took over the upstream business, downstream 
business and offshore assets of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry respectively.195 
 
While energy businesses were taken over by CNOCs, governmental duties were 
assigned to the Ministry of Energy, which was established in 1988. The Ministry of 
Energy was not created from scratch but was instead a merger of a few energy-related 
ministries, including the Ministry of Coal Industry, the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, the 
Ministry of Hydro and Electrical Power and the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. Among 
them, electrical and coal sectors were more influential in the government and 
supervised the energy industry in general. Furthermore, the function of the Ministry of 
Energy overlapped with the State Planning Commission (SPC) 196  and CNOCs. 
Therefore, the Ministry was abolished five years later in 1993, with its function taken 
over by the Ministry of Coal Industry and the Ministry of Hydro and Electric Power 
Industry.197  
 
From 1993 to 1998, the SPC dominated the supervision of China’s energy industry and 
was in charge of long-term energy plans, authorization of construction projects, final 
production schemes, distribution of energy commodities and setting import levels. 198 
Comparatively, the administrative power of CNOCs remained weak. Since CNOCs 
were not powerful enough to control and manage the whole energy industry, regional 
production units like oil fields and refineries tended to be influenced by and relied on 
local government. Moreover, different parts of the Chinese energy industry were 
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broken down into a number of companies, which resulted in inefficient allocation of 
resources and information flows. The above sets the background to the fragmented 
governance of China’s energy sector.199 
 
3.1.1.2 Restructure in 1998 – SEC, SETC and SBPCI 
In the mid 1990s, China continued to reform its energy sector by separating 
government from companies’ business to create an integrated energy production 
chain.200 The Chinese government realized the need for effective energy governance 
and increasing dependence on oil imports.  
 
In 1998, the State Economic Commission (SEC) and Ministry of Domestic Trade 
merged to become the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).201 The Ministry 
of Coal Industry, the Ministry of Power Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry 
were abolished and re-established as the State Bureau of Petroleum and Chemical 
Industry (SBPCI) under the administration of SETC.202 Taking over the function of the 
abolished ministries, SBPCI was responsible for energy policy shaping, guideline 
drafting and supervision of both upstream and downstream business at domestic level 
as well as energy trade policy coordination at international level. Such arrangement 
turned SETC to be the most influential authority in China’s energy governance.203 In the 
same year, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) was formed by merging the 
Ministry of Geology and Mining, State Administration of National Land, State Oceanic 
Administration and State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. It was responsible for the 
regulation and management of natural resources including mines and shale gas.204  
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It is notable that, in order to handle concerns over energy security, such as increasing 
oil dependency, the Chinese central government allowed CNOC’s presence among the 
top elite circle in Beijing, increasing the influence of the Chinese oil industry in the 
country’s energy governance.205 
 
3.1.1.3 Restructure in 2003 – NDRC, Energy Bureau and SELG  
The restructure of China’s energy sector in 1998 was not considered a successful one 
in improving effectiveness because of poor management and unbalanced interests 
among all the parties involved.206 The Chinese central government pushed for another 
restructure of the Chinese energy industry, which followed the broader footprint of the 
country’s governmental reorganization.  
 
In 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was formed by 
merging State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC, formerly SPC), part of 
SETC and restructuring the Economic System Office at State Council. SBPCI and 
other energy-related bureaus were abolished. Consequently, NDRC became one of the 
most powerful authorities in Chinese government as well as energy sector. In regard 
with energy, NDRC is responsible for industry supervision, guideline drafting, policy 
shaping, oil-reserve management, coordination of international cooperation, etc.207 To 
facilitate the implementation and monitor of the above duties, the Energy Bureau was 
set up under NDRC. 
 
However, this Energy Bureau lacked both political and administrative power in 
coordinating Chinese energy policy. Since different functions were shared by different 
actors in the Chinese energy sector, the Energy Bureau had to work with other 
governmental actors and CNOCs’ ministry-level ranking. Politically speaking, the 
ranking of the Energy Bureau was much lower, and hence it was difficult for the Bureau 
to coordinate policy among these actors.208 Besides, the Bureau was relying on a team 
of less than 60 officers to deal with energy issues from those that occurred on a daily 
basis to broader strategy. Therefore, it had to rely on the capacity of other departments 
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in NDRC 209  as well as other ministries and CNOCs. The passive and ineffective 
position of the Energy Bureau is the epitome of the China’s energy governance. 
 
A supra-ministerial body, the State Energy Leading Group (SELG) was established in 
2003 in face of the above obstacles to the Energy Bureau as well as worsening 
domestic power shortages.210 As shown in table 3.2, most of the members of SELG 
held ministry- or national-level rank. With its special status211, SELG was expected to 
balance interest among CNOCs, build consensus in the sector and provide 
recommendations to the State Council at critical moments.212 This reflects the Chinese 
leadership’s tendency to rely on the experience and knowledge of authorities in 
handling discrete energy issues. However, at the operational level, the efficacy of 
SELG was under question as it lacked expertise and daily involvement.213 
 
Table 3.2 Rankings of SELG members 
Name Position in Central Government at the time of joining SELG 
Wen Jiabao Premier 
Huang Ju Vice Premier 
Zeng Peiyan Vice Premier 
Ma Kai Minister, National Development and Reform Commission 
Li Zhaoxing Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Xu Guanhua Minister of Science and Technology 
Zhang Yunchuan Minister, Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for 
National Defence 
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Jin Renqing Minister of Finance 
Sun Wensheng Minister of Land and Resources 
Du Qinlin Minister of Agriculture 
Bo Xilai Minister of Commerce 
Li Rongrong Minister, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission 
Xie Zhenhua Director, State Environmental Protection Administration 
Li Yizhong Director, State Administration of Work Safety 
Chai Songyue Chairman, State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
Ge Zhenfeng Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army 
Source: Downs. 2006.214 
 
3.1.1.4 Restructure 2008 – NEA and NEC 
In 2008, the National Energy Administration (NEA) was created under NDRC to replace 
the Energy Bureau. NEA holds vice-ministerial ranking and is headed by the vice-
minister of NDRC215. It is responsible for the supervision of all energy sectors and deals 
with both domestic and international energy issues, including formulation of energy 
plans, implementation of the policies, promotion of institutional reform and coordination 
of international cooperation. However, it is not easy for NEA to fulfil its mandate 
because of obstacles similar to those the Energy Bureau faced, such as lack of 
autonomy to coordinate energy policy, overlapping duties with other ministries and 
NOCs and limited manpower of around 200 staff. The list below explains the broad 
duties of NEA.216  
 
• promoting institutional reform in the energy sector;  
• administering energy sectors including coal, oil, natural gas, power (including 
nuclear power), new and renewable energy;  
• taking charge of energy conservation;  
• comprehensive utilization of resources in the energy sector;  
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• guiding scientific and technological advancement;  
• organizing and carrying out the R&D of important equipment and guiding the 
assimilation and innovation of imported complete sets of major equipment;  
• organizing and coordinating key energy-related demonstration projects and 
promoting the deployment of new products, new technologies and new equipment;  
• approving, reviewing or examining fixed-asset investment projects for the energy 
sector within national plans and the scale of annual plans in accordance with the 
authority stipulated by the State Council;  
• energy forecasting and precautions and participating in energy operation 
coordination and emergency preparedness;  
• formulating and implementing national oil reserve plans and polices;  
• taking the lead in launching international energy cooperation;  
• participating in the formulation of policies related to energy such as resources, 
finance and taxation, environment protection and addressing climate change;  
• making recommendations on energy price adjustment and imports and exports 
aggregate; and 
• undertaking the daily work of the National Energy Commission.” 
 
Although China needs a single authority overseeing all energy issues, the Chinese 
central government have failed to set up a ministry of energy due to strong opposition 
from NDRC and CNOCs who are concerned about their maintaining their own influence 
in the government. 217 Instead, NEC, an ad hoc high-level advisory body, has been 
established. Similar to SELG, NEC offers advice about the country’s domestic and 
international energy policies but has no specific decision-making role. Table 3.3 shows 
the member list of NEC and their high rankings. It demonstrates that the Chinese 
leadership tends to rely on the experience and knowledge of authorities in handling 
discrete energy issues but, similar to SELG, it lacks expertise and daily involvement at 
the operational level. By comparing NEA with the Energy Bureau and NEC with SELG, 
it can be seen that the Chinese government has not made any substantial restructuring 
progress in the management of the energy sector since 2008. 
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Table 3.3 Rankings of NEC members (at 2010 when it was formed) 
Name Position in NEC Current position in government 
Wen Jiabao Director Premier 
Li Keqiang Deputy Director Executive Vice Premier 
Zhang Ping General Office 
Director 





Deputy Minister of the NDRC/Director of 
the NEA 
You Quan Member Deputy Secretary General of the State 
Council 
Zhu Zhixin Member Director of the Central Finance General 
Office 
Yang Jiechi Member Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Wan Gang Member Minister of Science and Technology 
Li Yizhong 
 
Member Minister of Industry and Information 
Technology 
Geng Huichang Member Minister of State Security 
Xie Xuren Member Minister of Finance 
Xu Shaoshi Member Minister of Land and Resources 
Zhou Shengxian Member Minister of Environmental Protection 
Li Shenglin Member Minister of Communication and 
Transport 
Chen Lei Member Minister of Water Resources 
Chen Deming Member Minister of Commerce 
Zhou Xiaochuan Member Governor of the People’s Bank of China 
Li Rongrong 
 
Member Director of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration 
Commission 




Luo Lin Member State Administration of Work Safety 




Member Chairman of the National Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
Zhang Qinsheng Member Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
Department 
Source: PRC State Council218. 
 
3.1.2 The influential Chinese national oil companies 
CNOCs, particularly CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC, are influential in China’s energy 
sector and policy-making.219 Their origins as the ministries in the 1980s and their direct 
informal access (or guanxi) to top Chinese leaders (for example Zhou Yongkang, a 
former Politburo Standing Committee member who was also once the gatekeeper of 
China’s oil and gas sector) made them key actors in Chinese energy sectors. Another 
two key factors are their position in the government’s political economic agenda and 
their increasing power as autonomous economic entities. 220 
 
CNOCs receive high attention from the Chinese top leaders due to their significant 
function in energy security, geopolitics and national development. The growing energy 
demand has forced China to list oil as a strategic resource for social and economic 
development, and CNOCs are the key body responsible for obtaining resources. 221 
CNOCs also have an important role in the Chinese “going out” policy which has been 
implemented and developed since the 1990s, when Deng Xiaoping was working hard 
on reform and opening up. Beyond energy security, the policy was meant to establish 
Chinese companies that could compete with leading international companies.  
 
CNOC’s political economic importance can also be measured by its profit-making 
ability. In 2010, the three largest CNOCs, CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC, together 
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accounted for 45% of revenues in China’s petroleum and petrochemical industry. As an 
industrial driver, the contribution of CNOCs has been extended to other domestic areas, 
such as training specialized expertise, increasing revenues and offering job 
opportunities.222 Since economic reform, balanced development and social welfare are 
prioritized in the agenda of Chinese top authorities, CNOCs are expected to facilitate 
the Chinese economy. As a result, CNOCs and their subsidiaries enjoy a favourable 
policy and market environment created by large capital injections, tax benefits, below-
market interest rates on loans from state-owned banks. 
 
Since the 1990s, the Chinese central government has allowed CNOCs to enjoy more 
administrative and financial autonomy to boost their productivity. In other words, the 
Chinese government’s direct control over the energy sector has decreased. Easy 
access to the government’s top leadership enables CNOCs to better implement their 
own plans. The formation of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) in 2003 further strengthened CNOCs’ power and provided them 
with more financial independence.223 Since the purpose of SASAC is to protect the 
state’s economic interests, CNOCs enjoy more financial independence and more 
assets as long as their business is based on economy but not politics.224 
 
It is notable that although CNOCs enjoy strong autonomy, they are not fully 
independent because the central government controls them by deciding their top 
leadership appointments and approvals of their projects and investments. As is a norm 
in Chinese bureaucratic circles, the careers of the members of a CNOC’s leadership 
heavily depend on how well they go along with the Party’s guidelines, interest and 
priorities. In other words, China’s top leaders could terminate the appointment of a 
CNOC’s leaders by judging that they are not in alignment with the country’s interest.225 
In addition, the central government could withhold, delay or even disagree the approval 
of CNOC’s project and investment. For example, a CNOC has to seek approval from at 
least four governmental bodies, NDRC, Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the State 
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Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and SASAC, if it plans to submit an 
investment application that exceeds $300 million.226  
 
Consequently, China’s energy security concern has made the government more reliant 
on the power of its oil companies, and the important role of CNOCs is expected to 
continue. 
 
3.1.3 Other government institutions in the energy sector 
Besides the above key actors, there are 19 other government departments as shown in 
Table 3.4 that deal with energy issues in China, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of 
Transportation. Historically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the most 
powerful actors among all other governmental institutes had a influential role in 
Chinese energy policy making.227 However, the need for Chinese domestic economic 
reform and broader global economic environment increased the importance of the 
Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance and also NDRC, China Development 
Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China in policy-making, especially in trade, 
economic and energy issues. Besides, the role of local governments cannot be 
neglected, because of their autonomy to refuse to follow the central policies made by 
the above bodies. 228 The complex structure involving too many bodies leads to easily 
changeable, ineffective and lengthy policy-making and consequently impedes the 
implementation of a coherent energy strategy. 
 
Table 3.4 Government institutions in the energy sector 
Government Institution Function and duties 
Ministry of Commerce 
Issues licences for energy imports and exports 
Provides regulations for foreign energy investors in 
China’s energy market and for Chinese investors in 
overseas energy markets 
Ministry of Finance 
Formulates tax and fiscal policies in regard to the energy 
sector 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Establishes commercial and political relations with other 
countries  
Supports Chinese investors in overseas energy markets 
Supervises the overseas activities of Chinese companies 
to ensure they are in line with foreign policy objectives 
Ministry of Land and 
Natural Resources 
Surveys natural resources in China 
Issues and sets exploration and production licences 
Ministry of Water 
Resources 
Responsible for hydro-related management including 
hydroelectric power 
Reviews and approves dam projects and hydroelectric 
power projects 
Ministry of Transportation 
Supervises and coordinates transportation of energy via 
road (except rail way) and waterway 
Ministry of Railways 
Supervises and coordinates coal transportation via 
railway 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Supervises and coordinates the use of energy for 
agricultural purposes in rural areas 
Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social 
Security 
Supervises the employment, income and pension plans 
of state-owned energy companies 
Ministry of Personnel 
Makes managerial appointments and decides the 
personnel structure of state-owned energy companies 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
Supervises and coordinates research and development 
of new technology in the energy sector 
Ministry of Environmental 
Protection 
Overseas environmental issues in regard to energy 
sectors 
Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development 
Supervises and coordinates energy issues such as 




Commission of the State 
Council 
Overseas state-owned energy companies 
Appoints top leaders of state-owned energy companies 
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State Administration of 
Taxation 
Sets and collects income tax from energy companies 
State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
Supervises energy market and regulations 
State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
Supervises the electricity and power industry 
Coordinates the development of electricity markets 
Export-Import Bank of 
China 
Allocates Chinese energy-related foreign aid  
Promotes Chinese trade in energy sectors 
China Development Bank Provides loans for energy projects 
Source: Author’s own, information collected from official websites of the above 
departments  
 
3.1.4 The fragmentation of China’s institutional energy structure 
China’s energy administration system has a fragmented structure with constant 
changes, decentralization and bureaucratic ineffectiveness.229 As shown in Table 3.1, 
since the abolition of the Ministries of the Petroleum and Chemical Industry in 1955, 
China’s energy administration system has undergone more than ten reforms and 
remains unstable. Such changes have not only wasted a lot of resources but also 
harmed the consistency of energy planning and policy, and they were not beneficial to 
the macro arrangement of energy development. The current governance structure and 
the way it is formed have led to an inconsistent and ad hoc management of the energy 
sector.230 
 
China’s energy administration system is decentralized. As shown in Table 3.4, there 
are over 20 agencies and institutions that exercise some administrative function related 
to energy at the same time, and they are each responsible for different issues. As a 
result, the functions of government and companies in China’s energy governance are 
often mixed. This leads to the disintegration of policy-making in China’s energy sector. 
The same government decree is issued by several government sectors, and different 
departments could be involved in carrying it out. Since the control of the energy sector 
has been transferred from the Chinese central government to and distributed among 
ministries, commissions, CNOCs and local governments,231 the effectiveness in policy 
planning has been reduced. 
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The bureaucratic ineffectiveness of China’s energy governance structure has negative 
impacts on the management and development of its energy sector. The formulation 
and implementation of energy policy has become a process in which different parties 
struggle for their own interests.232 Under such circumstances, CNOCs could enhance 
autonomy and alter their operations. Constant trade-offs undermine the government’s 
objectives and could lead to a waste of administrative time and resources, which 
eventually hinders energy development. 
 
Although energy retains a key position in Chinese national strategy, China has not 
been able to establish a proper energy governance structure for decades. Therefore, it 
is unrealistic to expect that further reformation could “magically transform China’s 
energy industry”.233 Obstacles remain not only at the executive level, but also at the 
institutional level. Competing ministries and government agencies with overlapping 
functions and ambitious CNOCs with more political importance and financial autonomy 
have made it more difficult to set and implement consistent and substantial policies. No 
effective central institution has been successfully created to supervise the energy 
sector due to the difficulty in balancing interests and building consensus among several 
different key actors. More importantly, the energy strategy setting relies on the 
experience and views of senior elites, but the close relationship between top leaders in 
CNOCs and the Chinese government complicates the policy-making process. As the 
case of domestic gas market reform showed, while the Chinese central government 
tries to liberalize the market by lowering the price of gas, the CNOCs prefer a high gas 
price to maintain their profit. Therefore, Chinese energy governance remains 




3.2 A historical overview of China’s energy security 
 
Traditionally, the concept of Chinese energy security has highly strategic, economic 
and geopolitical considerations.235 Impelled by the objective of every country to survive 
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and to develop, energy production has become the focus of competition in the world, 
especially China, whose energy demand increased rapidly following the blooming of 
the country’s economy. It needs a stable and sufficient supply of energy to support its 
rapid economic development, socio-political stability and sovereignty.236 
 
While Chinese energy security is closely related to Chinese national security, it is 
essentially equated to oil security because of China’s increasing reliance on ‘‘foreign 
oil’’ and the desire for self-sufficiency.237 Since 1993, when China became a net oil 
importer, Mr Fan Bi, a director from PRC State Council Research Office, points out that 
Chinese scholars have carried out research into energy security. From the perspective 
of political realism, most Chinese scholars think that oil is an important part of the 
security strategy of countries, especially the big energy-consuming countries. 238 
Therefore, geopolitical energy competition is the main factor affecting the relations 
between major countries. On the other hand, they also pay attention to the influence of 
international energy coordination mechanisms on the promotion of energy security.239 
In terms of its overseas strategy, Chinese energy security emphasizes a “going out” 
policy. Chinese interaction with both developing and developed countries in accessing 
resources includes strengthening cooperation with countries that produce, transport 
and consume oil. 240 This section reviews the historical background of China’s energy 
development, the dominant ideology of Chinese energy security and the rationale 
behind Chinese energy policy in different periods, including 1949 to 1992, the 1990s 
and the 2000s.  
 
3.2.1 From 1949 to 1992: the mentality of self-reliance 
When China was first founded, the oil supply basically relied on imports, and the 
external dependence rate was very high because the oil industry was in recovery and 
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in an exploratory stage.241 While China’s energy security has maintained an intensive 
focus on securing its oil supplies, the rationale and boundaries of energy security have 
transformed over the years, but the mentality of self-reliance (zili gengsheng) was the 
dominant concept in China’s energy security from 1949 to 1992. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, China relied heavily on imported oil. The US oil trade embargo 
and the termination of the Soviet oil supply left Chinese leaders with a painful and 
indelible memory. They learned the lesson that the supply of imported oil is not reliable 
and can easily be interrupted by hostile parties for political reasons. The breakdown in 
China–Soviet Union relations resulted in China adopting a comprehensive self-
sufficiency policy and formulating an energy security strategy.242  
 
In order to change this situation and get rid of the impression of being a “lean-oil 
country”, from the 1950s to the 1970s China discovered and developed several oil 
fields, including Yumen, Shengli, Liaohe, Daqing and North China oil fields. The 
discovery of the Daqing and Shengli oil fields in 1959 and 1962 marked a new phase 
for China’s oil industry. What followed was the discovery and exploration of more oil 
fields, such as Huabei, Dagang, Liaohe, Changqing, Henan, Zhongyuan and Jianghan. 
China’s oil production skyrocketed, and China became self-sufficient in oil in 1963.243 A 
rapid rose in oil production eased the tensions of energy supply fundamentally and 
changed the backward situation in China’s oil industry.  
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After 1973, for the purpose of earning foreign income, China began to export crude oil 
to Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Romania, etc. According to the China Energy 
Statistical Yearbook, at its peak, in 1985, China exported 30.03 million tons of oil. 
However, China began to witness a decrease in oil exports due to the slowing down of 
oil production and the increasing demand for oil resulting from fast domestic economic 
development. According to the China Energy Statistical Yearbook, China turned from a 
net oil exporter into a net oil importer in 1993.244 Although there was no significant 
disruption in the oil market after the 1970s, supply security remained the core objective 
of China’s energy policy in the next few decades. The People’s Liberation Army Navy 
never forgot or underestimated the US’s capability to control Asian shores.245 As a 
result, the major discourse among Chinese leaders was that as long as China was a 
net importer, hostile powers would be able to block oil imports by disrupting the trade 
route in a conflict. This highlights the importance of the mentality of self-reliance, which 
became a driving force of China’s energy strategy. 
 
3.2.2 From 1993 to 2002: the supply-oriented concept of energy 
When China became a net oil importer in the 1990s, the global oil market was very 
different from the time of the oil embargoes in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
After the reform and opening up, China’s economy developed rapidly, but the annual 
growth rate of oil production in China was still far lower than that of consumption. In 
1993, China changed from a net oil exporter to a net importer. The external 
dependence continued to increase in accordance with the annual increase of import 
volume. From 1993 to 1996, China’s dependence on foreign oil remained at less than 
10% and in 1999 it grew to over 20%.246.  
 
In the early 1990s, China’s energy security policies focused on oil, with the overall goal 
of increasing domestic output and avoiding imports. This rationale echoed the mentality 
of self-reliance (zili gengsheng). 247  Another concern was the price of oil imports, 
because the country had exported oil to gain hard currency in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Turning into an oil importer meant that China lost a great deal of foreign income. China 
tried to increase its domestic production by stabilizing eastern oil fields, developing 
western and offshore oil fields, increasing the efficiency of oil consumption and 
imposing temporary import bans on crude oil and oil products. Since none of the above 
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measures reversed the growing dependence on foreign oil, China continued to import 
oil. The concerns about supply security grew because of increasing tension between 
China and the US on the Taiwan issue, US opposition to China’s World Trade 
Organization (WTO) entry, US renewal of China’s most favoured nation (MFN) status 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade.248  
 
With such a background, the supply-oriented concept of energy became the dominant 
one from 1993 to 2002. China put forward a goal for energy security, which was to 
“ensure a stable long-term oil supply”.249 China’s energy policy during this period was 
closely in accordance with this goal. As a result, Chinese energy companies started to 
implement a “going out” strategy.  
 
In March 1993, CNPC was entitled to exploration and operation rights in Bang Yai, 
Thailand, which was the first time that an oil company from China had been entitled to 
such rights. Such action marked the Chinese oil companies’ entry into the global 
energy market as well as the commencement of the “going out” energy strategy.250 In 
July 1993, CNPC obtained a share of the North Twining Oil Field in Alberta, Canada, 
and, for the first time, produced a barrel of oil abroad.251 From 1993 to 1996, Chinese 
energy companies’ foreign investment mostly comprised small-scale projects, such as 
cooperation on production sharing, improvements in oil field exploration and service, 
and increasing the production-restoring rate of old oil fields. However, through such 
cooperation, Chinese energy companies were familiarized with the international energy 
investment environment, acquired the skill for bidding and obtained useful 
experience.252  
 
In 1997, the development of China’s foreign energy business progressed into a stable 
phase. Energy companies cast their attention to the energy market in Central Asia, 
signing contracts with Kazakhstan, Sudan, Venezuela, etc. on oil and gas exploration 
and with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Iraq, Thailand, Myanmar, Canada, etc. on 
production sharing, joint ventures and leases. These collaborations covered the fields 
of pipeline construction, oil and gas exploration, ground infrastructure, the 
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petrochemical industry, petroleum refining, petroleum sales, etc. 253  Among them, 
CNPC’s exploration project in Sudan and the China–Kazakhstan pipeline project were 
two large-scale projects. During this phase, China’s energy strategy consisted of 
exploring and investing, with the aim of increasing supply, and encouraging investment 
in energy construction. Investment in construction was especially remarkable during 
the 1990s.254 Fixed-asset investment in the energy industry increased by 30 billion 
yuan each year, with investment in the electric power industry enjoying the greatest 
increase and the oil industry enjoying the second greatest.  
 
On 1 June 1998 the price formation mechanism of petroleum products was reformed. 
Through the reform, a connection between the price of domestic and international 
petroleum was established, marking the internationalization of China’s oil production.255 
As a result of the Chinese government’s long-term policies and mass investment 
caused by the “going out” strategy, the development of China’s energy industry 
achieved marked progress and expanded overseas. This highlights the importance of 
the supply-oriented concept of energy, which became a driving force of China’s “going 
out” strategy and influenced China’s energy strategy. 
 
3.2.3 From 2002 to now: the concept of source opening up and flow regulating 
In the 2000s, the energy security landscape of China was changing. In general, 
Chinese scholars’ discussion on energy security problems became deeper and more 
integrated. Fan points out that the oil energy challenges that China is currently facing 
mainly come from three sources: (1) the fierce energy competition among major 
countries; (2) “China energy threat” discourse in the Western world and the strategic 
constraints to Chinese overseas energy investment; and (3) limits on the energy supply 
caused by the instability in energy supply regions in China.256  
 
(1) China gave up its oil isolationism and associated with global oil markets parallel to 
its entry into the WTO in 2001. It began to deal not only with its oil importers but also 
with regional and global oil markets. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered the 
Chinese belief that if the US was anxious enough to launch a full-scale invasion as an 
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aggressive attempt to gain control of Iraqi oil, then energy security and future oil 
availability must have been very important and urgent. The 9/11 terrorist attack also 
complicated Russian attitudes towards pipeline cooperation with China and hence the 
energy security in Eurasia.257 According to Fan, China’s dependence on imported oil 
started to rise sharply, with its proportion of imported oil increasing from 30% in 2002 to 
40% in 2009 and over 50% in 2004. By 2011, the proportion had reached 56.5%.258 
Although China is currently the fifth-largest oil producer in the world, Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) predicts that it will become the world’s 
largest crude oil importer by 2014. 259  The dependence on imported oil in China 
remained high throughout the first decade of the 21st century due to unabated rises in 
oil demand in the transportation sector (averaging 9% per year during 2000–2009) and 
in industry (averaging 5% per year), depletion of domestic reserves and the lack of 
substitutes for oil as a liquid fuel.260 Therefore, oil security has become one of China’s 
most important focuses.  
 
 (2) China’s global hunt for oil has triggered the so-called “China energy threat” 
discourse among other major energy consumers, resulting in broad academic 
discussion on topics such as the implication of China’s external oil strategy, the 
potential Chinese revisionism in the global political economy and the ‘‘resource 
wars”.261262 On the other hand, China and its national energy companies believe that 
foreign countries, particularly in the West, often have a negative perception towards, 
and hence impose strict regulation on, Chinese overseas energy and resource 
investment. For instance, the Chinese oil company CNOOC dropped its bid to buy the 
US oil firm Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) in 2005 since the US 
considered such a deal as a national security threat and a violation of fair trade.263 
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Similarly, in the face of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) from China, Canada 
and Australia imposed a strict stance on state-owned energy investments in their 
recent investment guidelines.264  
 
(3) Another important safety concern regarding energy security in Chinese academia is 
the safety of maritime traffic.265 According to Fan, some scholars expound that the 
increasingly saturated carrying capacity of the Malacca Strait is the most important 
long-term factor that influences energy transport security, with piracy and terrorism 
being the major threats to strait security in peaceful times; in non-peaceful times, the 
US and the strait countries are capable of making use of the strait to restrict China. 
Therefore, the “Malacca dilemma” represents an issue not only of economic security 
but also of political and military security. In 2003, President Hu Jintao publicly claimed 
that ‘‘certain powers’’ were attempting to control the Malacca Strait, through which over 
80% of Chinese imported oil travels, and hence were threatening the security of 
China’s oil supply.266 
 
Based on this understanding, Zhang Wenmu points out that “the energy security 
problem in China does not primarily lie in the contradiction between the general supply 
and demand, but the structural contradictions caused by rigid increase of clean energy 
demand and the notable lack of energy supply, which is the principal contradiction of 
China’s energy security; while oil shortage is a major aspect of the primary 
contradiction in China’s energy security. In the process of globalization, a country’s 
energy security is not only an economic issue, but also a political and military issue: it 
is associated with not only the domestic supply and demand contradiction and the 
external dependence, but also the country’s diplomatic, military influence and the 
control force to the resource-rich regions in the world.”267 Therefore, Zhang Wenmu put 
forward the specific policy choices for China: based on the energy advantage, to 
develop and promote clean coal technology; to substantially increase the nuclear 
energy consumption proportion; and, finally, to accelerate the construction of the navy 
and expand international cooperation.  
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The Chinese authorities did not simply associate restrictions in Chinese energy security 
with US led geopolitical factors, but also actively explored how to integrate itself into 
the global energy cooperation system.268 The Chinese government started to adopt the 
“source opening up and flow regulating” concept for energy security in 2003, which 
became the dominant concept from the beginning of the 11th Five Year Plan in 2003 to 
2010269. This concept was formulated in several official meetings, embodied by official 
development plans and implemented by Chinese oil companies. 
 
Firstly, such a concept was formulated and confirmed in several meetings. During the 
Third Plenary Session of the 16th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee 
in October 2003, the Scientific Outlook on Development was comprehensively 
introduced, emphasizing a harmonious balance between the development of society 
and nature.270 This pointed out that the formulation and implementation of the country’s 
energy security strategy should be guided by the Outlook.  
 
The Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee in October 2005 passed 
the CPC Central Committee’s Advice on the 11th Five Year Plan for the Development of 
National Economy and Society. The objectives mentioned were “to significantly improve 
the utilization efficiency of resources and to reduce the energy consumption per unit of 
GDP by 20%; to accelerate the construction of an environmentally friendly and 
resource saving society, to intensify environmental protection efforts, to practically 
protect natural ecology, to develop a cyclic economy, to resolve the prominent 
environmental problems that hinder economic growth and jeopardize people’s health, 
to form within the society a healthy and civilized consumption pattern and economical 
growth pattern”.271  
 
In October 2007, during the CPC’s 17th National People’s Congress, the proposals 
raised included “to thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development, to establish 
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an ecological civilization, to formulate a basic growth pattern, industrial structure and 
consumption pattern that are environmentally friendly and economical; to stick to a 
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development mode … to build an 
environmentally friendly and resource saving society, to strengthen energy resource 
saving and ecological environment protection, to improve sustainability”.272 
 
Secondly, a development plan was formulated by the government to fulfil the concept. 
In June 2004, the Outline of China’s Medium and Long-term Energy Development Plan 
was passed in the State Council’s executive meeting.273 It set the energy development 
strategy and policy objectives. The principles put forth in the outline were: “energy 
saving is the priority while efficiency is the basis; coal is the basis while diversification 
of energy is encouraged; domestic market is the foothold while the overseas market is 
to be explored; urban and rural areas should be planned as a whole and the layout 
should be appropriate; technology is to be depended on and institutional innovation is 
needed; the environment should be protected while security should be ensured”.274  
 
In the Outline of the 11th Five Year Plan for National Economy and Society 
Development, which was passed at the Forth Plenary Session of the 10th National 
People’s Congress in March 2006, a chapter was included on optimizing energy 
development.275  The chapter expounded the objectives, which were “to firmly take 
resource saving as the priority, to take the domestic market as the foothold, to take coal 
as the basis, to achieve diversification of energy, to optimize production and 
consumption structure and to establish a stable, economical, clean and secure energy 
supply system”. Moreover, the sixth chapter of the outline was about “building a 
resource saving and environmentally friendly society”. It further emphasized the 
objective of “implementing the basic national policy of resource saving and 
environmental protection, establishing a recycling and sustainable national economic 
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system with low input, high output, less energy consumption and less emission and 
building a resource saving and environmentally friendly society”. 276  
 
In April 2007, NDRC formulated the 11th Five Year Plan for Energy Development.277 
The plan established the Scientific Outlook on Development and the Construction of a 
Harmonious Socialist Society as the two guiding principles for energy development. 
Moreover, it emphasized the strategy of “giving priority to energy saving, taking the 
domestic market as the foothold, encouraging diversification of energy, protecting the 
environment, strengthening international cooperation” and the effort to “establish a 
stable, economical and clean energy system and to support the sustainable social and 
economic development with sustainable development of energy” .278 
 
Thirdly, Chinese energy companies’ overseas direct investment was in accordance with 
the concept. Such investment started in the 1990s. According to Zhang Guobao, former 
Director of NEA, Chinese energy companies signed 131 contracts with 43 countries 
and regions on oil and gas exploration and refining, pipeline construction and 
technological service during the period of the 11th Five Year Plan. 279  Oil and gas 
cooperation zones in the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific, South America and Central 
Asia-Russia were established. Meanwhile, the field of cooperation was expanded from 
oil and gas to coal, electric power and clean energy. According to NEA, Chinese energy 
companies’ overseas production reached 50 million tons by late 2009, which raised the 
security level of overseas oil sources for the country.280 In the wave of the economic 
crisis in 2009, Chinese energy companies took advantage of the decreasing 
international energy demand and the dropping energy price to improve the domestic 
industry, strengthen international energy cooperation and establish a secure, stable 
and clean energy supply system. These efforts helped to maintain the stable 
development of the energy industry and to support the fast-developing national 
economy. China turned into a net coal importer in 2009, during which growth of 
electricity generation and consumption recovered stably, demand for petroleum 
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products grew rapidly and construction of key domestic oil and gas networks ran 
smoothly.281 
 
To put it succinctly, the history of China’s energy security concepts demonstrates that 
international cooperation on energy is one of the paths to the realization of China’s 
energy security.  
 
3.3 Chinese energy policy paradigms: from bilateral to multilateral 
 
Based on the history and development of China’s energy security policy, international 
cooperation is understood to be a crucial element in the realization of energy security. 
Although it is observed that oil supply security and the mentality of self-reliance (i.e. not 
relying on others or low dependency) has remained a key concept in China’s energy 
security since the 1950s, China unavoidably opened itself up to international 
cooperation since it became a net oil importer in the 1990s. Since then, the “going out” 
strategy has been a predominant method used in China’s international energy 
cooperation. It is through this strategy that China achieved its energy goal of the 
“energy supply oriented concept” in the 1990s and “the source opening up and flow 
regulating” concept in the 2000s. During the 1990s and early 2000s, China’s 
international energy cooperation was more concerned with bilateral energy cooperation 
or, in other words, energy diplomacy.  
 
The importance of international cooperation in the form of multilateralism and energy 
security was first discussed as a special case in the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 
2007.282 In that same year, China issued its first China’s Energy Policy White Paper 
(2007), 283  which emphasized international energy cooperation via bilateral and 
multilateral approaches. Energy issues were mentioned in previous White Papers on 
China’s diplomacy but lacked a structured discussion on the context of multilateral 
energy cooperation. The White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2008 emphasized the 
need for international cooperation in both bilateral approaches and multilateral dialogue 
to achieve energy security.284 The White Paper noted that China was taking on an 
increasing leadership role in multilateral energy security dialogues.  
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Eventually, China publically called for global energy governance both at the World 
Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi285 and officially in China’s Energy Policy (2012) 
White Paper. 286  Emphasizing international energy cooperation in the form of 
multilateralism can be regarded as a new understanding of energy security for China. If 
this is the case, 2007 marked a watershed in development for China’s energy security 
and policy. Whereas the period before 2007 can be regarded as a policy paradigm of 
energy diplomacy that relied on bilateralism, the period after 2007 can be viewed as a 
policy paradigm of global energy governance that relied on multilateralism. This section 
examines the rationale behind China’s international energy cooperation in the above-
noted periods and examines if there has been a change at the policy-making level. 
 
3.3.1 The policy paradigms of China’s energy diplomacy 
Chapter 2 provided the definitions of energy diplomacy and bilateralism, and they are 
used to understand China’s international energy behaviour in regard to the Chinese 
paradigm of energy diplomacy. In short, energy diplomacy refers to the bilateral 
government-involved foreign activities used to secure an energy resource supply and 
promote energy business cooperation. 287 It is the bilateral way of energy policy 
coordination, including diplomatic relations, economic agreement and FDI, between 
two countries. It “differentiates relations case-by-case based principally on a priori 
particularistic grounds or situational exigencies.”288  
 
In its earlier years, energy diplomacy did not constitute an important part of China’s 
overall diplomacy. However, since China turned into an oil-importing country, 
increasing energy imports and diversifying supply channels have become important 
tasks for China’s energy security strategy. The 11th Five Year Plan stated that the 
security of China’s energy supply should be ensured by “expanding international 
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energy cooperation”, “actively engaging with the international energy system” and 
“making full use of the international market”.289 
 
In China’s national strategy, energy and political interests are intertwined: “Oil is the 
key factor in the creation of public wealth and also one of the most important 
commodity influencing the global political pattern, economic order and military 
operations.”290 Opening its market to foreign suppliers, China encourages and assists 
CNOCs and private energy companies gain direct access to overseas resources. While 
China wants to guarantee its supply in the long run, foreign suppliers attempt to 
generate maximum profits among their customers. Chinese authorities consider it 
imperative to gain control over overseas resources in order to guarantee long-term 
supplies and avoid being overdependent on other actors. This pragmatic “going out” 
energy strategy is also referred to as energy diplomacy and draws high academic 
attention.  
 
Pang Zhongying argues that China’s energy diplomacy is carried out as a part of 
globalization. It is not merely about the market but involves other complicated 
considerations of geopolitics and strategies. 291  China’s former Foreign Minister, Li 
Zhaoxing, claimed, “our diplomatic work should provide vigorous support to those 
efforts aiming to promote international energy cooperation.” 292  This resonates with 
other Chinese energy experts, who asserted that there is a need for direct access of 
overseas energy resources. Chen Huai, an energy expert at the Development 
Research Center of the State Council, emphasized that China should attempt to exploit 
overseas energy resources with its technology and capital instead of merely 
purchasing them.293  
 
Unlike energy trade, which is negotiated among profit-driven firms by cost-benefit 
analysis, energy diplomacy is achieved by inter-government agreements and relies on 
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the credibility of states. Therefore, other than commercial interest, energy diplomacy 
serves as an important tool to achieve national objectives, such as ensuring energy 
security, managing political risk, expanding international influence and improving inter-
state relations.294 In other words, while the promotion of energy resource trade is one of 
the objectives of energy diplomacy, it can also be used to serve other national interests. 
For instance, Ian Taylor, a specialist on the international relations of Africa, points out 
that ideological concerns of non-political intervention and the ambition to position itself 
as a global player are aspects of China’s oil diplomacy in Africa.295 
 
The motto of China’s energy diplomacy could be summed up as “going out and 
bringing in”. While China’s government became well aware that it had to open its 
market internationally, China developed a strategy of “going out and bringing in” 
through bilateral means in the late 1990s. Literally understood, “going out” encourages 
Chinese companies to invest globally (for example, oil investment in Africa) and 
“bringing in” aims to attract foreign investment (for example, Europe’s clean energy 
investment in China).296 This followed the overall economic strategy of China at the 
time. In order to satisfy its growing appetite for energy resources driven by industrial 
productivity, the “going out” strategy was also applied to China’s international energy 
strategy.297 
 
The actual practice of China’s energy diplomacy includes bilateral cooperation with oil-
rich states through energy diplomacy, diversification of oil suppliers, acquisition of 
overseas oil assets by CNOCs, the construction of pipelines to tackle the “Malacca 
Dilemma” and the modernization of the navy to protect sea-lanes.298 Chinese oil and 
gas companies, with the three major companies being CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC, 
have reached out to oil and gas fields in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and 
South America. They are also planning their entrance into the markets of developed 
countries and regions such as North America, Europe and Oceania. Chinese oil and 
gas companies’ overseas activities mostly fall in the upstream. Besides importing oil 
and gas in large quantities, these companies are becoming increasingly proactive in 
overseas mergers and acquisitions. They have emerged as major actors in mergers 
and acquisitions, and their overseas equities are growing.  
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The above practices rely heavily on bilateral initiatives. Since 1982, China’s protection 
of its FDI, including energy trade and investments, has been reliant on bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). This type of treaty is one of the most important international 
legal frameworks. China has already become one of the largest BIT signers in the 
world, as of 2015. Although China joined the WTO in 2001, it prefers to handle its 
overseas energy issues through bilateral approaches. China remains outside the realm 
of major international energy frameworks, which are dominated by the West, due to its 
lack of confidence in the ability of these international institutions to protect its own 
national interests. Such conservative behaviour reflects Chinese scepticism towards 
international systems, which are understood by the Chinese authorities as Western 
dominated, and Chinese insistence on state sovereignty, which is top priority on the 
agenda of Chinese authorities.299 Relying on bilateral approaches, China is attempting 
to avoid over-participation in and maximize its national benefits from the international 
system. In sum, bilateralism underpins the policy paradigms of China’s “going out” 
energy diplomacy. 
 
3.3.2 The policy paradigms of China’s global energy governance 
Chapter 2 provided the definitions of global energy governance and multilateralism, 
and they are used to understand China’s international energy behaviour in regard to 
the Chinese paradigm of global energy governance. In short, global energy governance 
is “the setting and enforcement of rules and regulations for global collective energy 
interests”.300 It is “the practice of coordinating national (energy) policies in groups of 
three or more states”301 with a foundation that relies on the multilateral regulations 
intended for organization and centralization of energy activities on a global scale.  
 
In China’s Energy Policy (2007) White Paper, ideas of market stability, climate change 
and sustainable development were added to the concept of energy security.302 Energy 
is a vital element that extends beyond national interests in terms of economic power 
and military fuel. Although oil supply security still maintains a very important role, the 
government calls for the promotion of other energy issues like international pricing 
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mechanisms, sustainable environment, solutions for energy-related pollution and low-
carbon economies. In order to achieve the above objectives, China emphasizes 
international energy cooperation as an important means.  
 
Since becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China has become increasingly dependent 
on the world oil market. As China goes into a deeper process of internationalization, its 
foreign trade and investment have also increased substantially and have already 
touched on the existing international rules and order. Although China has already 
become one of the largest BIT signers in the world,303 it is argued that international law 
cannot provide China’s overseas energy investment with sufficient protection in terms 
of national treatment standards and arbitration mechanisms. In the BITs signed with 
major trade partners, such as Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, the UK and the US, national treaties were either non-existent or subject to 
local law.304 Furthermore some of the international arbitration mechanisms were limited 
to investor–state dispute settlement. Since there are different laws and regulations 
amongst different countries, such inconsistencies reduce the legitimacy of international 
investment arbitration. 305  When states realize that bilateral approaches are not 
sufficient or are too costly to coordinate international issues, they opt for a multilateral 
approach.  
 
Seeking greater protection of its energy supply, China emphasized the importance of a 
multilateral approach in handling energy issues in the White Papers regarding energy 
issues.306 The importance of multilateral cooperation with regard to international energy 
security was first discussed as a special case in the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 
2007 as a response to high oil prices in the mid 2000s.307 Since then, international 
energy cooperation via multilateral approaches has been discussed in China’s Energy 
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Policy (2007) White Paper,308 the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2008309 and the 
China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper.310 
 
Alarmed by the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, China further addressed global 
energy governance. There were two important messages regarding global energy 
governance delivered publicly by top Chinese leaders. On 9 July 2011, the former 
Deputy Premier of the State Council, Zeng Peiyan, delivered a speech at the Energy, 
Resources and Sustainable Development Conference at the Boao Forum, pointing out 
that in order to prevent the new global economic crisis caused by sharp fluctuations in 
the prices of energy and resources, a stability mechanism in the global energy 
resource market should be established under the framework of the G20.311 On 16 
January 2012, when Premier Wen Jiabao attended the World Future Energy Summit 
held in Abu Dhabi, he pointed out the need to consider establishing a global energy 
market governance mechanism under the framework of the G20 to effectively ensure 
energy security,312 namely, by setting up a mechanism that includes energy-supplying 
countries, consuming countries and transit countries based on a principle of mutual 
benefit.  
 
Echoing the above two claims, China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper emphasized 
global energy governance, which can be understood as “the setting and enforcement of 
rules and regulations for global collective energy interests”.313 It called for countries to 
tackle energy problems collectively and proposed the establishment of an international 
institute to govern the energy market. It also claimed that China would actively engage 
in global energy cooperation, which focuses not only on energy resources, such as oil, 
gas, coal, renewable and nuclear, but also on other local and global externalities such 
as the environment, health and habitats.314  
 
The above observation shows how China’s energy policy evolved from multilateral 
energy cooperation to global energy governance. It echoes the argument in Chapter 2 
that the process of change is not necessarily revolutionary but could be evolutionary, 
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and it is not always linear or clean cut but can be messy and contingent. In sum, 
multilateralism underpins the policy paradigms of China’s global energy governance. 
 
3.3.3 China’s view of international energy organizations 
China’s transformation into the world’s biggest energy consumer and greenhouse gas 
emitter has already placed it on the international energy policy agenda for issues such 
as meeting global energy demands, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
transitioning to a low-carbon economy. China is not only affected by global energy 
governance; rather its behaviour towards multilateralism will also influence the 
operation and development of global energy governance. As asserted in Chapter 2, 
while discussion of global energy governance should focus on international 
organizations which form the top layer of the world system, it should also pay attention 
to the contribution of regional coordination as a foundation from the bottom layer.315 
This section discusses China’s stance toward the top layer of global energy 
governance, which refers to the international organizations.  
 
In practice, China is reluctant to participate in the international energy platform 
although international organizations such as International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
Energy Charter strongly welcome it.316 Currently, it is reasonable to argue that instead 
of working towards the ideology behind the international framework, China is 
attempting to avoid over-participation in it and seeks to maximize its national benefit.317 
Chinese authorities consider bilateral strategies to be efficient and flexible. With fewer 
parties involved, coordination costs are lower and clarity of interest is easier to attain. 
Moreover, there are different histories, cultures, domestic politics and economic 
development levels in different regions, which a bilateral approach could address more 
directly.318  
 
With regard to China’s involvement in multilateral platforms like IEA and ECT, the 
perception and reality in China is multi-layered according to a number of interviews with 
both senior officers from Chinese energy government and international 
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organizations. 319  Chinese attitudes towards multilateral cooperation are always 
politically oriented. Despite technical obstacles such as the requirement of being a 
member of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to join 
IEA, China is hesitant to accept the international standards and requirements found in 
their legal regulations, emission standards and the strategic oil reserve amongst other 
aspects.320 Joining these international energy organizations implies that China falls into 
the same energy governance system dominated by Western countries. The Chinese 
decision-makers are not familiar with the ‘game’ of multilateralism and hence have 
concerns about the political risks of joining international organizations.321  
 
Such conservative behaviour reflects China’s scepticism towards Western led 
international systems its insistence on state sovereignty. Meanwhile, as mentioned 
above, China’s government and CNOCs share a common viewpoint that foreign 
countries, particularly in the West, often have a negative perception towards the 
Chinese actors, and hence, impose strict regulation on their overseas energy and 
resource investment. As a result, China remains outside major international energy 
frameworks due to the lack of confidence in the capability of these international 
institutions to protect Chinese national interests.  
 
Moreover, China’s energy strategy does not completely depart from bilateralism, which 
remains a major component. Actually, in both Energy Policy White Papers in 2007 and 
2012, the Chinese authorities did not rule out a bilateral approach in energy 
cooperation. 322  In other words, China planned to use multilateralism together with 
bilateralism in its energy strategy. A multilateral approach even becomes a cover for 
China’s bilateral energy diplomacy on some occasions. It is used to gain benefit from 
the current liberal system. Blanchard points out that “national interests seem to explain 
much of China’s devotion to multilateralism or, where relevant, the lack thereof.”323 
 
                                               
319
 Interview with a researcher from a CNOC, Beijing, 8 August 2014. Interview with a former 
officer of IEA, Beijing, 18 November 2013, Interview with an Regional coordinator at Energy 
Charter. Beijing, 3 September 2014, Interview with a vice-division head of PRC NEA, Beijing, 
15 November 2014. 
320
 Interview with a senior officer of an international energy organization, 15 November 2014. 
321
 Interview with a former manager of a CNOC, Beijing, 28 March 2013. Interview with Xu 
Qinhua, Beijing, 28 March 2013. 
322
 PRC State Council. 2007. op. cit., PRC NDRC. 2012. op. cit. 
323
 Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. 2008. “Harmonious World and China’s Foreign Economic Policy: 
Features, Implications, and Challenges.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 13(2):165–192. 
89 
 
If China were reluctant to join international energy frameworks, then it would be 
necessary to investigate the Chinese perception towards the consequence of 
remaining outside such frameworks. 53 interviewees are consistent in that, if condition 
allows, in general, Chinese authorities prefer a bilateral approach above a multilateral 
one in international energy cooperation. Another common viewpoint shared by the 
interviewees is that China should follow its own path rather than the Western one. One 
interviewee argued that the West does not understand China, and hence should 
neither criticize China’s path nor force China to follow the Western way (global energy 
governance). 324  Although a few interviews emphasise the importance of China’s 
participation in global energy governance and the need to learn to play the “game of 
multilateralsim”, Chinese authorities have a strong preference for bilateral approach in 
international energy cooperation. 
 
A Chinese senior officer, who was responsible for coordination work with international 
energy organizations in the past two decades, explicitly claimed that China is feeling 
very comfortable in not joining international energy organizations and thinks that there 
is no urgent need join them. However, the same person asserted that China has 
already contributed a lot to multilateral energy cooperation and one should not be too 
critical of China’s attitude towards global energy governance. 325  This contradiction 
raises the questions of whether Chinese elites share the same understanding of global 
energy governance and how China understands its own contribution to global energy 
governance. 
 
Regarding the first question, how Chinese leaders literally understand international or 
multilateral cooperation might occasionally be different from the Western understanding 
and hence results in a “gap of knowledge.”326 According to the interviews conducted for 
this thesis, almost one third327 of the interviewees affiliated to China’s government, 
energy companies and think tanks misunderstood multilateralism by presuming that 
participation in more than one international bilateral cooperation was equivalent to 
multilateral cooperation. In other words, they thought that if China established three 
separate bilateral cooperative relationships with for example South Korea, Nigeria and 
Germany, it was considered as taking part in a multilateral cooperation. Yet, it is 
notable that the definition of multilateralism used to analyse China’s international 
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behaviour should not be based on the above misunderstood version of multilateralism 
among Chinese energy elites. It is because the above interviewees did not reject the 
definition used in this thesis after explanation. Instead, such a careless misperception 
among Chinese energy elites helps explain China’s ineffective multilateral approach 
and the different expectations between China and the West. 
 
Besides, Chinese officers are sent on exchange to international energy organizations, 
such as Energy Charter headquarters, to learn the experience of multilateral energy 
cooperation, but what can be brought back and delivered to the top authorities is often 
limited.328 In most cases, while officers sent abroad to learn about and experience 
multilateral cooperation are not senior enough to make a real difference in policy 
setting, seniors who are in such a position are reluctant to change the tradition of a 
bilateral approach. Comparatively speaking, the circle of Chinese academia and 
energy elites has a diverse understanding of global energy governance or 
multilateralism and therefore lacks a common consensus towards any further 
discussion.329 
 
Regarding the second question, China’s lack of full participation in the international 
energy organizations does not mean that China is isolated from global energy 
governance or multilateral energy cooperation. Actually, China is one of the most active 
participants in global energy governance via IEA among all other non-members.330 In 
the process of breaking the traditional pattern, China needs to find a niche and an entry 
point to participate in global energy governance. Since the current global energy 
governance system is diversified and multilevel, China should join international 
organizations at different levels or set up mechanisms of cooperation with such 
organizations.331  
 
China has not closed its doors to global energy governance, particularly in regions 
where there is an emergence of multilateral energy relations in areas such as energy 
markets, gas and oil pipeline systems, cross-border electricity transmission grids and 
technology transfer. For example, CNOCs would show more interest in the function of 
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) because they are keenly aware of the multinational 
pipeline risks in Central Asia, which could be potentially reduced by the Treaty.332 
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Therefore, approaching oil companies may form a way in for ECT membership 
expansion into China. Although China prefers bilateralism, it may have to turn to the 
ECT once it realizes that the risk-management of its Central Asia pipeline project relies 
on multilateralism. 333  Instead of joining an existing international framework, China 
would prefer the establishment of a regional international energy institute to manage its 
energy problems, and the ECT is an international framework that China could learn 
from.334  
 
The above sections have studied the rationales behind the two Chinese energy policy 
paradigms. More importantly, they have analysed China’s view of global energy 
governance, particularly the obstacles China is facing in joining international energy 
organizations. Based on these analyses, the next three chapters move to case studies 
of China’s multilateral or regional energy cooperation with Central Asia, the EU and 
Africa respectively. By looking into China’s approach to energy cooperation in different 
cases, the following chapters attempt to answer if such forms of cooperation in each 
case could reflect a policy paradigm change in China’s energy security approach 
towards global energy governance and what the reasons and causes of the policy 
transition, or lack thereof, in China’s energy security are.  
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has conducted a comprehensive study on China’s energy security by 
exploring its historical background, governing structure, key actors, strategy, policy-
making process and rationale. For decades, China has been trying to set up a proper 
institutional framework to manage its energy sector, but there is limited achievement 
even after a number of reformations. Involving over 20 ministries, government agencies 
and national oil companies in the governance of the energy sector, China’s energy 
administration system remained in a fragmented form because of constant changes, 
overlapping duties, decentralization and bureaucratic ineffectiveness. Traditionally, the 
concept of Chinese energy security has been linked closely with strategic and 
geopolitical considerations. It is also essentially equated to oil security because of its 
increasing reliance on ‘‘foreign oil’’ and desire for self-sufficiency. Key concepts of 
Chinese energy security include the mentality of self-reliance from 1949 to 1992, the 
supply-oriented concept of energy from 1993 to 2002 and the concept of source 
opening up and flow regulating from 2002 to now. Since the late 1990s, Chinese 
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energy security has emphasized a “going out” policy in its overseas energy strategy. 
International energy cooperation is considered as a means to the realization of China’s 
energy security. The above discussions have laid the foundation for and provide 
explanation in further investigation of different case studies in the following chapters.  
 
This section has also outlined the rationales underpinning the two policy paradigms of 
China’s energy security, namely the paradigm of energy diplomacy and the paradigm 
of global energy governance, in the early 21st century. More importantly, it pointed out 
2007 as the watershed between the two paradigms. In sum, the policy paradigm of 
China’s “going out” energy diplomacy is underpinned by bilateralism. The motto of 
China’s energy diplomacy during that time could be summed up as “going out and 
bringing in” based on bilateral energy cooperation. Multilateral cooperation in regard to 
international energy security was first discussed by the Chinese authorities in the  
White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2007. The importance of this was addressed again 
in China’s Energy Policy (2007) White Paper, the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 
2008 and China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper and delivered publicly by top 
Chinese leaders in 2011 and 2012. China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper further 
emphasizes global energy governance. China has also modified its policy instrument 
from a traditional bilateral approach to a multilateral one, paving the way for a policy 
paradigm regarding global energy governance. In sum, multilateralism underpins the 
policy paradigms of China’s global energy governance. These factual and ideological 
discussions narrow down the broader conceptual framework to one with China’s 
characteristics for analysis in the case studies.  
 
Top Chinese leaders’ attitude towards global energy governance or a multilateral form 
of energy cooperation is complicated. If condition allows, Chinese authorities have a 
strong preference for bilateral approach in international energy cooperation. Yet, as 
discussed in 3.2, although China appears hesitant and cautious in joining a global 
energy governance, there is a change in the Chinese understanding of energy and 
energy security from a merely bilateral approach to a multilateral one, as reflected in 
China’s official energy documents. 
 
By using a five level of paradigm shift theory proposed in Chapter 2, the following three 
empirical chapters continue the discussion with case studies on China’s energy 
security in Central Asia, the EU and Africa. China’s stance towards multilateral 
relationships in energy cooperation as well as its energy policy transition from a 
bilateral approach to a multilateral approach in different periods, with 2007 as a 
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Chapter 4 - China–Central Asia Energy Cooperation 
 
Energy cooperation plays an important role in China’s relationship with Central Asia in 
the 21st century. Two key elements in their energy cooperation are the transnational 
pipeline projects and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). They do not 
merely indicate the development and changes in the energy cooperation mechanism 
between China and Central Asia; they also reveal the rationales underpinning Chinese 
energy security in the region. By studying the case of Chinese–Central Asian energy 
cooperation, this chapter aims to answer the question of whether China’s energy 
security had undergone a policy transition which has resulted in a paradigm shift away 
from the “going out” energy diplomacy paradigm to the global energy governance 
paradigm during Hu Jintao’s era. 
 
This chapter first introduces the background of China and Central Asia’s energy 
relationship and the foundation of their cooperation. It then commences with a review 
of China’s energy diplomacy towards Central Asia as well as the ideas and rationales 
behind it. This is followed by an overview of the mechanisms which underpin energy 
cooperation between China and Central Asia in terms of projects, specifically oil and 
gas pipelines and multilateral platforms, and in particular the SCO. The above sections 
lay the foundation for analysis of the paradigm shift of China’s energy strategy, which is 
fully developed in the next section. This section includes a discussion of the impact of 
the development of the China–Central Asia transnational pipeline and the SCO in 
China’s energy security strategy in Central Asia. The last section of this chapter 
examines whether there is a policy paradigm shift in China’s energy cooperation with 
Central Asia by applying the framework of five levels of energy policy aspects against 
which change can be measured. The discussions in the last two sections are based on 
a systematic analysis of official documents and communications and original primary 
data collected from interviews with senior Chinese energy experts who are involved in 
or have witnessed the China–Central Asia energy cooperation. The method employed 
to analyse Chinese energy security in this chapter is original and departs from existing 
works.  
 
4.1 The Foundation of the China–Central Asia Cooperation 
 
The Central Asia region is located in Central Eurasia, and includes the five countries of 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Not only linked by 
mountains and rivers, China and Central Asia also have the historical origin of the 
ancient “Silk Road”. Since modern times, despite the different social systems, 
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ideologies and wide gap in national power, China has always sought mutual support 
and multi-cooperation based on a good-neighbourly relationship with Central Asia.335 
The two sides have solid foundations in the oil and gas resource field and have carried 
out extensive cooperation and explored many cooperation models.  
 
Adjacent to the Caspian Sea, which is rich in energy reserves, the Central Asia region 
is known as the “new world of energy”.336 Since independence from the Soviet Union, 
countries within the region have all made the resource industry their primary one, 
promoting the fast development of the oil and gas industry. Since the abundant 
production of oil and gas in Central Asia is in stark contrast with their limited oil and gas 
consumption ability, the region has a large amount of surplus oil and gas available for 
export. Although oil and gas reserves are unevenly distributed across the five countries 
in the region, 337  the export quantity of oil and gas resources in Central Asia has 
continued to rise in recent years, with an increase in oil exports from 31.7 million tons 
in 2001 to 74 million tons in 2012, and in the natural gas export volume from 37.3 
billion m3 in 2001 to 60.3 billion m3 in 2012. 338  So Central Asia is increasingly 
becoming an important driving force to change the global energy trade pattern. 
 
Since the reform and “opening up” of over 30 years ago, China’s economy has 
achieved rapid development, and correspondingly the consumption of oil and gas 
resources is also increasing. After 1993, when China became a net oil importer, the net 
import of oil increased year by year, reaching 271 million tons in 2012.339 Dependence 
on foreign oil also rose. Following 2009, when China exceeded the internationally 
recognized “security line” of 50% for the first time, it rose above this line for four 
consecutive years and is increasing fast.340  
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Compared to the oil resources, China’s gas production is more abundant, with some 
remaining gas available for export. However, from 2007, when China became a net 
importer of natural gas for the first time, net import increased rapidly, reaching 36.6 
billion m3 in 2012;341 at the same time, China’s external dependence on natural gas 
also rose exponentially from only 1.84% in 2007 to a new record of 25.45% in 2012.342 
The complementary pattern of oil and gas resources in China and Central Asia makes 
it possible for the two sides to cooperate. Moreover, the necessity to diversify its 
energy suppliers has determined the reorientation of China’s foreign energy policy 
towards Central Asia. Carrying out oil and gas cooperation also conforms to the 
common interests of both sides. All these factors have laid a solid foundation for 
cooperation between the two sides. Here China has the possibility of securing its 
energy imports from extraction to terminal, through continental pipelines. 
 
 
4.2 China’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy in Central Asia  
 
The cooperation of China and Central Asia in relation to energy started in the early 
1990s. The China–Central Asia energy relationship can be viewed through the broader 
picture of the China–Central Asia relationship, which started as a strategic partnership. 
Since the energy interdependence continues to strengthen, diplomacy has become an 
important means to promote energy cooperation. To ensure a reliable supply of oil in 
Central Asia, China’s top leaders strengthen relations with Central Asia particularly in 
the field of energy. 
 
When discussing the considerations of China in Central Asia, there are economic and 
political factors to take into account. The layout can be divided into bilateral and 
multilateral levels. In terms of layout considerations, China has striven to promote oil 
source supply in Central Asia. Regarding economic factors, the primary objective is to 
meet the growing domestic demand for oil in order to maintain sustainable 
development of the economy, while political factors are related to national security and 
geopolitics. If China aims to maintain rapid economic development, a stable and 
peaceful external environment is necessary,343 especially relating to the border issue 
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and regional security. The US troops in Central Asia, terrorism, separatism, extremism 
and other issues are all distracting and worrying China.  
 
In terms of the levels of layout, China, as a neighbouring country of Central Asia, 
naturally pays great attention to cooperation with the region. To further develop energy 
relations with Central Asia, China is committed to promoting bilateral and multilateral 
regional cooperation. In bilateral cooperation, China attaches importance to developing 
economic, trade and security relations with the countries in Central Asia and enhancing 
their oil security interests through the development of bilateral relations. In addition, 
multilateral cooperation aims for regional economic and security integration in the 
framework of the SCO. 
 
4.2.1 China’s Diplomatic Principles regarding Central Asia 
At present, China adheres to the neighbouring foreign policy of creating an “amicable, 
secure and prosperous neighbourhood” 344  and positively develops friendly bilateral 
relations with the Central Asian countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided 
China with an opportunity in Central Asia. On the diplomatic stage, in December 1991, 
China acknowledged the independent status of the Central Asian countries, and since 
the beginning of January 1992 China has continued to establish diplomatic relations 
with the Central Asian countries (Table 1).345 After establishing bilateral consultation 
with the Central Asian countries, China agreed with Russia’s proposal of a border 
cooperation on a multilateral basis. In late 1992, the “4+1 formula” – a working group 
comprised of including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan plus China – 
was set up. Under the Shanghai Five group, China further signed agreements 346 
promoting good neighbourhood relations, friendship and cooperation with Russia 
(2001), Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (2005), as well as a strategic partnership with 
Kazakhstan (2005), and agreements on border demarcation with Kazakhstan (2002), 
Kyrgyzstan (1996, 1999) and Tajikistan (2002). 
 
Table 4.1: Dates when China Established Diplomatic Relations with Central Asian 
Countries  
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Kazakhstan 3 January 1992 
Kyrgyzstan 5 January 1992 
Uzbekistan 3 January 1992 
Turkmenistan  6 January 1992 
Tajikistan  4 January 1992  
Sources: Website of Chinese MFA 
 
In April 1994, when China’s Premier Li Peng visited Central Asia, he put forward the 
four diplomatic principles347 to Central Asian countries: first, adhere to the principle of 
good-neighbourly relations and peaceful coexistence; second, expand mutually 
beneficial cooperation and promote common prosperity; third, respect the choice of 
people in all countries and never interfere in their internal affairs; and fourth, respect 
independent sovereignty and promote regional stability. In the late 1990s, China was 
concerned with new threats to its western borders from the intensifying of the Uyghur 
separatism in Xinjiang and the instability in Afghanistan. As a response, China 
increased the measure of security in the region and got the support of the Central 
Asian countries, inclusively within the Shanghai Five.  
 
The anti-terrorist campaign of the US in Afghanistan from 2001 complicated the 
prospect of China’s economic expansion in Central Asia and, more importantly, its twin 
concerns of its own sovereignty and control of Xinjiang.348 On 15 June 2001, China 
obtained the Convention on the Fight against Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism in 
the SCO to transfer military resources and equipment to its neighbours and to launched 
joint exercises. Geopolitically speaking, China did not want to be contained by the 
increasing power of the US and its alignment with India and Japan in Central Asia.349 
Consequently, China promoted the SCO and enhanced economic cooperation with the 
Central Asian countries.  
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In 2004, when China’s President Hu Jintao visited Uzbekistan, he further proposed four 
suggestions based on the deepening relations between China and Central Asia:350  
To strengthen the friendly neighbourhood interaction and enhance political mutual trust, 
and on the important issues related to national sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
national dignity, maintain a good-neighbourly and cooperative relationship;  
To strengthen security cooperation, maintain regional stability and jointly combat 
extremism, terrorism, separatism and other factors that would destabilize the region;  
To insist on mutual benefits and promote pragmatic cooperation, expanding mutual 
investment, promoting energy and transportation cooperation, and adjusting trade 
structure to make it conform to the development of multilateral economic cooperation; 
and  
To expand cultural exchanges and consolidate traditional friendship, as well as support 
and encourage bilateral cultural, media, academic, sightseeing and social exchange 
and strengthen cooperation.351 
 
4.2.2 China’s Energy Diplomacy regarding Central Asia 
Central Asia has been one of China’s key targets in its energy diplomacy strategy. 
China has been involved in the energy geopolitics of Central Asia through political, 
military and financial instruments. The Chinese government supports the investment of 
its CNOCs in Central Asia bilaterally and multilaterally in at least four ways.  
 
(1) Leaders pay frequent visits to the Central Asia region  
In energy diplomacy, relevant diplomatic conferences are always used to promote the 
signing of energy cooperation agreements.352 Since establishing diplomatic relations 
with the Central Asian countries, China has been committed to developing friendly and 
cooperative partnerships. China has agreements of strategic partnership with Central 
Asian countries. It supported Kazakhstan to join the WTO and sustained Uzbekistan in 
the Andijan episode.353  
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Chinese leaders pay frequent visits to Central Asian countries, and the exchange of 
high-level officials has backed up various energy deals that the Chinese have pursued 
to obtain long-term agreements. Besides the president, other high-level officials such 
as the vice president, premier and vice premier, and minister of foreign affairs have all 
paid intensive visits to Central Asia. For example, two presidents, Jiang Zemin and Hu 
Jintao, visited Central Asian countries almost every two years, and in all the visits, 
Kazakhstan was visited the most frequently. 354  Therefore, during high-level visits, 
China often takes the opportunity to discuss cooperation issues and sign important 
agreements, thus enhancing bilateral relations and laying the foundation for China’s oil 
cooperation with Central Asia.  
 
For example, in 2003, after Hu Jintao became the president, his first visit was to 
Kazakhstan. The two sides issued a joint statement announcing the strengthening of oil 
and natural gas cooperation and signed an agreement to jointly develop the China–
Kazakhstan oil pipeline.355 Moreover, take China’s visit to Turkmenistan as an example. 
In return, during the visit to China of Kazakhstan’s president, Nazarbayev, in February 
2011, China and Kazakhstan signed several agreements concerning cooperation on 
energy. 356  For example, the Development Bank of Kazakhstan signed a loan 
agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China on the joint infrastructure construction. 
KazMunaiGaz (KMG) and CNPC signed an agreement in principle regarding 
cooperation on the Urikhtau project.357 Kazphosphate signed a framework agreement 
with Sinochem on strategic cooperation, etc.358 
 
In 1994, when Premier Li Peng visited Turkmenistan, he promoted cooperation 
between CNPC and the Turkmen Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas and signed the oil 
and gas cooperation letter of intent. To deepen the energy cooperation of the two 
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countries, in early July 2000 President Jiang Zemin visited Turkmenistan and promoted 
the signing of the oil and gas cooperation memorandum. 359  As for China and 
Uzbekistan, in 2004 Hu Jintao visited Uzbekistan and contributed to the signing of the 
oil and gas mutual cooperation agreement between CNPC and Uzbekistan National Oil 
and Gas Company, enhancing the oil cooperation between the two countries. 
 
(2) Strengthening bilateral economic and trade relations  
In 1994, when Premier Li Peng visited four countries in Central Asia, in addition to the 
basic diplomatic principles regarding Central Asia, he also proposed six points focusing 
on the bilateral economic and trade relations:360 (1) adhere to equality and mutual 
interest principles and follow the economic principles; (2) diversify cooperation forms; 
(3) make full use of local resources; (4) improve transport conditions and construct the 
“New Silk Road”; (5) provide financial assistance to the Central Asian countries; and (6) 
develop multilateral cooperation and promote common development. To implement the 
above points, China’s economic and trade activities in Central Asia focused on trade, 
investment and providing loans. Generally, since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1992, China’s trade volume with Central Asian countries shows a growing 
trend. Especially in recent years, the trade volume continues to create new records.  
 
Currently, Kazakhstan is still C'hina’s most important trading partner in Central Asia. In 
1992, the total trade volume was $ 369.1 million. In 1999, it exceeded $ 1 billion for the 
first time and amounted to $ 1.1 billion. Then it increased year by year and totalled $ 
3.2 billion in 2003. In 2005, the bilateral trade volume was recorded at $ 6.8 billion, of 
which China enjoyed $ 1 billion trade surplus. The economic interaction between China 
and the Central Asian states has grown rapidly. Between 2001 and 2005,361 China’s 
trade grew by 429% in Kazakhstan, 718% in Kyrgyzstan, 1,368% in Tajikistan and 
1,067% in Uzbekistan. In the same year,362 China was the fourth-largest exporter to 
Kazakhstan (9.9%) and the second-largest importer (15.4%). Furthermore, China was 
Kyrgyzstan’s third-largest exporter (12%) and the largest importer (26.3%), and 
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Uzbekistan’s second-largest exporter (14.7%) and the sixth-largest importer (5.8%). 
The Central Asian states export mainly raw materials to China,363 such as energy 
(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), metals (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and textiles 
(Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).  
 
As seen from the trade structure between China and Central Asia, the two sides have 
strong economic complementarity. Central Asia exports energy resources to China and 
China exports customer goods to Central Asia, while China mainly invests in the 
energy industry in Central Asia. In short, China intends to obtain necessary energy by 
strengthening its economic and trade ties with Central Asian countries.364 
 
(3) The legal basis intergovernmental agreement 
China attaches great importance to friendly cooperation with Central Asian countries. 
Together they have signed plenty of intergovernmental cooperation agreements in the 
fields of energy, economy and trade, culture and education, etc. In the field of energy, 
China and Central Asian countries have already signed some guiding agreements, 
such as joint declaration, intergovernmental economic and trade agreements, and 
other agreements that concern concessional loans and investment in energy. Other 
specific agreements China has signed with Central Asian countries on energy 
cooperation are: 
 
Table 4.2: Energy Agreements China signed with Central Asian countries 









Agreement on Oil and Natural Gas Cooperation 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Oil and 
Gas Cooperation 
Agreement on Geological and Mineral Cooperation 
(altogether eight agreements) 
Outlook on Economic Cooperation between the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
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China–Kyrgyzstan Energy Cooperation Agreement 
Outlines of China–Kyrgyzstan Cooperation, 2004–
2014 




Letter of Intent on the Cooperation between CNPC 
and Turkmenistan Natural Gas Department 
Memorandum of Understanding on Oil and Gas 
Cooperation between CNPC and Turkmenistan 
Natural Gas Department 
Uzbekistan 6/2004 Agreement on Mutual Beneficial Cooperation in Oil 
and Gas between CNPC and Uzbekistan National 
Petroleum Corporation, etc. 
Source: Zhang, Ning. 2009. “Central Asia Energy and the Game between Major 
Economies”, Changchun Press, pp. 229–230. 
 
(4) Multilateral platforms 
Although China preferred the bilateral approach in its energy investments in Central 
Asia, it is also involved in multilateral platforms such as the SCO to build mutual trust 
with other Central Asian countries and maintain its influence in the region: “The 
purposes of the SCO are: strengthening mutual trust and good-neighbourly friendship 
among the member states; encouraging effective cooperation among the member 
states in political, economic and trade, scientific and technological, cultural, educational, 
energy, communications, environment and other fields; devoting themselves jointly to 
preserving and safeguarding regional peace, security and stability; and establishing a 
democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order.”365  
 
In order to retain regional security for its economic expansion, China also provides 
military support to Central Asian countries through conventional arms transfers, training 
and joint military exercises, especially with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.366 Within the 
SCO, common military exercises took place in October 2002, August 2003, August 
2006, September 2007, etc. 367  Chinese financial support was represented by 
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investments in a variety of local sectors, aid packages and loans with low interest rates, 
offered by the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank. Other than 
oil and gas sectors, CNOC also made investments in the hydroelectricity sector, 
mineral industry (gold, aluminium and uranium) and infrastructure sector (roads, 
tunnels and railways) in Central Asia. China’s energy diplomacy via multilateral 
platforms in Central Asia is discussed in the following sections.  
 
4.3 Energy Cooperation Mechanism between China and Central Asia 
 
As the energy initiative progresses with official promotion, China and Central Asia have 
by now preliminarily established a structured cooperation mechanism. Such a 
mechanism involves joint energy projects between the two big powers in both bilateral 
and multilateral approaches. The Central Asia–China transnational pipeline and SCO 
are the main national channels facilitating China–Central Asia energy cooperation. 
 
4.3.1 Oil and Gas Resource Cooperation between China and Central Asia 
At present, the oil and gas cooperation between China and Central Asia mainly 
includes resource exploitation and the construction of transportation pipelines, and the 
cooperating countries are mainly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since the 
proposal of the “going out” strategy in the 1990s, China has actively participated in the 
investment in and development of international oil, and Central Asia is one of the key 
strategic areas.368 Since China’s oil companies are state-owned enterprises, they can 
cooperate fully with the government’s policies. 369  CNPC and Sinopec have been 
performing actively in obtaining the operation rights of overseas companies.370 Under 
the guidance of the government, China’s cooperation operating practices with Central 
Asia in energy mainly comprise: (1) equity merger and acquisition; (2) building 
pipelines; and (3) new energy cooperation. The key work is to participate in 
constructing a relative oil source infrastructure and oil and gas pipelines for continent 
entrance, seeking to diversify the source of oil through investment. 
 
4.3.1.1 Cooperation in Equity Merger and Acquisition 
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The CNOCs arrived late in the Central Asian energy market, but they attempted to 
develop a methodical strategy of acquisitions. China has actively participated in 
exploring and developing oil and gas resources in Central Asia, especially in 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and CNPC is the key player. 
 
In June 1997, CNPC and the Kazakhstan government signed an agreement for the 
acquisition of 60.3% stock of AktobeMunaiGas.371 It obtained a 20-year user licence for 
the Zhanazhol gas site and the Kenkiyak oil site. Since 2002, China has made a variety 
of other acquisitions in Kazakhstan. In 2002, CNPC bought 50% of Salejan field in 
Kazakhstan. 372  In June 2003, according to the agreement of CNPC to expand 
investment in Kazakhstan, CNPC acquired another 25.12% stake of the 
AktobeMunaiGas with $ 150 million, thus capturing 85.6% stock of the Aktyubinsk 
field.373 In August 2003, CNPC first bought 35% stock of the North Buzachi oil and gas 
field from the Nimir Petroleum Company of Saudi Arabia374, and then acquired the 
remaining 65% from Chevron of the US in October the same year. 375  The North 
Buzachi oil field, located in Western Kazakhstan, became the first overseas oil field that 
was 100% held by CNPC.376  
 
In December 2004, CNPC acquired 100% equity of the ADM oil stock company and 
renamed it CNPC International ADM Co., Ltd. This company owned the exploration 
licence for Aris and Brinov exploration blocks with recoverable reserves of about 10.42 
million tons.377 In the same month, CNPC completed another acquisition in Central Asia, 
purchasing 50% stock of KAM Company’s Konys and Bektas oil fields in Kazakhstan 
by sharing the interests with Zhenhua Oil Company Limited. The recoverable reserve 
of the oil field is 21.64 million tons.378 In 2005, CNPC acquired PetroKazakhstan Oil 
Company for the total price of $ 4.18 billion. Through the acquisition, CNPC owns a 
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second overseas refinery and made breakthrough in their oil and gas exploration.379 In 
the same year, CNPC together with CNOOC signed a joint agreement with 
KazMunayGas, a Kazakh national oil and gas company, for exploitation in Darkhan oil 
field in the Caspian Sea.380  
 
In late 2007, CNPC signed an agreement with KazMunayGas to export 5 bcm of gas 
annually to China. Both parties confirmed the construction of the Kazakhstan–China 
gas pipeline which became part of the great Sino–Central Asia gas pipeline.381 In April 
2009, CNPC and KazMunayGas purchased MangistauMunaiGas for $ 3.3 billion and 
eventually acquired 100% of MangistauMunaiGas shares in the same year. In this 
purchase, CNPC extended a $ 5-billion line of credit to KazMunayGas.382  
 
On the other hand, another CNOC, Sinopec, acquired the American First International 
Oil Company (FIOC) in 2004 for around $ 160 million. Such an acquisition allowed 
Sinopec to access the user licences of small fields like Begaidar, Fedorov, 
Mezhdurechensk, Sagiz and Sazankurak.383 Yet, CNOCs’ acquisitions in Central Asia 
have not always been successful. CNPC and Sinopec failed in their bid for British 
Gas’s 16.67% stake in Agip KCO International Consortium in 2005. Participation by 
CNOC was refused by the other members of the consortium, including Agip, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalFinaElf.384  
 
CNOC’s energy investment is not limited to Kazakhstan. In 1992, CNPC and Mitsubishi 
proposed the gas export from Turkmenistan to China. They agreed to conduct a 
feasibility study together with Exxon, which was completed in 1996.385 In 2004, China 
Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation and TurkmenGas signed a $ 
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14.5-million contract regarding equipment supply and, two years later, another 
agreement about the delivery of 30 bcm of Turkmen gas to China in 2009.386 CNPC 
further signed a production agreement in 2007 in Bagtyyarlyk field in eastern 
Turkmenistan as well as a development contract in Turkmenistan’s South Yolotan 
onshore gas field. These deals were announced in June 2009.387  
 
In Uzbekistan, CNPC obtained participation in Uzen oil field in 1997, but it withdrew 
from the project in 1999.388 In 2003, CNPC entered the oil development market of 
Uzbekistan, and in the same year, the Petroleum Logging Co., Ltd of CNPC took over 
the exploratory operation of Kokedumalak oil field in Uzbekistan. During the visit of 
China’s President Hu Jintao to Uzbekistan in June 2004, CNPC and Uzbekneftegaz 
concluded several oil and gas contracts. In June 2006, CNPC and Uzbekneftegaz 
signed an oil and gas exploration agreement in which CNPC would drill 27 exploration 
wells in Uzbekistan by 2011.389  
 
In August of the same year, CNPC signed another two contracts with Uzbekneftegaz to 
explore and develop natural gas deposits in the Aral Sea.390 After the discovery of oil 
and gas resources, the two sides would form joint ventures (each holding 50% of 
shares) to further explore oil and gas fields. In addition, in July 2005, Sinopec signed a 
memorandum of cooperation with the Ukrainian national Oil and Gas Company and 
established a joint venture to work together on exploration and development 
programmes in Andizhan oil field in Uzbekistan.391 Furthermore, in October 2008, the 
two companies signed a cooperation agreement to develop a joint venture in the 
Mingbulak oil field.392 The cooperation between CNPC and Uzbekneftegaz extended 
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via a framework agreement on the purchase of 10 bcm per year of natural gas in June 
2010. 
 
4.3.1.2 Cooperation in Constructing Oil and Gas Transportation Pipelines  
The cooperation between China and Central Asia in constructing oil and gas 
transportation pipelines mainly includes the construction of the Kazakhstan-China oil 
pipeline and the Central Asia–China gas pipeline.  
 
(1) Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline 
The Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline was developed by CNPC and the Kazakh oil 
company KazMunayGas.393 Currently capacity of the pipeline is at 14 million tons per 
year, and it could reach nominal capacity of 20 million tons per year in 2014.394 The 
idea of an oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and China was launched in 1993 and was 
agreed by CNPC and KazMunayGas in 1997 when both parties started energy 
cooperation. The two parties signed the memorandum of understanding to build an 
eastward oil pipeline to China with an estimated cost of $ 3.5 billion. The Chinese side 
postponed the construction due to oil prices and the competition from the Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan project. Yet, the first visit of China’s President Hu Jintao to Kazakhstan in June 
2003 renewed China’s momentum in building the oil pipeline395 because of the increase 
of Kazakhstan’s oil production, the increase of world oil prices and the Angarsk failure.  
 
Started in September 2004, this 2,228-km-long pipeline stretches from the oil city 
Atyrau in the western part of Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China’s Xinjiang Province at 
the border of the two countries.396 The Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline is supplied from 
the Aktobe region’s oil fields and Kashagan field in Kazakhstan.397 The first phase of 
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the Kenkiyak-Atyrau pipeline, originally in Kazakhstan, was officially put into operation 
in March 2003 with a length of 448 km and the design stipulating an oil transportation 
capacity of 6 million tons/year; the second phase of the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline 
connecting China’s Xinjiang Province was started in September 2004 and put into 
commercial operation in July 2006 with a length of 965 km and the design stipulating 
an oil transportation capacity of 10 million tons/year; the third phase of the Kenkiyak–
Atasu pipeline was constructed in May 2008 and put into commercial operation in 
October 2009 with a length of 1,344 km and the design stipulating an oil transportation 
capacity of 10 million tons/year.398  
 
The above phases jointly were built and are operated by both Chinese and Kazakh 
parties. The Atasu–Alashankou section of the pipeline, which is near to the Chinese–
Kazakh border, is operated by MunaiTas, a joint venture between CNPC and 
KazMunayGas.399 The Kenkiyak–Kumkol section in Kazakh territory was built and is 
operated by a joint venture between China National Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Development Corporation (CNODC) and KazTransOil JSC.400 At the Chinese end, the 
Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline is connected to Dushanzi District in Xinjiang Province of 
China via the Alashankou–Dushanzi crude oil pipeline. The pipeline was constructed 
and is operated by CNPC and supplies mainly the Dushanzi refinery.401 
 
(2) Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline 
The Central Asia–China gas pipeline is China’s largest overseas natural gas project. It 
was prepared by the Chinese side from 2000, through agreements regarding the 
development of infrastructure and loans with low interest rates.402 The initial proposal 
for this pipeline was presented as the Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline when the 
agreement was signed in June 2003, during China’s President Hu Jintao’s visit to 
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Kazakhstan. 403  The cooperative of CNPC and the KazMunayGaz planned to start 
construction of the Kazakhstan natural gas pipeline in 2008,404 following along the 
Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline. KazMunayGas and CNPC conducted the feasibility 
study in February 2005. The pipeline project between Kazakhstan and China laid the 
foundation for expanding the pipeline network to other Central Asian countries.  
 
In 2006, China and Turkmenistan signed a framework agreement on pipeline 
construction and long-term gas supply. 405  In 2007 the two parties announced that 
Turkmenistan was joining the Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline and a transnational gas 
pipeline would be built to export natural gas to China. 406  Although the energy 
cooperation between China and Turkmenistan started late, it developed fast. In the 
same year, China and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the construction and 
exploitation of the pipeline’s Uzbekistan section.407 The construction of the Turkmen 
section of the pipeline started on the right bank of the Amu Darya in 2007.408 This 
section was built by Stroytransgaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom409 and key contractors 
included China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, China Petroleum Engineering and 
Construction Corporation and Zero-Max.410 This was followed by the start-up of the 
Chinese section in February 2008 and the Uzbek section in June 2008. The Uzbek 
section was built by Asia Trans Gas, which is a joint venture between CNPC and 
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Uzbekneftegaz.411 The Kazakh section was started the latest, in July 2008,412 by Asia 
Gas Pipeline company, a joint venture of CNPC and KazMunayGas, 413  with 
KazStroyService and China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation as 
key contractors.414 
 
The Kazakh section of the pipeline was inaugurated and ventilated in late 2009 during 
China’s President Hu Jintao’s visit to Kazakhstan415 with the leaders of Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Later in 2010, China and Kazakhstan signed an 
agreement on an additional branch line to China from Western Kazakhstan.416 The 
Central Asia–China gas pipeline has dual lines A and B in parallel, each running for 
1,833 km. 417  It starts at the Turkmen–Uzbek border and runs through central 
Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan before reaching China’s northwest region of 
Xinjiang, following the route Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Erdos–Urumqi–
Lanzhou–Xian–Shanghai. Line A became operational in late 2009 and Line B started 
running in 2010.  
 
According to the initial sales and purchase agreement between CNPC and 
Turkmengaz signed in 2007, China could receive 30 bcm/year Turkmen gas via Lines 
A and B for 30 years, supplied via natural gas of 13 bcm/year from the Amu Darya 
project, and natural gas of 17 bcm/year from Turkmengaz State Concern.418 In 2012, 
the construction of Line C of the pipeline, parallel to A and B, was started, and this 
additional line was designed to deliver 25 bcm/year gas to China. Line C is supplied by 
natural gas of 10 bcm, 10 bcm and 5 bcm per year from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
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Kazakhstan, respectively.419 The construction of the fourth pipeline, Line D, started in 
2014. It will receive its gas supply from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan and be 
routed via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to China.420  
 
The Central Asia–China gas pipeline is China’s first and largest cross-border gas 
pipeline. According to CNPC, all four lines of the pipeline network will be able to supply 
China with 85 bcm/year of gas, accounting for at least 40% of China’s total imported 
gas supplies in the next three decades.421 Aside from fostering economic cooperation 
between China and Central Asian countries, the pipeline will also be a source of 
prosperity for the region, promoting the development of and investment in local natural 
gas resources, stimulating the growth of local equipment manufacturing and 
construction industries, and creating employment opportunities.  
 
The China–Central Asia pipelines mentioned above were all connected to China’s 
domestic gas pipeline network, the West–East Gas Pipeline, with the farthest scope to 
the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong and Macao. In summary, 
the construction of transnational oil and gas pipelines, for China, is very consistent with 
the strategic considerations of energy security and reduced dependence on sea 
transport modes. With a total length of almost 10,000 km, the natural gas pipeline 
connecting the two countries passes through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and China, ranking as the world’s longest natural gas pipeline.  
 
4.3.1.3 Cooperation on other energy 
Although China–Central Asia energy cooperation has a key focus in the oil and gas 
sector, it is extended to the other fields of energy. Particularly, China, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan are witnessing a favourable trend in electrical and nuclear power 
cooperation. 
 
China attaches equal importance to the exploration of uranium resources in Central 
Asia and is involved in mutually beneficial cooperation with Kazakhstan in this field. In 
this cooperation, Kazakhstan will be eligible to join the construction of China’s nuclear 
station once China is granted permission to explore uranium mines in Kazakhstan. 
Through such cooperation, Kazakhstan will be able to learn the core technology for 









independent development of their nuclear power. 422  In order to access uranium 
resources, China National Nuclear Corp and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corp 
(CGNPC) would hold 49% of the shares of a uranium company in Kazakhstan, with 
Kazatomprom holding the remaining 51%. In exchange, Kazatomprom would acquire 
the shares of China’s nuclear fuel processing plant or power plants.423 The trade was a 
breakthrough for the seemingly mysterious Chinese nuclear industry, and it marked its 
active strategy in obtaining energy. It is on the Chinese government’s blueprint to 
complete 40 nuclear stations by 2020 to reduce the country’s dependence on coal-
burning electricity generation. 
 
China is also actively carrying out nuclear energy cooperation with Ulba Metallurgic 
Plant, the affiliate of Kazakhstan State Corporation for Atomic Power and Industry and 
a world-famous uranium fuel manufacturer. The powder pellets from Ulba Metallurgic 
Plant are mainly used by nuclear stations and in beryllium, tantalum and niobium 
products. Kazakhstan is devoted to exporting finished uranium fuel and is active in 
nuclear fuel certification.424 Ulba Metallurgic Plant passed the certification in China for 
uranium fuel and uranium powder pellets respectively in September and December 
2010 and began exporting uranium fuel pellets to China in late 2011. The plant planned 
to export two tons of uranium fuel to China per year from 2014 and will gradually 
increase the volume to 200–400 tons from 2020.425 President Nazarbayev’s visit to 
China in February 2011 further expanded the energy cooperation between the two 
countries. During his visit, Kazatomprom and CGNPC signed a memorandum of 
understanding on an industrial investment fund.426 
 
                                               
422
 Qiu, Lin. 2010. “日本为能源向中亚示好 [In English: Japan approach Central Asia for energy]”, 
中亚信息 8: 33–34 
423
 FT. 2007. “中國與哈薩克斯坦達成核能合作協議 [In English: China and Kazakhstan reach 
nuclear capability collaboration agreement]”. Financial Times. 19 Nov. Accessed on 13 
October 2013. http://big5.ftchinese.com/story/001015591?full=y 
424
 Chinese Embassy to Kazakhstan. 2010. “哈萨克完成出口中国铀粉末芯块的认证 [In English: 
Kazakh uranium to complete the export certification Chinese powder slug]” Accessed on 13 




 Chinese Embassy to Kazakhstan. 2011. “纳扎尔巴耶夫总统访华期间中哈签署系列经贸协议 
[In English: President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a series of economic and 




In August 2009, CGNPC and Goskomgeo from Uzbekistan established a joint venture, 
CGN-URC, to explore uranium mines. Two establishers each held 50% of the shares, 
and the venture was scheduled to be put into operation in 2014.427 On 3 November 
2007, during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Uzbekistan, CGN and Uzbekistan’s State 
Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources signed a contract on uranium 
cooperation.428 According to the contract and another agreement on long-term natural 
uranium procurement, which was signed in February 2007, China can purchase 
another 8,000 tons of natural uranium from 2019 to 2028 and cooperate with 
Uzbekistan on exploring sandstone-type or black-shale-type uranium mines.429  
 
4.3.2 China’s Energy Cooperation via the SCO 
The above examples show how China promotes energy cooperation with Central Asian 
countries via a bilateral approach, which leads to energy diplomacy. In contrast, this 
section analyses the case of the SCO, as a platform to promote Sino–Central Asian 
energy cooperation in a multilateral way, which could lead to global energy 
governance. 
 
The SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and military organization which was founded 
in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was transformed from the Shanghai Five grouping which 
was originally created in 1996 by the membership of Uzbekistan with the signing of the 
Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions. The SCO is primarily centred on 
its member nations’ security-related concerns in Central Asia regarding terrorism, 
separatism and extremism. David Kerr identifies three aims of the SCO as “repressing 
transnational radicalism; stabilizing regional regimes and their foreign policy 
orientations; and checking US influence”.430 Since the SCO was founded in 2001, its 
activities in the area of social development of its member states are increasing fast. 
Both energy cooperation and cooperation in other areas of common interest – such as 
politics, trade, national defence, law enforcement, environmental conservation, culture, 
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technology, education, traffic, financial credit and so on – have experienced three 
stages, which include improving the cooperation mechanism, laying down the 
principles and strategies of cooperation and consolidating the basis of cooperation 
through projects.  
 
Yet, the Eurasian organization has been variously criticized by external observers as an 
under-analysed international organization,431 an “OPEC” with nuclear power432 and a 
prospective “Asian NATO” against the US.433 It is also considered to be an ineffectual 
and shallow regional “talk-fest” or a transparent cloak for the maintenance and 
expansion of malignant Chinese influence in Central Asia. 434  However, these 
observations fail to understand the roots of the SCO and the core imperatives of one of 
its key drivers, China. As discussed in previous sections, China’s foreign policy in 
Central Asia is important for China’s energy security, and China’s “westward advance” 
into Central Asia is also determined by its growing need for energy resources.435 This 
section first discusses the progress of the SCO in energy cooperation. 
 
4.3.2.1 The Progress of the SCO regarding Energy Cooperation 
Specifically, in September 2003, the second Prime Ministers’ Meeting of SCO member 
countries was held in Beijing, and the meeting approved the Outline of Multilateral 
Economic and Trade Cooperation among SCO member countries, indicating that SCO 
regional economic cooperation was gradually getting back on track.436 In September 
2004, the third Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting was held in Moscow and 
agreed the Measurement Plan draft of the Outline of Multilateral Economic and Trade 
                                               
431
 Bailes, A.J.K., P. Dunay, P. Guang, and M. Troitskiy. 2007. “The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper 17”. 
432
 Brummer, M. 2007. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Iran: A Power-Full Union.” 
Journal of International Affairs 60(2), 185–198, p. 185. 
433
 Weitz, R. 2006. “Shanghai Summit Fails to Yield NATO-style Defence Agreement.” Jane's 
Intelligence Review 18(8):42, p. 42. 
434
 Blank, S. 2002. “China's Defeats in Central Asia.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 14 Aug;  
Tisdall, S. 2006. “Irresistible Rise of the Dictators' Club.” The Guardian, 6 Jun. 
435
 Li. 2007. op. cit.; Goldstein. op. cit.; Swanstrom. op. cit. 
436
 PRC MFA. 2013. “上海合作组织成员国总理会议 [In English: Shanghai Cooperation 





Cooperation among SCO member countries, which included 11 areas and 127 projects 
in energy.437  
 
In September 2006, the Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting was held in Tashkent, 
the capital of Uzbekistan, and agreed to set up a professional working group aiming to 
promote energy cooperation. In June 2006, Russia’s President Putin delivered a 
speech at the sixth Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in which he 
pointed out that “the SCO has a sufficient organizational and legal infrastructure to 
actively engage in promising economic projects” and “the proposal to create an SCO 
Energy Club is a topical one, as well as expanding cooperation in transport and 
communications”.438   
 
On 16 August 2007, the Council of Heads of State of the SCO meeting was held in 
Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. During the meeting, the heads pointed out that 
economic cooperation within the framework had entered “project demonstration” stage, 
which carries out relevant plans and agreements, implements multi-participation in 
energy, traffic, telecommunication, etc. and gets benefits together from these areas. 
The industrialist committee and banks association of the SCO should play a significant 
role in this process. The heads emphasized the importance of close coordination in the 
energy field and sharing common ground between member countries. The energy 
mechanism of the SCO should be based on the principles of openness to countries and 
organizations that agree with the purposes and tasks of the SCO. Meanwhile, the 
heads noted the importance of taking effective measures to protect the environment 
and to use natural resources rationally.439 
 
On 2 November 2007, the sixth Prime Ministers’ Meeting of SCO member countries 
was held in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. At the meeting, the prime ministers of 
member countries drew particular attention to the outcomes of the SCO Energy 
Ministers’ Meeting which had been held on 29 June in Moscow. They emphasized the 
necessity of close cooperation, reviewed common ground in the energy field and 
discussed the future of energy cooperation, which included contrasting problems of 
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energy strategy between member countries. At the same time, at the meeting Russia’s 
Prime Minister Zubkov pointed out that “energy cooperation is one of the most 
important tasks of the SCO”. He suggested that SCO member countries should make 
active preparation for the SCO Energy Club.440  
 
In May 2008, Russian Federation President Medvedev accepted an invitation from 
China’s President Hu Jintao and paid a state visit to China. During his stay, Medvedev 
expressed that “Russian–Chinese energy cooperation represents a very important 
component of our [the two countries’] business ties”.441 Meanwhile, the two heads of 
state pointed out that China and Russia will continue to “intensively promote 
cooperation in oil and gas”.442 The heads of the two countries believed that developing 
nuclear cooperation should be taken as one of the priorities of bilateral economic 
cooperation. The two sides expressed satisfaction over the cooperation outcome and 
would continue to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation. 443  
 
On 28 August 2008, the eighth Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO 
was held in Dushanbe. The heads of state welcomed “the positive dynamics which had 
appeared in a number of areas of common interest in trade and economic cooperation” 
and emphasized “the creation of favourable trade and investment conditions, 
development of transportation routes and transit potential, modern information and 
telecommunication technologies.”444 Later, on 30 October, the Meeting of the Council of 
Heads of Government (prime ministers) of the SCO Member States was held in 
Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The prime ministers vowed to implement the 
consensus reached at the Dushanbe summit to promote sustainable development of 
multilateral cooperation within the SCO. They agreed to deepen multilateral economic 
and trade cooperation and boost the cooperation in “enhancing energy efficiency, 
developing clean energy, utilising renewable energy and ensuring energy security”. 445 
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In conclusion, from the very beginning, with guidance from heads of state and 
government of member countries, SCO energy cooperation has been implemented by 
relevant departments and enterprises. Therefore, it has achieved a great deal in 
promoting energy cooperation in the last decade.  
 
4.3.2.2 Projects under the SCO 
The energy cooperation between SCO member countries is moving on as planned. In 
September 2009, the second Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting agreed to set up 
a senior commission and a professional working group, which has provided mechanism 
guarantees for the realization of various goals of regional economic cooperation. In 
addition, after rounds of senior commission consultation, the “Measurement Plan” 
drafts of the Outline of Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation among SCO 
member countries were agreed, including 11 areas and 127 projects in trade, 
investment, customs, inspection, traffic, energy and information. At that time, 19 energy 






Table 4.3: Joint Energy Projects of SCO Member States 
Project Participating 
Countries 









2004–2009 Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
Tajik Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade and 
relevant departments of other SCO 
member countries  
Analysis of the 
prospects of energy 
fuel complex 
cooperation for SCO 
member countries 
SCO member countries 2004 Russian Ministry of Industry and 
Energy, Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, Tajik Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade, 
State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Oil and Gas State-
Controlled Companies of 
Uzbekistan and relevant 




Proposals of energy 
cooperation priorities 
and joint plan and 
projects of mutual 
interest 
SCO member countries 2004–2007 Russian Ministry of Industry and 
Energy, Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, Tajik Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade, 
State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Oil and Gas Companies 
of Uzbekistan, Oil and Gas State-
Controlled Companies of 
Uzbekistan and relevant 
departments of other SCO member 
countries 




and regulations of the 
current gas transport 
system 
SCO member countries 2004– 
2006 
Russian Ministry of Energy and 
Industry, Kyrgyzstan’s State Assets 
and Investment Committee, 
Kyrgyzstan’s natural gas company, 
Tajik Ministry of Energy and 
Industry, Oil and Gas State-
Controlled Companies of 
Uzbekistan and relevant 
departments of other SCO member 
countries 
Co-construction of the 






2004–2005 Russian Ministry of Energy and 
Industry, “Russian Unified Power 
System” Company, Kyrgyzstan’s 
State Assets and Investment 
Committee, Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry and relevant 
departments of Russia and China 
Study of the 
possibilities of 
expanding the transport 
capacity of existing 






2005 Kyrgyzstan’s State Assets and 
Investment Committee, 
Kyrgyzstan’s natural gas company 
and relevant departments of China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan 
Hydroelectric Power 
Stations in Kyrgyzstan 
China, Russia and 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
2004–2005 Russian power companies, 
Kyrgyzstan power companies and 
relevant departments of Russia and 
China 
Study of the questions 
about creating 
conditions for mutual 
access to the electricity 
market between SCO 
member countries and 
SCO member countries 2004 Kyrgyzstan power companies, State 
Grid Corporation of Kyrgyzstan, 
State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry and relevant 




transit within them 
countries 
SCO member countries 
participating in the 
development of 500 
220-kilovolt mains in 
Kyrgyzstan and 






2004–2005 State Grid Corporation of 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry and relevant 
departments of Russia and China 
Information exchange 
on the reform process 
of power field markets 
and the development 
prospects of the  power 
industry  
SCO member countries Long- term State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry and relevant 
departments of SCO member 
countries 
SCO member countries 
participating in the bid 
invitation of concession 
of “Nortel” Distribution 





2004–2005 “Kyrgyzstan power companies, Tajik 
Ministry of Energy and Industry and 
relevant departments of China, 





Tajikistan, China and 
Russia 
2005–2010 Tajik Ministry of Energy and Industry 
and relevant departments of China 
and Russia 
To study improvement 
and construction of the 
new existing natural- 
gas transport corridor 
SCO member countries 2004–2010 Oil and gas state-controlled 
companiesof Uzbekistan, Tajik 
Ministry of Energy and Industry and 
relevant departments of SCO 
member countries 
Construction of natural 




Uzbekistan and ending 
at Xinjiang Province, 
China 
SCO member countries 2004–2010 Natural gas transportation company 
of Uzbekistan, oil and gas state-
controlled companies of Uzbekistan, 
Tajik Ministry of Energy and Industry 
and relevant departments of SCO 
member countries 
Studies on drawing up 
investment plans for the 
construction, 
transformation and 
renewal of energy 
projects and the 
SCO member countries 2004–2010 State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry, Kyrgyzstan power 
companies and relevant 








renewable energy to 
obtain sources of 
electricity 
SCO member countries 2004–2010 State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Uzbek Academy of 
Sciences, Ministerial Meeting and 
Technology Center of Uzbekistan, 
Tajik Ministry of Energy and Industry 
and relevant departments of SCO 
member countries 
To take advantage of 
the contracting 
capability of SCO 
member countries to 
initiate reconstruction 
projects of Afghan 
hydropower stations  
SCO member countries Since 2004 State Energy Company of 
Uzbekistan, Tajik Ministry of Energy 
and Industry and relevant 
departments of SCO member 
countries 
To study the 
cooperation possibilities 
among SCO member 
countries in terms of 
jointly exploring and 
developing oil and gas 
fields 
SCO member countries Long-term Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Development Company of 
Uzbekistan, oil and gas state-
controlled companies of Uzbekistan, 
Tajik Ministry of Energy and Industry 
and relevant departments of SCO 
member countries 
Source: Info summarized from news and official website of SCO and Chinese MFA 
 
Between 2004 and 2012, it could be concluded from the SCO that because member 
countries and observer countries have the advantages of geographic position and 
convenient transport, many energy projects have been implemented and do bring 
tangible benefits to relevant countries. They also exchange information on the 
development and implementation of energy strategies and the development of large-
scale energy enterprises. The complement of energy resources promotes the 
development of economy and transport, the construction of infrastructure, the structure 
of energy consumption and the improvement of people’s living standards for all 
member countries. All of the relevant countries have realized that only energy 
cooperation based on mutual benefits can meet the fundamental interests of each 
country.  
 





With increasing cooperation between China and Central Asia in the field of energy, 
several obvious features and obstacles appear. This section analyses these features in 
the framework of five levels of energy policy aspects against which change can be 
measured to answer the question of whether there is a policy paradigm shift from 
bilateral-based energy diplomacy to multilateral-based global energy governance in 
China’s energy cooperation with Central Asia. It is notable that Chapter 3 marked the 
year of 2007 as the watershed in the development of Chinese energy security and 
policy. While the period before 2007 can be regarded as the policy paradigm of energy 
diplomacy relying on bilateralism, the period after can be viewed as the policy 
paradigm of global energy governance reliant on multilateralism.  
 
4.4.1 Policy Goals 
A number of interviewees point out that China–Central Asian relations are increasingly 
defined by a dynamic of economic and political dependency, which can be seen 
through China’s trade relationship with Central Asian countries and its major 
investment in acquiring Central Asian oil and gas.446  Dramatic energy investments 
listed in Section 4.3.1 were the clearest sign that Central Asia figured prominently in 
China’s overall development strategy. However, China’s interests in its energy trade 
relationships with Central Asia go beyond securing the supply of natural resources: in 
other words, desire for energy security in Central Asia encompasses wider political, 
economic and strategic interests.447 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, China’s interests within its relations with Central Asia are 
intimately connected to its diplomacy towards Central Asia, and hence embrace the 
concern about Xinjiang. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China has shown its intent to 
develop greater economic and trade relations with the newly independent Central Asian 
states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, through border trade and 
infrastructural links. Xia Yishan argues that Xinjiang’s potential role is becoming the 
hub connecting China with the Central Asian countries. 448 The key commodities in this 
Silk Road are no longer silk, as in the past, but oil and gas. The oil and gas industry in 
Xinjiang became the pillar industry in the Chinese government’s plan in both opening 
Xinjiang’s economy and establishing the region as a transit route and refinery zone for 
Central Asian oil and gas. Philip Andrews-Speed points out that such an approach 
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ultimately enmeshed China in the wider geopolitical competition for not only access to 
Central Asia’s oil and gas but also greater political and economic influence in the 
region.449  China’s reorientation of its energy strategy toward Central Asia in the early 
1990s was very much a strategic manoeuvre rather than a “market” approach to oil and 
gas resources.450  
 
Therefore, China’s energy diplomacy towards Central Asia is initially underpinned by 
China’s broader diplomatic strategy towards the region whereby China provides 
Central Asia with certain economic or political/security goods. China’s economic and 
security concerns with the Central Asian countries are complementary in that the 
development of their bilateral relations, spurred on by the economic linkages noted 
above and further strengthened by the identification of common interests in the security 
sphere.  
 
Through bilateral relations, the nascent multilateral platform of the Shanghai Five, or 
the subsequent SCO, China has pressured the Central Asian countries to control and 
suppress the activities of separatists within the Uyghur community in the region. 
Indeed, anti-terrorism and anti-separatism is a theme in China’s participation in the 
Shanghai Five and subsequent SCO process. Since 2001, China has successfully 
extradited a significant number of alleged Uyghur “separatists and terrorists” from the 
Central Asian region, Pakistan and Nepal451  by a security mechanism through the 
SCO.452 Yet, there are two major obstacles in the development of a stronger China–
Central Asian relationship, including the lack of adequate infrastructure, and trade 
barriers such as tariffs and visa restrictions.453 These concerns have been clear in 
Chinese policy towards Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with 
Chinese investment in infrastructure both within Xinjiang and in the neighbouring 
Central Asian regions.  
 
Although China’s energy strategy towards Central Asia in the 1990s was very much 
geopolitically characterized, this does not necessarily mean that energy security is 
merely a part of China’s political manoeuvre in the region. In order to feed the growing 
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economy of China, its energy security strategy of diversification and increased 
investment and exploration of its state oil corporations has also continued since 2001. 
Central Asia is one of the key energy cooperation targets, reflected by massive 
developments and activities in this sphere (listed in Section 4.3.1). 
 
More importantly, China realizes that the increasing of oil and gas production in Central 
Asia could be one of the ways out of a combination of energy security challenges it has 
been facing, including the rise of domestic energy demand, an increase in world oil 
prices and the strategic weakness of China’s growing dependency on Middle Eastern 
energy sources.454 This realization is critical for understanding the rationale behind 
China’s energy diplomacy towards Central Asia, because energy cooperation is not just 
part of the medium for achieving China’s diplomatic goal in Xinjiang and Central Asia, 
as discussed above; energy security has risen to the national level, and energy 
diplomacy towards Central Asia has become a channel to relieve China from its energy 
challenge.  
 
Similar to the broader China–Central Asian cooperation, the lack of adequate 
infrastructure and trade barriers455 are the main obstacles in their energy relationship. 
Therefore, since the first visit of China’s President Hu Jintao to Kazakhstan in 2003, 
China has renewed the momentum of energy cooperation with Central Asia, 
particularly oil and gas pipelines.456 More importantly,457 the transnational gas pipeline 
projects announced in 2007 laid the foundation for multilateral energy cooperation 
between China and Central Asian countries. The need, if not crisis, of transnational 
transit management had urged China to look into better energy governance in 
multilateral ways. This also echoes the analysis in Chapter 3 that 2007 was the 
watershed for China’s energy strategy in shifting from a bilateral to a multilateral 
approach.  
 
4.4.2 Policy Instruments 
In order to achieve its policy goal on energy security, China has adopted a variety of 
instruments, mainly joint energy projects and energy diplomacy, on both bilateral and 
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multilateral levels. These instruments are complementary to each other and reveal the 
change in Chinese policy instruments in Central Asia. Based on the existing energy 
cooperation between China and Central Asian countries listed in Section 4.3.1, the 
major cooperation mechanisms of the two sides include the Production Sharing Model, 
Joint Management Model and Technology Service Model. 
 
 
(1) The Production Sharing Model 
The Production Sharing Model is based on the premise that the resource governments 
have the ownership and franchise of oil and gas resources and foreign oil and gas 
companies are responsible for the exploration, development and production costs. 
When it is time to use the resources, these companies negotiate and sign oil and gas 
exploration and development contracts on how to share products with the resource 
governments (or oil and gas companies of resource countries).  
 
Most terms of the Production Sharing Model can be reached through the consultations 
of the two cooperative sides. The main terms include national participation, signing 
fees and various taxes, such as production bonus, mining royalty, income tax, etc. The 
core items are the fiscal and taxation costs related to cost recovery and production 
sharing. 458 The actual operation of this model in the oil and gas fields in Central Asia is 
primarily through the direct investment of foreign oil and gas companies, the 
establishment of consortiums with oil and gas companies of resource countries, the 
signing of production-sharing agreements and participation in the development of one 
or multiple projects. In the oil and gas resources cooperation between China and 
Central Asia, one of the resource development projects belongs to this model: that is 
the oil and gas resource development project of the Aral Sea, which belongs to 
Uzbekistan.459  In the project, China is one member of the “Aral Sea Oil and Gas 
Development Consortium”. 
 
(2) The Joint Management Model 
The Joint Management Model can be divided into two categories: namely, the Joint 
Venture Model and Joint Operation Model. In the Joint Venture Model, national oil and 
gas companies of resource countries and contractors fund and set up a new company 
according to a certain percentage. As an independent legal entity, the new company is 
engaged in oil and gas exploration, development, production, transportation and sales, 
and the two sides bear the risk of operation, share tax liability and share the revenue in 
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accordance with the proportions stated in the contract. 460  Meanwhile, in the Joint 
Operation Model the two sides need not form joint venture companies, but in 
accordance with the joint operation agreement they fund, operate and share risk and 
revenue together. This model is widely applied in the practice of oil and gas resource 
development in Central Asia. In addition, the tax system is adjusted through the mineral 
tax system, and the main categories of taxes include corporate income tax, dividend 
tax, value-added tax, income tax of non-foreign nationals, tax for developing mineral 
resources, crude oil export income tax, excess profit tax, etc.461  
 
In Central Asia, this model is mainly operated through forming joint venture companies, 
transnational mergers and acquisitions, or purchasing shares and joint operations. 
Within the cooperation between China and Central Asia, this model was commonly 
seen, including in the Aktyubinsk Projects cooperated by China and Kazakhstan, the 
Darkhan Block Development Project in the Caspian Sea, the North Buzachi Oil Field 
Project and the five-year oil and gas development project gained by China to explore 
the three basins of Ustyurt, Bukhara-Khiva and Fergana in Uzbekistan in the 
cooperation between China and Uzbekistan.462 
 
(3) The Technology Service Model 
The Technology Service Model, intended to provide service, refers to the cooperation 
in which a party takes their technological knowledge as the carrier to solve specific 
technical problems for the other party. In this model, when the investing country and 
resource country cooperate to develop resources, advanced technology support is 
provided, advanced management experience is brought and the infrastructure to 
develop resources is improved.463  
 
In Central Asia, this model is mainly achieved through providing advanced exploration 
and development technology and constructing oil and gas transportation pipelines. The 
construction of the China and Kazakhstan oil and gas pipeline and the China and 
Turkmenistan natural gas pipeline are examples of this model.464 The main oil and gas 
resource cooperation models of China and Central Asian countries include the 
Production Sharing Model, Joint Operation Model, Technology Service Model and a 
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combination of the three models. The models of China’s cooperation with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are similar to each other but have different 
characteristics due to the different countries’ conditions and development of oil and gas 
industries. Therefore, when carrying out oil and gas resource cooperation, countries 
should choose the most suitable model according to their national conditions.465 
 
The above three cooperation models are crucial to China–Central Asia cooperation as 
they solve the two main obstacles in it and could result in a structural transformation in 
terms of how China approaches Central Asia regarding energy issues. First of all, the 
models reduce the trade barriers regarding taxes and provide technological 
development for the infrastructure linking the two sides, such as transportation 
pipelines. Joint management can also facilitate cooperation between China and 
different countries in the region. Because of cooperation under these models over time, 
the groundwork was well established for the initial proposal of transnational oil and gas 
pipelines from Kazakhstan to China in 2003.466 Section 4.2 has clearly illustrated that 
China relies heavily on a bilateral approach in its energy diplomacy towards Central 
Asia; indeed, 53 interviewees point out that Chinese authorities prefer the bilateral 
approach in China-Central Asian energy cooperation if China could make its own 
choice. Yet, the official announcement of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joining the 
China–Kazakhstan partnership in 2007 marked the moment which brought the China–
Central Asian energy cooperation to another level, from bilateral to multilateral.  
 
This also echoes the analysis in Chapter 3 that 2007 was the watershed for China’s 
energy strategy in shifting from a bilateral to a multilateral approach. A transnational 
pipeline has structurally changed the dynamic of how China approaches Central Asian 
countries. The transnational pipeline effectively creates long-term interdependencies 
among multiple actors, including suppliers, consumers and transit countries. The 
construction of a transnational pipeline requires huge amounts of investment, worth 
tens of billions of dollars of financial capital, and can only be profitable over the course 
of many decades. It also raises considerable political cost and benefits, both in the 
short and long term. The cross-border oil and gas pipelines jointly constructed by China 
and Central Asian countries demonstrate a win-win situation in which the energy 
interests of the countries concerned are well served.467  
 









With respect to the cooperation method, which is the joint construction of the pipeline, it 
is a special method in international economic cooperation. Firstly, even though the 
construction period of the pipeline is long and the cost is high, participants will benefit 
in the long term. Secondly, partners are unlikely to change. The ends of the pipeline are 
located in specific countries or regions, and once the line is confirmed, countries along 
the line are constrained. Thirdly, the cost for quitting is high. It will be a total waste if the 
pipeline is abandoned. As a result, the joint construction is a great challenge to the 
political trust among the cooperating countries. However, such joint construction has 
almost, since the beginning, ruled out the possibility of any alternative. Joint 
construction itself is a commitment from multiple parties to their long-term supply and 
demand and reflects their willingness to establish an interdependent and mutually 
constraining partnership.  
 
The Kazakhstan-China pipeline project may not be economically beneficial but could 
provide safety in terms of geopolitics. Moreover, such cooperation on pipeline 
construction can enhance the political trust between the countries along the line, and 
an overflow effect can be created. The political stability and financial viability of China 
and Central Asia must be weighed and maintained within the context of broader 
international goals and multilateral platforms. 468  In short, China–Central Asia 
cooperation via this transnational pipeline has paved the path for multilateralism in 
regard to policy instruments. 
 
4.4.3 The Physical Structure of Energy Policy 
The SCO was established in 2001 by China, Russia and Central Asian countries. Its 
origin is based on the issues addressed by the Shanghai Five, primarily focused on 
security concerns in Central Asian including terrorism, separatism and extremism. The 
above section points out that the mission of the SCO in its early stages was more 
about security and paid less attention to energy. Because of the proposal, construction 
and operation of the transnational pipeline, the Eurasian organization re-drew the 
attention of Chinese authorities in the mid and late 2000s, who attempted to utilize the 
SCO as a multilateral energy platform to facilitate energy cooperation in the region.  
 
The logic behind managing energy issues via the SCO is similar to that of removing the 
threats of terrorism, separatism and extremism, both in Central Asia and Xinjiang 
through the SCO. In the late 1990s, failing to tackle the transnational terrorism in the 
region alone, China’s motivation for greater regional action was both obvious and 
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pressing, with ongoing incidents of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in 
Xinjiang. 469  China realized it had to expand the security issues addressed by the 
Shanghai Five and produce a further agreement in border areas of common interests, 
which it did via the 1998 joint statement declaring that the member states would not 
“allow their territories to be used for activities undermining the national sovereignty, 
security and social order of any of the five countries”.470 This document also contained 
the “concrete manifestation of the new-type security concept” and stressed the pursuit 
of common interests, peaceful dialogue, common security for all regional actors and 
the discouragement of formal, hierarchical alliances.471 This had become a dominant 
trope of China’s foreign policy discourse and applied to China’s energy diplomacy 
towards Central Asia.  
 
Especially after the start of the China–Central Asia transnational pipeline, China 
together with other member states continued to shift the focus towards establishing a 
regional response to the interconnected issues of transnational energy investment and 
transportation. Since 2004, the Council of Heads of State of the SCO, which includes 
China, has stated that the SCO would prioritize energy cooperation within the SCO 
framework.472  In 2006, adhering to the consensus of the 15 June 2006 Shanghai 
summit, the prime ministers during the meeting of the six countries studied priority 
directions of economic cooperation of the SCO member states and proposed that the 
six countries cooperate in economic, trade, scientific and technological, social, cultural 
and other areas in the series-specific measures. The prime ministers noted that the 
SCO economic cooperation has injected new vitality.  
 
To promote economic and trade cooperation, an Energy Working Group on a modern 
information and telecommunications technology was established within the framework 
of the organization. Especially in 2006, Russia’s President Putin proposed to establish 
an “Energy Club”, which was approved by all member countries all immediately. The 
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prime ministers instructed the Energy Working Group in conjunction with the 
Secretariat to study the possibility of establishing the SCO Energy Club.473 It is notable 
that, although the China–Central Asia pipeline only become officially multilateral in 
2007, the proposal and studies of feasibilities of such a huge project were carried out a 
few years ahead, as listed in Section 4.3.1, and Russia is believed to have been well 
informed about this. Therefore, the proposal of the SCO Energy Club in the year 2006 
does match the timeframe in this chapter, which marks 2007 as the watershed in the 
development of the Chinese energy strategy as well as the progress of construction of 
the transnational pipeline.  
 
China and other SCO member states have tried to implement and promote a variety of 
energy cooperation programmes via the SCO under the Measurement Plan of the 
Outline of Multilateral Economy and Trade Cooperation listed in Section 4.3.2. The key 
points to start the long-term cooperation mechanism of energy suppliers and 
demanders for China, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are to sustain the long-term 
demand for oil and gas, to guarantee the supply of oil and gas as well as the energy 
market of each side and to overcome fraud in the multilateral energy cooperation. As 
the major economies, China and Russia should play a leading role and offer other 
countries preferential benefits. It is also notable that the headquarters of the SCO are 
in Beijing, which is very important for the cautious Chinese authorities. Without the 
physical controlling of the entity, China will not see any comfort in participating in an 
international organization.474 In short, the establishment of the SCO and utilizing it as a 
platform for energy cooperation indicates a change in the physical structure of energy 
policy towards multilateralism in Central Asia. 
 
However, when it comes to implementation, cooperation via SCO was not always 
effective. More importantly, most of the cooperation projects among SCO member 
states are bilateral and do not really belong to SCO’s multilateral framework. 
Furthermore, China and Central Asian countries do not coordinate key projects such as 
transnational pipelines via the SCO. Bilateral cooperation remains the main way of 
energy cooperation at present. In other words, although the SCO is a multilateral 
institute that covers joint exploration, mining, processing, transportation and 
cooperative marketing and other business, in practice, its regional energy cooperation 
is based on bilateral cooperation, including cooperation agreements between both 
governments and corporate bodies. Such cooperation does not only derive from the 
national energy policy and strategic cooperation projects with significant influence; 
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there are also some business activities starting from commercial cooperation projects. 
Overall, bilateral energy cooperation has strong operability as it avoids third-party 
intervention. The multilateral energy cooperation mechanism of the SCO has not been 
established effectively. In other words, although there is a new physical governance 
structure in China–Central Asia energy cooperation, the degree of appropriation and 
legitimacy of the ideas of multilateralism via the SCO is low. 
 
4.4.4 Conclusion: No Profound Change to Multilateralism 
The previous sections explain the energy cooperation mechanism between China and 
Central Asia. This final section attempts to answer whether there was a profound 
change in China’s energy strategy towards Central Asia from bilateral to multilateral 
during the era of Hu Jintao. Section 4.2 and Section 4.4.1 have explained that the 
Chinese understanding of energy security in the region was not merely about a channel 
for achieving geopolitical or security goals in the late 1990s and early 2000s but also 
expanded with market elements in order to feed China’s growing economy. Section 2 
and Section 4.4.2 have also illustrated how cooperation between China and Central 
Asia, particularly in the oil and gas sectors, has expanded from a bilateral one to a 
multilateral one via pipeline projects. It points out that construction of a China–Central 
Asian transnational pipeline is the event that triggered the need for a new idea of 
multilateralism in regard to the regulation of transnational transit. This need, if not 
management crisis, leads to the evolutionary change in policy instruction of Chinese 
energy cooperation in the region. An important foundation for multilateral cooperation 
was laid here.  
 
Section 4.3 and Section 4.4.3 have explained that a physical body, the SCO, has also 
been established to facilitate multilateral cooperation, which is an unusual practice for 
China. There are also energy projects conducted by China and other Central Asian 
countries via the SCO, as discussed in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. However, the 
implementation of policy and projects via the SCO was not always effective. Section 
4.4.3 points out that most of the projects under the SCO are actually bilateral 
cooperation projects among SCO member states and not multilateral ones via the SCO. 
On the other hand, key multilateral projects such as transnational pipelines are not 
coordinated via the SCO. A multilateral mechanism via the SCO is ineffective and a 
bilateral approach remains the main way of energy cooperation between China and 
Central Asia. Therefore, the degree of appropriation and legitimacy of the ideas of 




Such a finding does not necessarily mean that China is turning multilateral energy 
cooperation down in the long term. Nonetheless, it reveals there were a variety of 
obstacles to the progress of multilateral energy cooperation in the region during Hu 
Jintao’s era. Energy cooperation within the SCO remaining bilateral is the result of the 
lack of legal mechanisms in the SCO rather than a lack of willingness to take the 
multilateral approach. Energy cooperation, particularly transnational pipeline 
management, can be a very complicated legal issue, involving transit regulation, 
different energy laws among different countries and huge financial transactions. 475 
Therefore, the SCO is an important regional political and economic organization in the 
field of energy, with the need for legal documents and internal safeguards to promote 
regional energy cooperation, as well as practical mechanisms and functions to 
influence the energy decisions of member states. Yet, coordination of national energy 
strategy objectives and the energy legislative situation is necessary, as well as the 
elimination of barriers to mutual trade and investment and the creation of favourable 
conditions for multilateral cooperation for regional economic development, thereby 
optimizing energy sector investment and trade flows in the system to give protection.476  
 
Due to the lack of legal mechanisms of energy cooperation, the function of the SCO is 
limited. This is one of the reasons why Putin’s proposed “Energy Club” has not made 
much progress. As a result, it is better to break the framework of the SCO and to 
establish a new energy cooperation mechanism which allows China, Russia, all the 
Central Asian countries and even the Caspian Sea countries to get involved. Indeed, 
Chinese authorities including CNPC, NEA and NDRC are noticing the limitations and 
showing interest in the ECT. They are keenly aware of the multinational pipeline risks in 
Central Asia, which could be potentially reduced by transition regulation in the Treaty.477 
Although China prefers bilateralism, it may have to turn to the ECT once it realizes that 
the risk management of its Central Asia pipeline project relies on multilateralism. This 
could lead to potential change in ideas if Chinese agencies start looking at multilateral 
means such as the ECT. 478 However, this progress would take decades and could not 
be finished by the end of Hu Jintao’s era. 
 
Moreover, security concerns, domestic problems in Central Asian countries, the great 
power competition, the multiple energy transport routes, the growing number of Asian 
NOCs and also the international oil companies, or the Russian and American military 
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presences represent new challenges for China’s interests in Central Asia and 
complicate the progress of the SCO. 479 The balance between all these problems will 
need diplomacy, increased coordination and substantial financial resources. Similarly, 
Davie Kerr argues that the regional problem of China and unclear future of the SCO 
results in a fluid environment for energy cooperation in Central Asia.480 
 
Nonetheless, China succeeded, in just a decade, to put its mark on the Central Asian 
energy industry. With the expansion of cross-border transport of energy resources, 
multilateral energy cooperation could move forward steadily and has a considerable 
degree of accumulated experience. In particular, the transnational Turkmenistan–China 
gas pipeline construction – a typical example of the SCO member states’ multilateral 
energy cooperation – laid the foundation for a multinational joint consultation 
mechanism. From a long-term perspective in the economic globalization and regional 
integration trends, the SCO’s multilateral energy cooperation between countries will be 
more and more frequent. Yet, it is notable that this progress would take decades and 
could not be finished by the end of Hu Jintao’s era. 
 
Although multilateral elements appeared in all policy goals, policy instruments and the 
physical structure of policies after the mid 2000s, particularly 2007, they were not solid 
enough to lead to a profound change in the energy cooperation between China and 
Central Asian countries during Hu Jintao’s era. In terms of policy goals, China’s energy 
policy towards Central Asia followed its overall energy security strategy discussed in 
Chapter 3. Although there were multilateral forms of cooperation between China and 
Central Asia, the bilateral diplomatic approach remained an important form of 
cooperation. In terms of physical structure of governance, the Chinese approach during 
Hu Jintao’s era was far from global energy governance mainly because the function of 
SCO was limited as discussed above. The degree of appropriation and legitimacy of 
the idea of enhancing multilateralism via SCO was low. Moreover, the fact that energy 
projects promoted via SCO were mainly bilateral ones further reflects Chinese top 
authorities’ reluctance towards multilateral forms of cooperation. The China–Central 
Asia transnational pipeline has changed the cooperation model as mentioned in 4.4.2 
and, more importantly, urged the Chinese authorities to look into multilateral means for 
transnational transit management. Yet, it is an evolutionary progress that takes a 
considerable amount of time. A number of Chinese experts have already pointed out 
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that both the full utilization of the transnational pipeline and progress to a 
multilateralism platform could not have been accomplished within the period of Hu 
Jintao. 
 
To conclude, first-order change and second-order change in regard to policy 
instruments and change in physical governance structure did occur in the energy 
cooperation between China and Central Asia but third-order change regarding ideas 
and policy goals was not obvious. Therefore, although the development of China–
Central Asia energy cooperation seemed to be following the direction towards global 
energy governance in the long term, the degree of change during the period of 
President Hu Jintao was not high enough to be claimed as a profound break from the 
past. This section concludes that China’s energy security strategy in Central Asia 
during the era of Hu Jintao did not undergo a profound change from a paradigm of 
bilateral energy diplomacy to a paradigm of multilateral energy cooperation.   
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter reviews China–Central Asia’s energy relationship and analyses whether 
China’s energy strategy in the region is moving towards global energy governance. 
Interest in energy security has laid a solid foundation for energy cooperation between 
China and Central Asia. The Chinese government supports the investment of its 
CNOCs in Central Asia bilaterally and multilaterally in at least four ways, including top 
leaders’ visits, strong bilateral economic and trade ties, intergovernmental agreements 
with legal basis and multilateral platforms. China and Central Asia have by now 
preliminarily established a structured cooperation mechanism with official promotion, 
involving joint energy projects between the two big powers in both bilateral and 
multilateral approaches. Among them, the China– Central Asia transnational pipeline 
and the SCO are the key channels facilitating China–Central Asia energy cooperation, 
and both of them could promote multilateral cooperation. However, the function of the 
SCO during Hu Jintao’s era was limited and most of the energy cooperation remained 
in bilateral form. Besides, it took years for the China-Central Asia translational pipeline 
to function to full capacity and hence the multilateral impact was limited in Hu Jintao’s 
era. Therefore, this chapter concludes that energy cooperation between China and 
Central Asian countries during Hu Jintao’s era did not undergo a profound change from 
a paradigm of energy diplomacy to a paradigm of global energy governance although a 
multilateral element appeared in all policy goals, policy instruments and the physical 
structure of policies since 2007.   
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Chapter 5 - China–EU energy cooperation 
 
This chapter discusses the development of and changes to China–EU energy 
cooperation in the 21st century. Energy cooperation plays an important role in China’s 
relationship with the EU. Two key elements in their energy cooperation are top official 
exchange platforms and project-based renewable energy technology transfer. These 
elements do not merely indicate the development and changes in the energy 
cooperation mechanism between China and the EU, but also the rationales for Chinese 
energy security strategies in the region. By studying the case of China–EU energy 
cooperation, this chapter aims to answer the question of whether China’s energy 
security underwent a policy transition resulting in a paradigm shift away from the “going 
out” energy diplomacy paradigm to the global energy governance paradigm during Hu 
Jintao’s era. 
 
This chapter will first commence with the background to the China–EU energy 
relationship and the foundation of their cooperation. It will then introduce China’s 
energy policy towards the EU as well as the ideas and rationales behind it. This is 
followed by a discussion of the mechanisms that underpin China–EU energy 
cooperation in terms of official channels and project-based channels. The above 
sections lay the foundation for analysis of the paradigm shift of China’s energy strategy, 
which is fully developed in the next section. This section includes a discussion of the 
impact of the development of the China–EU energy projects and official platform in 
China’s energy security strategy towards the EU. The last section of this chapter 
examines whether there was a policy paradigm shift in China’s energy cooperation with 
the EU by applying the framework of five levels of energy policy aspects against which 
change can be measured. The discussions in the last two sections are based on a 
systematic analysis of official documents and communications, and original primary 
data collected from interviews with senior Chinese energy experts who are involved in 
or have witnessed the China–EU energy cooperation. The method employed to 
analyse Chinese energy security in this chapter is original and departs from existing 
works. 
 
5.1 The foundation of China–EU energy cooperation 
 
In a broader strategic perspective that is reflected in the agreements signed by both 
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parties, the EU 481  sees China as a global partner with equal power to raise its 
international position.482 The actions of a great power like China are believed to have a 
significant influence on international, regional and bilateral relations. China’s energy 
security is very important to global security, as well as to global energy governance. It 
is necessary for the EU, as a key leader in the international energy and environmental 
regime, to encourage China’s participation in international frameworks. 
 
Historically, China and EU did not consider each other as sources of energy supply.483 
Geographical distance has limited their trade in coal, oil and gas despite increasing 
energy demand.484 Instead, China–EU energy cooperation has a strong focus on clean 
energy and energy efficiency, particularly technology transfer. China, in its Energy 
Policy (2012) White Paper,485 asserts its attempt to enlarge its reliance on renewable 
energy and increase its energy efficiency in existing power facilities. Advanced energy 
technologies are understood to be important for its economic growth, sustainable 
development, foreign investment and better local environment. Due to the lack of 
advanced technology in green energy and energy efficiency, China needs a partner 
that has mastered such technologies and, more importantly, is willing to cooperate with 
a rising power. For instance, the US and Japan have the technological capability but 
hesitate to enter into technology exchange with China because of strategic concerns. 
The EU, by contrast, is understood to be more open to technology cooperation with 
                                               
481
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China.486 In addition to the general strategy of both powers, there are at least two 
further favourable conditions for clean energy cooperation between China and the EU. 
 
Policy perspective 
The governments of China and of the EU Member States have published a series of 
supporting policies to promote the development of clean energy and which are the 
policy foundation for the promotion of local clean energy industries through mutual 
cooperation. During the process of industrial promotion, each nation’s government has 
an influential role. Governments usually publish a series of supporting policies and 
measures to lead the clean energy market and to promote its industrialization. This 
applies to both China and the EU, who have been promoting the development of the 
clean energy industry in recent years. 
 
In February 2005, China published the Renewable Energy Law of the People’s 
Republic of China. This law establishes the basic legal system and policy framework 
for the development of renewable energy.487 In order to ensure the implementation of 
the Renewable Energy Law, the related departments of the State Council published 
relevant administrative regulations, administrative rules, technical specifications and 
standards. In October 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress ratified the amendment of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Conserving Energy, in order to perfect the basic system of energy conservation, 
regularize the energy-conserving standards and the supervision system and strengthen 
policy incentives.488  
 
To further the domestic development of clean energy and to activate solutions to the 
issue of global warming, the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress 
adopted an amendment to the Renewable Energy Law, in December 2009. The 
amendment came into effect in April 2010. 489  It regulates the full indemnificatory 
acquisition system for renewable energy generation, the feed-in tariff management 
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system and the nationally financed renewable energy development foundation. It also 
dictates that the government should develop relevant plans for the smooth realization 
of the national mid- and long-term goal of renewable energy exploitation and usage.  
 
In December 2011, China published its 12th Five-Year Plan on the development of 
renewable energy, which emphasized quality instead of quantity. If China planned to 
build up a competitive clean energy industry system, including wind power, solar power, 
nuclear power and other non-fossil energies. In addition, the Plan stated that China 
would continue its international cooperation efforts in the field of clean energy in order 
to break the development bottleneck in technology.490 
 
On the issue of promoting the development of a clean energy industry, the EU provided 
governmental leadership and support at a very early stage. The EU has published a 
series of policy documents and established a support plan and evaluation mechanism 
for the implementation of a clean energy policy. The guidance paper on the 
development of renewable energy as proposed by the EU includes the White Paper for 
Renewable Energy and its Action Projects and other EU directives concerning the 
development of renewable energy.491 EU directives are legally binding documents that 
guide each EU Member State’s legislation, and directives specifically regulate the 
development of renewable resources. In 2001, the EU published the Renewable 
Energy Sources-Electricity (RES-E) Directive (Directive 2001/77/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001), which stated a goal that 22% of 
the total energy consumed by Member States should be produced from renewable 
energy resources by 2010.492 In 2009, the EU enacted a directive on the promotion of 
the development of the renewable energy industry and confirmed, by legal form, the 
20% ratio of renewable energy consumption and 10% ratio of biofuel consumption by 
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2020 proposed by the EU Committee in 2007. In addition, the EU published the Energy 
Roadmap 2050, in which renewable energy plays a vital role. It is estimated by the EU 




While the EU is leading in clean energy technology, China’s demand for this 
technology, particularly renewable energy and energy saving, is high. In 2012,494 the 
primary production of renewable energy in EU was 177.3 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (toe), accounting for 22.3% of the total primary energy production from all 
sources. From 2002 to 2012, the overall production of renewable energy increased by 
81.3%. Accounting for almost two-thirds of primary renewables production, biomass 
and renewable waste was the most important contributor to the EU’s energy mix. 
Hydropower accounted for 16.2% of the total primary renewables production and was 
another major source of energy. Wind and solar energy accounted for 10% and 5.1% 
respectively and were undergoing rapid expansion. In 2012, renewable energy sources 
accounted for 11% of total inland energy consumption in the EU, which seeks to 
increase this to 20% by 2020. Germany is the largest producer of renewable energy in 
the EU, followed by France, Sweden and Italy.  
 
Due to differences in climatic conditions and natural factors, the renewable energy mix 
differs across the EU Member States. For example, in the 2000s, while over 60% of the 
renewable energy produced in Cyprus was from solar energy, almost half of Ireland’s 
renewal energy production was from wind power. Electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources accounted for almost one-quarter of the gross electricity consumption 
in the EU. From 2002 to 2012, there was rapid growth in electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources, especially from wind turbines, solar power and biomass. 
The relative proportions of these three sources in the total electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources rose to 30.4%, 10.5% and 4.1% respectively in 2012. It is 
notable that electricity from solar power underwent rapid growth from 0.3 TWh in 2002 
to 71.0 TWh in 2012, overtaking other renewable sources like geothermal energy, 
biomass and renewable waste. 
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China enjoys abundant renewable energy resources, which provide for China’s clean 
energy industry development. Generally, China has realized certain achievements in 
the fields of solar power  and wind power.495 However, the share of renewable energy 
in China’s total energy mix is still low, having made a limited contribution to China’s 
energy supply security. 496  The promotion of renewable energy is more about 
maintaining the capability of the renewable energy sector for future energy security. In 
2011, renewable energy sources accounted for under 7% of China’s total energy 
consumption. Of that, 6% came from hydroelectric sources, and other renewable 
energy sources accounted for less than 1%.497 According to its environmental goals, 
China aims to produce at least 15% of its energy output from renewable energy 
sources by 2020.  
 
It is notable that in 2011 China was the second largest wind producer in the world, 
generating 73 TWh in that year.498 This figure is almost two-thirds higher than that in 
2010. Its grid-installed wind capacity has almost doubled every year since 2005, but 
lacks the transmission infrastructure to connect the wind farms to the electricity grid. As 
a result, the government is promoting grid development to avoid excess wind capability. 
China also invested in solar power and plans to increase its solar capacity from 3 GW 
in 2012 to 35 GW by the end of 2015. 499  In order to achieve these goals, the 
government has prioritized the expansion of both natural gas and renewable power 
plants, and the upgrade of the electricity grid to connect remote power sources with 
population centres.  
 
According to its five-year plan, China is promoting investment in the renewable energy 
industry and the transmission of energy infrastructure through a variety of financial and 
economic incentives. It planned to spend US$473 billion on clean energy investments 
between 2011 and 2015. In 2012, Chinese companies invested $65 billion in renewable 
energy projects, which was an increase of 20% from 2011.500 The above developments 
represent a giant market for China’s clean energy, which could attract European 
investment. 
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The above factors have galvanized both European and Chinese interests in technology 
transfer, the improvement of energy efficiency, the reduction of CO² emissions and a 
shift to low-carbon economies. Actively promoted by the authorities, China’s and the 
EU’s clean energy industries have undergone long-term development. Thus, certain 
policy, industrial and technical conditions have been provided for China–EU 
cooperation in both the public and private sectors. 
 
 
5.2 China’s energy relations with the EU and its Member States 
 
With the EU and its Member States becoming increasingly dependent on foreign 
energy sources, as well as China’s total energy consumption growing year by year, 
security of energy supplies, energy efficiency and conservation have become the key 
issues in EU–China economic and trade relations, as well as science and technology 
cooperation. Therefore, studying the development of and changes to EU–China 
cooperation policies and mechanisms will be of significance in understanding the 
technology cooperation and the setting up and developing of the concepts of green 
energy and low-carbon energy. Cooperation between China and the EU in relation to 
energy started in the early 1980s. The EU–China energy relationship can be viewed 
through the broader lens of the EU–China relationship, which started as a trading 
partnership. The development of the EU–China relationship has undergone three 
phases: 501  (1) exploration and construction of the partnership, (2) deepening and 
maturing of bilateral ties, and (3) managing the relationship, particularly in the context 
of cooperation and competition. It is notable that while the EU is the international 
organization with the highest level of integration in the world, each one of its 28 
members, and even different regions of each Member State, differ in their degree of 
interest in the EU–China energy relationship. The Member States have formulated 
clean energy policies or developed plans that are unique to each. Therefore, China is 
facing a group of diversified stakeholders when cooperating in the clean energy field. 
Its partners can be the EU as a whole, the central government or local governments of 
each Member State, or companies and academic institutes whose headquarters are 
situated in Member States. This chapter focuses on the cooperation between China 
and the EU and its Member States. 
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5.2.1 China-EU energy relationship in different periods 
In the 1970s 
China started to interact with the rest of the world in the energy sector in the 1950s, but 
its energy cooperation with certain EU Member States only began after the reform and 
opening up of China in the 1970s.502 After the establishment of a formal diplomatic 
relationship between China and the European Economic Community (EEC)503 the two 
parties expand their trade cooperation covering industry, agriculture, energy, 
environment, transportation, science and development aid. Trade has remained a key 
platform for the interaction of the two powers, as has the exchange of energy-related 
technology over the three phases.  
 
Since 1978, the opening-up policy and structural change of China under the leadership 
of Deng Xiaoping has made trade a driving force in the EU–China partnership, and 
economic initiatives have shaped their relationship.504 In light of its market size, China 
is the fastest-growing power in the world and became an important target in the EU’s 
policy agenda in Asia. Yet, both China and the EU Member States did not consider 
energy as a significant factor in their cooperation in the early 1970s. In 1978, China 
and EU signed their first key accord,505 Agreement between the EEC and the People’s 
Republic of China, which established a new initiative to regulate trade-related issues 
between them. This agreement also underpinned the ideology behind EU–China 
relations and remained at the heart of the bilateral partnership between the two 
powers. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s 
The earliest concrete cooperation between the two parties, the China–EU Energy 
Training Programme, was launched a year after a delegation from the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Energy (EC DG ENER) visited China. Meanwhile, 
China also began to involve certain EU Member States in its offshore oil 
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development. 506  In 1985, the two powers signed the Agreement on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, which can be seen as a new reference for their relationship. 
 
In the early 1990s, the EU began to see China as a rising power and “an 
unprecedented series of summits between China and some of its key world partners 
had demonstrated China’s wish to be recognised as a world power”.507 A full-scale 
relationship between the two parties materialized in 1995, when the EU announced its 
first China policy paper, which stated: “Europe must develop a long-term relationship 
with China that reflects China’s worldwide, as well as regional, economic and political 
influence. Europe’s relations with China are bound to be a cornerstone in Europe’s 
external relations, both with Asia and globally.”508  
 
In the 2000s 
Because of increasing interdependency in economies, the EU and China became each 
other’s major trading partner in the 2000s. As of 2015, while China is the EU’s largest 
source of imported goods, it is also the EU’s major export market.509 China and the EU 
have also carried on policy coordination through EU–China summits, the highest level 
of political meeting, which started in 1998.510 Up till now, there have been 17 summits. 
As described in Table 5.1, the summits play a significant role in developing and 
deepening the relationship between China and the EU. During each summit, the two 
sides hold consultations on issues of common concern and discuss the issues in the 
fields of politics, economics, etc. Table 5.1 also shows that, since 2001, energy, 
especially the clean energy issue, has become the key focus in the discussions, which 
can be seen in the agreements signed during the summits and the joint statements 
issued after each summit. 
 
The Strategic Partnership between China and the EU established in 2003 has 
enhanced China-EU energy cooperation, which was not a prominent focus in China-EU 
relationship compared to other areas. While China and the EU have undergone a 
dramatic transformation in recent decades, their common interests in energy 
cooperation and environmental issues have expanded because neither China nor any 
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of the EU countries can solve these issues alone. 511  The two giants account for 
approximately one third of the world’s energy use and their energy needs are expected 
to increase continuously to fuel their growing economies and populations. Gradually, 
energy have become more prominent in interactions between China and its EU 
counterparts. In face of climate change, the issues of high global energy consumption, 
volatility of international oil prices and environmental degradation have brought the two 
powers closer together.512  
 
In May 2012, China and the EU signed their energy “partnership” agreement, ensuring 
“open” access to each other’s markets.513 In addition to affirming the EU’s agenda to 
develop beneficial energy partnerships with key third countries, the new agreement 
also set out China’s new concept of energy security that called for “mutually beneficial 
cooperation, diversified forms of development and common energy security through 
coordination”.514 Sino–EU energy cooperation was not limited to traditional security of 
resources and price, and extends to broader energy security issues, including energy 
governance, diversification of energy supplies, improvement of energy efficiency, and 
conservation and research innovations. Both sides understood the benefit of 
sustainable energy development, and this paved the path for clean energy cooperation 
between China and the EU. As a result, interactions between China and the EU in the 
realm of energy feature energy development in and technological transfer to China. 
 
Table 5.1 Agreements and achievements related to clean energy reached in EU–China 
summits from 2001 to 2012 
EU–China Summit Achievement 
The 3rd EU–China 
Summit 
The two sides carried out extensive discussions on bilateral 
relations, the development of China and the EU and the regional 
and international issues of common concern and interest. The 
focus of the summit was China’s entry into the WTO. In addition, 
the two sides exchanged views on cooperation in the sectors of 
science and technology, energy, information, education, etc. 
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The 4th EU–China 
Summit515 
Leaders from both sides stressed the importance of dialogue in 
the trade sector and strengthening and expanding inter-
departmental dialogues in the sectors of enterprise policies and 
regulations, information society, environment, energy, science 
and technology, satellite navigation, etc. 
The 6th EU–China 
Summit516 
Leaders from both sides emphasized the significance of 
strengthening and expanding industry dialogues on a broad 
range of topics. The existing industry dialogues cover the 
important sectors of energy, environmental, regulatory and 
industry policy; social information; “digital Olympics” exchange; 
etc. This kind of cooperation is attracting widespread interest. 
The 7th EU–China 
Summit517 
Leaders from the two sides both expressed satisfaction with the 
progress of cooperation in all the sectors. They also appreciated 
the new momentum of Energy Dialogues after the successful 
convening of the 5th EU–China Energy Conference. The 
Agreement on R&D Cooperation on the Peaceful Use of 
Nuclear Energy between the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China was signed. 
The 8th EU–China 
Summit518 
The two sides signed the Memorandum of Understanding of 
Strategic Dialogue in the Energy and Transportation Sectors 
between China and the EU. During the summit, both sides 
released the EU–China Joint Statement on Climate Change, 
which established the partnership between China and Europe in 
relation to climate change. It would strengthen the cooperation 
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and dialogue in relation to climate change, including clean 
energy, and would promote sustainable development. It would 
also promote cooperation in the development, application and 
transfer of low-carbon technologies, such as advanced coal 
technology through carbon capture and storage to achieve “zero 
emissions”. The two sides welcomed the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding as a start to China–EU strategic 
dialogue in the sectors of energy and transportation. 
 
The 9th EU–China 
Summit 519 
 
Leaders from the two sides welcomed the progress made in 
solidifying the partnership between China and the EU in relation 
to climate change. Both leaders appreciated the closer 
cooperation in the clean development mechanism advocated in 
Kyoto Protocol. They both attached great importance to 
significantly reducing the costs of key technology and its 
transfer, application and promotion. Also, full coordination and 
cooperation in relation to promotion of energy security, 
sustainable energy supply, innovation and reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions was emphasized. In addition, they 
also emphasized the strategic significance of the China–EU 
High-Level Energy Working Group and regular China–EU 
Energy Cooperation Conferences, the strengthening 
cooperation on the Clean Coal Action Plan and energy 
efficiency, and the renewable energy action plan within the 
cooperation framework. China and the EU had a common 
concern in the need to ensure a reliable, economical and 
sustainable energy supply. At the same time, both parties 
continued to emphasize cooperation in the sectors of energy 
and transportation. 
The 10th EU–China 
Summit 520 
Leaders from the two sides attached great importance to climate 
change issues and were willing to continue cooperation to jointly 
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 cope with the severe challenges brought by climate change. It 
was agreed that China and the EU would shoulder the “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” 521 , rely on their respective 
capabilities and jointly be committed to stabilizing the 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, thereby 
preventing dangerous human interference with the climatic 
system. China and the EU agreed to take effective measures 
and advance mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy 
sector. 
 
The 11th EU–China 
Summit 522  
 
The two sides reached cooperative agreements, including the 
Joint Statement by the China–EU Clean Energy Centre (EC2), 
the China and EU Science and Technology Partnership Scheme 
and the China–EU Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Cooperation Consensus. The leaders mainly discussed EU–
China relations, the global economic and financial crisis, climate 
change and energy security, and exchanged views on issues of 
the Korean Peninsula and other regions. They stated their 
determination to strengthen cooperation and to undertake 
further work together to address the financial crisis, climate 
change and other global challenges, and that they were actively 
committed to promoting coordination and cooperation in 
international affairs. 
The 12th EU–China 
Summit 523  
 
The Chinese and EU leaders renewed the China and EU 
Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, signed and 
started the Memorandum of Understanding of the Second 
Cooperation Phase of Near Zero Emissions of Carbon Project, 
signed the Memorandum of Cooperation Framework of 
Buildings’ Efficiency and Quality and the China–EU Finance 
Agreement of Environmental Governance Projects. The leaders 
agreed that the international community was facing severe 
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challenges and needed a global response. Climate change, the 
financial crisis, energy and resources security, food security, the 
environment and public health security and other global issues 
were emerging, and terrorism and other non-traditional security 
threats had become global concerns. It was agreed that the 
need for close cooperation and coordination in the international 
community to cope with global challenges was becoming more 
and more urgent. 
The 13th EU–China 
Summit 524 
 
The leaders all agreed that it was necessary to take appropriate 
climate change and energy policies to support the joint efforts in 
energy conservation, improve energy efficiency and promote the 
green low-carbon development efforts. They emphasized the 
further strengthening of China and EU partnership on climate 
change and the policy dialogue and pragmatic cooperation 
under the framework of Energy Dialogue. The focus of 
cooperation should include renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
smart grid and clean coal technology, including carbon capture 
and storage technology. Both sides agreed to encourage 
research units, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, 
to carry out energy cooperation in R&D to promote energy 
saving and emission reduction. 
The 14th EU–China 
Summit 525 
 
As an initiative from the 14th Summit in 2012, the first China–
EU High-Level Meeting on Energy (HLME) was held in May 
2012, between NEA, EC DG ENER, energy ministers of the 
then 27 EU Member States and relevant ministers belonging to 
the NEC. NEA and EC DG ENER were in charge of the 
organization of the meeting, which was in a restricted and 
exclusive format. The China–EU Joint Declaration on Energy 
Security was signed in this meeting, and the China–EU strategic 
energy consumer partnership was announced. 
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The 15th EU–China 
Summit 526 
 
The leaders redoubled their joint efforts to tackle global 
challenges, including sustainable development, environmental 
protection, climate change and energy security. They also 
agreed to further deepen dialogue and cooperation on 
promoting low-carbon development under the EU–China 
Partnership on Climate Change. 
 
 
5.3 Energy cooperation mechanism between China and the EU  
 
As the energy initiative progressed with official promotion, China and the EU had 
preliminarily established a structured cooperation mechanism, involving joint energy 
projects between the two big powers via official channels and projects in both bilateral 
and multilateral approaches to facilitate China’s “going out and bringing in” strategy. As 
discussed in Section 5.1, energy cooperation between China and the EU focused on 
energy technology transfer particularly in renewable energy and energy efficiency to 
China. While the EU is leading in clean energy technology, China’s demand on these 
technologies is high. Trade on clean energy has been the most significant tie in China-
EU energy relation. This section first discusses the official channels and then the 
projects in China–EU energy cooperation.  
 
5.3.1 Official channels in China–EU clean energy cooperation 
The China–EU Energy Conference, the China–Europe High-Level Energy Working 
Group, the China–Europe Energy Dialogue and the EU–China Summit are the main 
official channels facilitating China–Europe clean energy cooperation. 
 
(1) China–EU Energy Conference 
As mentioned in the prevision section, China and the EEC signed the Agreement on 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, the first official agreement between them regarding 
energy. Yet, energy was just one of many other policy fields in this new reference for 
the China–EU relationship. In 1994, energy was first treated as an individual agent in 
the China–EU Energy Conference, convened under the co-sponsorship of China’s 
Ministry of Science and Technology (formerly the State Science and Technology 
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Commission) and the EC DG ENER.527 . The conference is the largest scale and 
highest standard (ministerial level) energy event between China and EU, offering a 
platform for Chinese and European ministries, enterprises and experts to meet and 
exchange ideas.528 To date, eight conferences have been held as China and the EU 
rotate to host the conference biennially. Each and every conference can expect 
attendance of a significant number of high-level industrial and government 
representatives. Topics on energy challenges commonly faced by both sides of 
representatives are discussed at the conference, which is not only an official channel 
through which energy issues are communicated but also a regular platform for Chinese 
and European energy corporations. 
 
(2) China–Europe High-Level Energy Working Group 
The second China–EU Energy Conference in 1996 proposed the initiative of a bilateral 
energy working group.529 A year later, a China–EU high-level Energy Working Group 
was created to institutionalize China–EU energy cooperation and provide guidance and 
supervision with a top-down approach. 530  Jointly convened by EC DG ENER and 
MOST, the first meeting was held the same year in Brussels and then once every two 
to three years. The Energy Working Group became a major form of communication and 
collaboration among government officials and experts from both sides..531 
 
(3) China–Europe Energy Dialogue 
As China–EU energy cooperation gained momentum, with the objective to better 
coordinate each party’s stance on energy issues and further cooperation, in 2005, 
China’s NDRC and the EC DG Transport and Energy signed the Energy Dialogue 
Memorandum of Understanding. Pursued since 2005, the Energy Dialogue is a deputy-
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ministerial-level meeting covering six prioritized areas including renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, clean coal, nuclear energy, smart grid development and energy 
law.532  
 
As of the end of 2013, a total of six Energy Dialogues533 had been held between China 
and the EU. The first and second ones were held in 2007 and 2008 respectively in the 
form of Strategic Dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies, and the others were 
held in the form of EU–China Energy Dialogue. Both parties had been known to 
exchange views and had reached a consensus on multiple energy issues. New steps 
had been taken towards practical cooperation. For instance, in the fifth China–EU 
Energy Dialogue, NEA of China and the EC agreed to inaugurate a high-level energy 
conference held in Brussels, 2012, with the aim of setting out directions and key areas 
of future practical cooperation. In 2013, the sixth EU–China Energy Dialogue covered 
issues like energy strategy, energy market reform, low-carbon energy technologies, 
energy innovation regulation and the sustainable use of energy.534 More importantly, a 
number of joint energy cooperative initiatives like the Europe–China Clean Energy 
Centre (EC2) are created in the Energy Dialogue. These will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
(4) EU–China Summit 
As mentioned in Section 5.1, China and the EU have held consultations on issues of 
common concerns like politics and economy through the EU–China Summit for over a 
decade. In these summits, Chinese and European leaders reach a relatively macro-
level agreement on energy issues, especially on clean energy, and other energy 
cooperative mechanisms such as the China–EU Energy Conference, the China and EU 
Energy Dialogue and the China–EU High-Level Working Group. These summits also 
provide specialized platforms for both sides to further exchange information, coordinate 
specific clean energy policies and implement the consensus. Through the forms of 
leaders’ Summit and Energy Dialogues, the two sides consult on issues including 
global warming, environmental problems and the future development of clean energy, 
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and they develop necessary policy coordination and reach various agreements on 
mutually beneficial premises.  
 
A number of cooperative agreements have been signed, for example, the Euratom–
China Research and Development Agreement at the 7th Summit in 2004, the 
Memorandum of Understanding on China–EU Dialogue on Energy and Transport 
Strategies at the 8th Summit in 2005, the Joint Statement on Europe–China Clean 
Energy Centre (EC2) at the 11th Summit in May 2009 and the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation Framework on Energy Performance and Quality in the 
Construction Sector at the 12th Summit in November 2009.535 These efforts not only 
laid policy foundations for China–EU cooperation in the clean energy sector but also 
strongly promoted bilateral pragmatic cooperation in the sector – the specific 
cooperation agreements signed during the summits can best show this. 
 
The above official channels promoted China-EU energy cooperation over the past two 
decades. While a wide range of topics is addressed, China and EU have located their 
common interest in the promotion of clean energy and energy efficiency, particularly 
technology transfer. The next section looks into energy projects established in the 
above areas. 
 
5.3.2 Energy projects in China–EU clean energy cooperation 
Since the 1980s, when China and the EU started energy cooperation, the two sides, 
through the abovementioned official Energy Dialogues, have achieved concrete 
cooperative action in clean energy, ranging from the large comprehensive cooperation 
projects of energy and environment with the investment of hundreds of millions, to the 
small pieces of solar equipment assisted by the EU. These can all be regarded as the 
results of China–EU clean energy cooperation. 
 
(1) China–EU Energy Training Programme (from 1982 onwards) 
China–EU Energy Training Programme established in 1982 is considered as the 
earliest concrete project in China-EU energy cooperation. This programme is organized 
every year to provide training courses for Chinese people. It symbolized the official 
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start of the China–EU energy-management training project.536 Since then, China–EU 
energy training centres have been gradually set up by Zhejiang Energy Research 
Institute, Tianjin Energy-Saving Technology Centre, Shanghai Energy Research 
Institute and the Chongqing Energy-Saving Technology Service Centre.  
 
From 1982 to now, every year, the five training centres have held one or two regular 
energy training classes, which are mainly taught by EU experts and professors, about 
EU energy management and energy-saving technology.537 In the beginning, European 
trainers were sent to China to conduct the training course. In return, since 1995, 
Chinese trainees have been sent to Europe for training. Over 5,000 Chinese energy 
personnel are trained in this program.538 By participating in the energy training class, 
Chinese energy management staff from energy companies, government departments 
and energy research institutions are expected to both grasp the latest developments of 
energy technology R&D in the EU and obtain a clearer and more rational 
understanding of energy conservation. 
 
(2) Joint Energy and Environment Programme (from 2004 to the end of 2009) 
In 2003, NDRC and the EC established the Joint Energy and Environment Programme 
(EEP) to push energy cooperation between the two sides. As a five year project, EEP 
had four components including energy policy development, energy efficiency, natural 
gas and renewable energy. Among them, cooperation in the clean energy sector plays 
an important role, and its objectives includes the utilization of renewable energies by 
developing biomass resources in rural areas, producing power for villages in Western 
China, and developing policies concerning the use of offshore wind energy.539 It had an 
investment of  €42 million devoted to policy research, training program, personnel 
exchange and technology transfer.540  
 
                                               
536
 Jun, Y. & Dongfeng, Y. 2000. “Review of China-EU Energy Training Programme.” Energy 
Engineering 4: 5; Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union. 2004. 
“China-EU Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Exchange.” March 9. Accessed on 






 Haugwitz, F. 2007. “EU-China Energy and Environment Program.” Paper presented at the 







The programme was implemented in two phases. The first phase consisted of ten large 
bidding projects, involving offshore wind energy, biomass and other sectors; the second 
stage provided the EU grants for feasibility studies and demonstration projects in 
certain key areas in China. In this phase, projects related to clean energy were sub-
projects of energy policy, energy efficiency and renewable energy. At the end of 2009, 
the EEP was announced to cease with the basic completion of the projects in the two 
phases.541 It achieved a large number of practical results, such as demonstrating the 
feasibilities of offshore wind power and energy saving in key energy-consuming 
industries; more importantly, the projects were a strong and effective demonstration 
and actively promoted China in improving energy policy, energy efficiency and the 
utilization of renewable resources. 
 
(3) Europe–China Clean Energy Centre (EC2) (from 2010 to 2014) 
In 2010, NEA, MOC and EC, with the support from Italian Ministry of Environment, 
Territory and Marine, launched the Europe–China Clean Energy Centre (EC2) in 
Tsinghua University to help the Chinese government to promote the use of clean 
energy in China and to create a more sustainable and efficient energy system. 542 
Particularly, this five-year cooperation project focused on energy policies and 
technology transfer in the following five areas: clean coal (such as carbon capture and 
storage, improving the efficiency of power generation); sustainable biofuels, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency (buildings, industrial products and industrial 
manufacture); and a sustainable and efficient energy allocation system. Understand the 
supervision of NEA and MOFCOM, training courses, public lectures, conferences and 
workshops are organized to archive the above objectives. Its mandate expired in 
2014.543 
 
(4) Near Zero Emission Coal project (from 2006 onward) 
In 2006, the Near Zero Emission Coal (NZEC) project was launched under the 
framework of EU and China Partnership on Climate Change develop carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS) technology in China. 544  The EU–China Partnership on 
Climate Change was designed to improve energy efficiency and achieve a low-carbon 
economy through cooperation on technologies. Both sides agreed to take concrete 
actions to develop, deploy and lower the cost of clean energy technologies. Through 












the NZEC project, China and the EU have attempted to develop advanced near-zero-
emission coal technology which allows for the capture of CO2 emissions from coal-fired 
power plants. Major participants are the EC, the UK and MOST. A total of three phases 
have been planned between 2006 and 2020.545 
 
(5) China–EU Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy (from 2010 onward) 
In 2010, China and EU co-funded the China–EU Institute for Clean and Renewable 
Energy (ICARE) located in Huazhong University of Science and Technology. It is 
composed of three components, including a master programme in renewable energy, a 
training center for energy professionals and a research support platform. 546  The 
Chinese government funded contributes €5 millions for infrastructure to the institute 
and the EU contributes €13 millions. It is expected to provide a platform for 
international cooperation in energy research.547 
 
(6) Other China–EU cooperation projects 
There are numerous other ad hoc energy cooperation projects and a series of energy-
related conferences, workshops and joint research projects between China and the EU. 
Under the EC–China Energy Dialogue, concrete cooperation projects 548  have 
commenced in six priority energy fields: renewable energy, smart grids, energy 
efficiency in the building sector, clean coal, nuclear energy and energy law. Under the 
2009–2013 Cooperation Framework on Energy Performance and Quality in the 
Construction Sector,549 a series of energy-related projects were organized, covering a 
wide range of topics: energy law, coal mine safety, environmental governance, 
ecological compensation, renewable energy and energy security. Apart from the 
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cooperation with the EU, China has also been cooperating with individual EU Member 
States on energy issues. For example, Germany is China’s strategic partner in the 
development of electric automobiles, France has been China’s long-term partner in 
nuclear energy and the UK is active in promoting CCS technology and offshore wind 
power in China. It is worth noting that some observers argue that such bilateral state-
to-state cooperation is more tangible than that of China–EU.550 
 
5.4 Analysis of the paradigm shift of China–EU energy cooperation 
 
With increasing cooperation between China and the EU in the field of energy, several 
obvious features and obstacles appear. This section analyses these features in the 
framework of five levels of energy policy aspects against which change can be 
measured to answer the question of whether there is a policy paradigm shift from 
bilateral-based energy diplomacy to multilateral-based global energy governance in 
China’s energy cooperation with the EU. It is notable that Chapter 3 marked the year of 
2007 as the watershed in the development of Chinese energy security and policy. 
While the period before 2007 can be regarded as the policy paradigm of energy 
diplomacy relying on bilateralism, the period after can be viewed as the policy 
paradigm of global energy governance reliant on multilateralism. 
 
5.4.1 Policy goal 
Section 5.2 indicates that, in China’s energy diplomacy policy paradigm, energy is 
understood as “a vital element of national interest in terms of economic power and 
military fuel”, but in the paradigm of global energy governance, the context of energy in 
China–EU energy cooperation is extended because of the connection with the 
environmental element. It is notable that energy, particularly renewable energy, in 
China–EU energy cooperation is considered as a commodity, diminishing its 
geopolitical nature.551 This is echoed in both the White Papers on China’s energy policy 
in 2007 and 2012, which addressed environmental concern, climate change, market 
and low-carbon economy. Although there was not a profound change, EU–China’s 
energy cooperation had witnessed an expansion of the concept of energy: that it was 
more than just fuel for the country and had become a commodity in the market with an 
environmental connection. 
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In the paradigm of energy diplomacy, the context of energy security includes traditional 
security thinking such as to control energy resources, obtain as many energy resources 
as possible, diversify resource suppliers and transportation routes, increase economic 
and military capability and secure the fuel for the national economic engine. In the 
paradigm of global energy governance, the idea of energy security in the context of 
China–EU energy cooperation is expanded with new contexts such as technology, 
environment protection, energy efficiency and international cooperation, as Section 5.2 
indicates.  
 
These new ideas are also embedded in the leaders’ meetings, initiatives and projects 
mentioned in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. For instance, the 2010 Joint Statement by 
MOST and the EC emphasizes energy research and innovation cooperation. Similarly, 
the Science and Technology Agreement, signed in 1998 and renewed in 2004, has a 
focus on innovation in renewable energy. The China–EU Partnership on Climate 
Change in 2005 included numerous cooperative initiatives on clean energy technology. 
Attention of projects like NZEC, EC2, ICARE is devoted to environmental protection 
and technology transfer with clean energy cooperation. EU–China’s energy 
cooperation has witnessed an expansion of the idea of energy security from the 
traditional security of acquiring a supply for national economic capability to the non-
traditional security of environmental issues and technology. Most importantly, the idea 
behind these projects and initiatives means that both Chinese and European 
authorities are in principle open to multilateral forms of cooperation. 
 
In the paradigm of energy diplomacy, the goal of policy is to secure a “reliable, 
diversified and cost-effective energy supply”. Because of geographical distance, there 
is almost no interdependency on energy resources like oil and gas between China and 
the EU. In contrast, in the paradigm of global governance, China–EU energy 
cooperation pays more attention to energy technology transfer. The goal behind 
cooperating with the EU, which can master advanced energy technology, is to improve 
energy efficiency as well as renewable energy development in China. By achieving this 
goal, a “reliable, diversified and cost-effective energy supply” can be secured as well, 
but it is more important that the idea of sustainable development is included in policy 
goals. However, it is notable that the share of renewable energy in China’s energy mix 
is so low that turning renewable energy as a reliable and cost-effective energy supply is 
a long-term goal and is only likely to be achieved decades from now.552 In other words, 
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renewable energy has an important position in China’s long-term energy plan, but it is 
not the only key resource in China’s energy structure in the 2000s and mid-term policy 
goal. Moreover, since R&D requires years of energy investment, one of the goals of 
China–EU energy cooperation is to maintain China’s capacity to develop renewable 
energy by learning from the EU’s energy technology and experience.  
 
EU–China’s energy cooperation has witnessed a change of its policy goal from merely 
securing an energy supply to sustainable development energy technology transfer, 
although the ultimate objective of technology transfer points back to the original one – 
diversifying the energy supply with renewable energy. 
 
5.4.2 Policy instrument 
While Section 5.3.1 explains how China and the EU facilitates energy cooperation via a 
number of high-level meetings, actual operations are conducted via initiatives and 
projects as discussed in 5.3.2. Other than these instruments, energy cooperation 
between China and the EU, particularly in the field of clean energy, is mainly carried 
out in three categories: personnel exchange and training, technology transfer and joint 
R&D, and financial investment in the energy industry. From 1990 to 2010, China and 
EU had organized over 100 joint energy events and projects.553  
 
(1) Personnel exchange and training 
The exchange of personnel is one of the long-term cooperation forms in the sector of 
EU–China clean energy. In the clean energy sector, the personnel exchanges between 
the two sides can be roughly divided into high-level government exchanges, energy 
management personnel exchanges and technical personnel exchanges.554 Due to the 
advancement of the EU in energy management and energy saving, and environmental 
protection technology, for a long time, the European energy talent to China to provide 
training on the above aspects have always been the main form of personnel exchanges 
between China and Europe.555 
 
As mentioned in Section 5.3, a typical project is the China–EU Energy Training 
Programme, which is the earliest and the longest exchange form in the energy sector. 
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After development of nearly three decades, the training project has cultivated a large 
number of energy management personnel for China, which is understood to have 
helped improve energy efficiency, protect the environment and promote the sustainable 
development of the economy. In training Chinese energy management staff, the EU not 
only spreads its ideas, but more importantly it advocates clean technology and 
promotes technology export and income.556 In recent years, with the development of 
energy saving, environmental protection and clean technology and the growth of 
China’s clean energy industry, there has been an increase in the exchange visits of 
clean energy technology and management personnel between China and the EU. In 
the visits, the two sides often carry out discussions and consultation on the common 
challenges and existing problems and also share successful experiences.557 In this 
sense, the equivalence properties of EU bilateral personnel exchanges have been 
improved. Personnel exchanges and training which deepen the understanding of the 
two sides are beneficial to popularize, utilize and marketize clean energy technologies. 
 
(2) Technology transfer and joint R&D 
In the early energy technology cooperation between China and the EU, only technology 
transfer played a major role. In terms of receiving EU technology, China mainly 
imported clean energy technology products from the EU. In addition, in order to enter 
the Chinese market, sometimes, the EU’s energy enterprises transferred some of the 
technologies to Chinese enterprises when they were working together. Also, Section 
5.3.2 indicates that, through assistance to China, such as building technology 
demonstration projects, the EU provided part of the non-core clean energy technology 
to China. In the early stage of China–EU cooperation, China was the receiver of clean 
energy technology because it was lagging behind in technology and there was a lack of 
funds.558 
 
In recent years, China has become a world leader in the manufacture of clean energy 
technology, from wind turbines and solar cells to pulverized coal gasification and the 
car lithium battery.559 While China has leapt to the forefront in clean energy production, 
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it is also increasing its investment in R&D of core clean energy technology.560 In order 
to improve its technological capabilities and financial strength, the cooperation mode 
between China and the EU in the technology sector has also changed. According to the 
Implementation Outline of International Science and Technology Cooperation released 
by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 2006, China claimed to treat the 
development of energy, water resources and environmental protection technology as 
the priority of international technology cooperation, strengthening its interaction with the 
EU in clean energy technology as well as international cooperation projects for clean 
development mechanisms. 561  
 
Despite the substantial investment in clean energy, the Chinese clean energy industry 
was still in the early development stage. With poor fundamentals, the Chinese clean 
energy industry has to overcome many technical problems. 562  In the China–EU 
cooperation, the EU hopes that China can undertake part of the fund risk of R&D 
technology. At present, both sides have strengthened their information sharing and 
experience exchange of the latest developments in the clean energy technology sector 
and started to cooperate in the field of technical standards with the purpose of creating 
conditions for pragmatic cooperation, including joint R&D for China and EU enterprises. 
For example, the China and EU Clean Energy Centre (EC2), which started in April 
2010 in Beijing, is a landmark project which shows that China and the EU have 
strengthened R&D cooperation. 
 
(3) Financial investment in the energy industry 
Foreign aid is of great importance in post-war international relations, especially in 
north–south relations. Post-war foreign aid given from developed countries and regions 
includes foreign development aid, emergency humanitarian aid, military aid and so 
on.563 In terms of the total amount, official development aid has comprised the greatest 
proportion of developed countries’ foreign aid in the post-war era. The field of 
environment, climate and sustainable development is seen as important in 
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development aid.564 Due to the very importance of clean energy in solving the problem 
of environment and climate and in achieving sustainable development, the number of 
clean energy projects aided by developed countries in recent years has been climbing. 
As the world’s largest developing country, China is an object of foreign aid that is 
certain to be targeted by the developed economies, the EU. In the field of clean energy, 
China lagged behind the EU in terms of the level of technology and industry 
development for a period of many years.565 Thus, collaborative projects of an aid-
related nature are an important aspect of clean energy cooperation between China and 
the EU. 
 
In 1984, the EU began to offer financial and technical aid to China and became one of 
the largest entities rendering it free aid. Before 1995, the EU’s foreign aid to China was 
mainly in the field of agriculture, in which comprehensive poverty alleviation was a 
focus. After 1995, the EU expanded the types of its aid towards China, moving its focus 
away from poverty alleviation and development and concentrating on technical aid and 
intellectual transfer through the channel of relevant ministries’ dialogue and cooperation 
on a higher level, as discussed in Section 5.3.1.566 There are two forms of aid provided 
by the EU to China in this field. One is giving training to Chinese energy company 
employees, as mentioned in the previous sections. The other is providing aid in the 
construction of clean energy projects, to which the EU offers technical or financial 
support. In recent years, important construction aid projects include China–EU EEP, 
China–EU Clean Development Mechanism Promoting Projects and China–EU Clean 
Energy Centre Project (EC2) in cooperation with China’s NEA and the China-EU 
ICARE on higher education. 
 
Up to now, the total amount of the EU’s aid to China has amounted to more than €700 
million and has covered the fields of agriculture, environment protection, energy and 
education. Among all the various types of aid, environmental resources and sustainable 
development are two of the most important. In 2001, the EU Committee passed a 
Country Strategy Paper, according to which the EU provided €250 million free aid to 
China during the five years of 2002–2006 and included “promote sustainable 
development and environment protection” as one of the three priorities of China–EU 
developmental cooperation. Currently, the Country Strategy Paper of China 2007–2013 
was underperforming. This file was conducted through two stages. One was from 2007 
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to 2010 and the other was from 2011 to 2013.567 It emphasizes environment and clean 
energy as one of the major fields of mutual cooperation. Besides, the EU also offers 
other forms of aid to China, like the developmental mechanism of clean energy, 
through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The World Bank (WB) 
and other international organizations and multilateral cooperative mechanisms. 
 
In short, China-EU energy cooperation is mainly carried out using three instruments: 1) 
personnel exchange and training, 2) technology transfer and joint R&D and 3) financial 
investment in the energy industry. In clean energy cooperation, technology transfer and 
joint R&D are the main forms of the current cooperation between the two sides. From 
1990 to 2010, China and EU had organized over 100 joint energy events and 
projects568 Both sides have, since then, established multiple functional and strategic 
mechanisms for long-term cooperation in terms of energy exchange. EU–China’s 
energy policy dialogue and the institutionalization of the energy agency have been 
developed.569  
 
These instruments allow China to cooperate with EU Member States via platforms and 
projects established under the EU. Policy instruments in EU–China’s energy 
cooperation have in part experienced a shift from technical consultation, training and 
personnel exchange in the paradigm of energy diplomacy to technical collaboration and 
joint research in multilateral form in the paradigm of global governance energy. 
 
5.4.3 The physical structure of energy policy 
In China-EU energy cooperation, both sides launched a variety of initiatives discussed 
in Section 5.3.2, ranging from the large comprehensive cooperation projects of energy 
and environment to joint university educational programmes. Since the 1980s, China 
and the EU have been working on an energy training programme, and this project has 
passed through the paradigm of energy diplomacy. Yet it was not until the mid-2000s 
that both sides established bodies to facilitate multilateral cooperation through a 
number of joint research projects to facilitate technology transfer. For example, the 
Joint Energy and Environment Programme in 2004, the NZEC project in 2006, the 
Europe–China Clean Energy Centre (EC2) and China–EU ICARE in 2010 established 
a physical platform for China’s governmental departments, companies and institutes to 
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cooperate with the EU, as an integrated entity, or government of each Member State, 
or companies and academic institutes. States and both state-owned and private energy 
companies are not the only entities in the physical structure of energy policy. However, 
while the emergence of this new layer of multilateral platform hardly matches the 
watershed of 2007 discussed in Chapter 3, and there are three reasons why its 
function is limited. 
 
(1) Lack of mutual trust in technology cooperation 
Interviewees mentioned the misunderstandings and misperceptions between European 
and Chinese companies. 570  These misunderstandings and misperceptions are 
generated because of a lack of trust between China and the EU reflected in technology 
transfer and business ideology. Since both sides established energy technology 
cooperation, technology transfer from the EU to China is greater than vice versa. 
Although China asserts that it understands the importance of R&D, both Chinese 
energy companies and governmental departments are reluctant to take action. Instead, 
what China is expecting is a “magic button”571 that could solve the problem promptly. 
Moreover, Chinese companies572 tend to have a poor attitude towards contracts and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) in general. Therefore, due to a lack of trust, Europeans 
were not always willing to transfer their high technology to China. The energy 
technology companies, especially small energy companies who rely on one or two 
unique technologies, feared the weak IPR regulation because disclosure of their 
intellectual property meant losing their trump card. 
 
Interestingly, leading suppliers of technology such as Schlumberger do not express 
such fear, because of the big contrast between their innovative capability in R&D and 
the incapability of China to fully master a transferred technology.573 By the time the 
Chinese companies have mastered the previous generation of transferred technology, 
Schlumberger’s technology could have innovated to a newer generation already.574 Yet, 
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Chinese companies recognize the importance of advanced technology provided by 
foreign companies such as Schlumberger but refuse to over-rely on them. 575  A 
researcher from State Grid Corporation of China holds similar views in that on one 
hand, China’s low capability in R&D is an obstacle to duplicating the advanced 
technology of imported Japanese grid technology;576 on the other, it might be a national 
security concern to rely on Japanese technology in China’s national electricity grid, a 
strategic sector.577  
 
In the field of energy technology and management, China is perceived to have more to 
learn from the EU then vice versa but the Chinese partners had limited motivation in 
cooperation. Mistrust was an obvious factor here. In another interview, a director of a 
China–EU energy project revealed that some joint energy projects were agreed and 
carried out merely because the Chinese side wanted to receive considerable funding 
from the EU. Their intention had a weak linkage with the objectives of the joint projects, 
and hence the Chinese side contributed little to the cooperation.  
 
(2) Trade friction becomes a hidden worry for EU–China clean energy cooperation  
Trade friction existing in China and EU’s clean energy cooperation was essentially due 
to the competitive interests of both sides, which not only concerned the conflict in 
economic interests but also contained a deeper meaning, namely the strategic conflict. 
The EU sides have tended to see Chinese enterprises as competitors. In recent years, 
China has sprung up as a new force in solar, wind energy and other clean energy 
sectors, and there has also been a rapid increase in the output of Chinese wind power 
equipment and photovoltaic products, which occupies an important position in the 
international market. 578  This will undoubtedly pose a threat to the interests of EU 
enterprises which have a traditional advantage in the clean energy sector.  
 
One example is the solar panel trade dispute. 579  China’s clean energy products 
squeezed the survival space of EU clean energy enterprises and reduced their profit 
                                                                                                                                         
China’s technology is always lagging behind given that they lack the determination to invest in 
their own R&D. 
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margin. 580  Chinese low-end and high-end products entering Europe could caused 
shaper competition between China and Europe. 581  As David Kerr argues, “EU 
enlargement expresses different aspirations… but in the economic sphere it clearly 
reveals a concern with the rising pressures of globalism, and perhaps especially those 
emanating from Asian industrialization… in both Europe and East Asia, a process of 
reducing competitive tensions intra-regionally may have the effect of increasing 
competitive pressures inter-regionally.”582 
 
Another obstacle is the lack of openness of the China and EU energy markets to each 
other.583 While European companies find it difficult to enter the Chinese market, they 
will not easily transfer the core energy technology to Chinese companies due to IPR 
concern. Trade friction and market restrictions have hindered the flow of technology. 
Due to the export restrictions, China cannot import such technologies, therefore it fails 
to conduct joint R&D on those technologies which could not only cut the cost of solar 
power 584  utilization but also expand application range. The joint R&D, however, is 
                                                                                                                                         
gigawatts in 2010, accounting for 50% of the global production. With 400 megawatts applied 
domestically and 7,600 megawatts exported, the export proportion reached 95%. Europe 
accounted for 80% of China’s export market. The aggravation of the European debt crisis led 
to a reduction in the global demand for photovoltaic products and overcapacity, which exposed 
the European photovoltaic industry to a severe situation. For example, major consumers of 
photovoltaic products, such as Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, and other EU Member States, 
began to cut their fiscal subsidies to photovoltaic power products. The export environment for 
China’s photovoltaic industry deteriorated with the lagging global environment. In November 
2011, the United States Department of Commerce declared an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigation into the solar cell panels imported from China. It was the first time that the United 
States had launched such an investigation into China's clean energy products. This action 
posed a severe challenge to China’s photovoltaic industry. 
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crucial to the investment- and technology-demanding clean energy industry. The EU’s 
export restrictions on China has curbed the latter’s demand, which has not only slowed 
down the development of China’s clean energy but also hindered the deepening of 
their cooperation in technology. 
 
(3) Insufficient cooperation between the public of Europe and China 
Thanks to the facilitation of official mechanisms such as the China–EU Energy 
Dialogues and the China–EU Energy Cooperation Conferences, China and Europe 
have achieved a variety of agreements in clean energy cooperation. However, 
cooperation between the public and the business circles is less active, cooperation in 
clean energy being a vivid indicator. Firstly, in terms of joint R&D in the field of clean 
energy, universities, research institutes and other academic institutes of Europe and 
China remained at an early stage during Hu Jintao’s era. Joint R&D is a key indicator of 
the progression of technology cooperation. Moreover, the wider the research range and 
the more in depth the content, the closer the cooperation. Judged by those criteria, the 
technology cooperation between China and Europe remains at a low level. 585  
 
Secondly, EU companies set a high price and impose restrictions on Chinese 
companies when transferring technology. 586  Technology transfer, however, is a key 
element in international technology cooperation, and it has been mentioned in previous 
sections that the EU export restrictions of high-tech goods to China are hindering EU–
China cooperation. Moreover, the number of Chinese companies investing in EU 
countries in the field of clean energy is currently small. For Europe, besides some 
government-led aid projects that inject capital into Chinese companies, European 
companies remain inactive in investment in China. Therefore, there is still considerable 
room for cooperation between the public of Europe and China. The clean energy 
                                                                                                                                         
of EU regulations, China’s ability to import the much needed technology from the EU is limited. 
Some advanced technologies in the field of solar power, such as the technology or new 
materials that can enormously improve the transfer efficiency of solar cells are widely used in 
aviation, satellites, and other fields concerned with military. Although these products or 
technologies are not applied to the battlefield, they are limited by export restrictions for being 
dual-use goods and technology. Such restrictions have undoubtedly exerted negative effects 
on the development of China’s solar power industry. 
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industry is at an early stage, and large investment is needed. Meanwhile, with a high 
cost of production and low profits, most companies cannot survive without fiscal 
subsidies.587 Currently, under the influence of the debt crisis, the EU is cutting fiscal 
subsidies to the clean energy industry. Chinese clean energy companies are facing 
problems as well. For example, some subsidy-taking companies have grown 
dependent on the government.588  
 
In short, the establishment of the above platforms and projects for energy cooperation 
indicates a change in the physical structure of energy policy towards multilateralism in 
relations with the EU. China’s cooperation with EU Member States via these channels 
established under the EU is classified as part of multilateralism.589 However, the above 
discussion reveals that the multilateral energy cooperation between China and the EU 
via the above platforms and projects has not been established effectively. In other 
words, the degree of appropriation and legitimacy of the idea of multilateralism via the 
above physical structure is low. 
 
5.4.4 Conclusion: no profound change to multilateralism 
This chapter explains how China understands energy and energy security in the 
context of China–EU energy cooperation. As discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, while 
the Chinese understanding of energy has expanded to include elements like clean 
energy (e.g. from coal to clean coal), Chinese energy security refers not only to oil 
supply but also to energy efficiency. The idea of sustainable development is included in 
its policy goals. Section 5.3.2 indicates that a number of physical bodies have also 
been established to facilitate multilateral cooperation, which is an unusual practice for 
China. This section considers whether there was a profound change in China’s energy 
policy towards the EU during Hu Jintao’s era. 
 
China’s transformation into the world’s biggest energy consumer and greenhouse gas 
emitter has boosted the market for clean energy technology transfer and negotiation 
addressing climate change. During the era of Hu Jintao, energy cooperation between 
China and EU grew in both scale and formality. The two sides demonstrated efforts to 
advance the mechanisms of promoting energy cooperation.590 However, China had 
limited cooperation with the EU through multilateral cooperation.  






 See footnote 1. 
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Firstly, the effectiveness of the China–EU energy cooperative platform was limited. 
Most of the energy initiatives had a short mandate or limited funding, and there are no 
extension plans. According to interviewees, while certain types of collaboration, namely 
training, joint research, technology demonstration, and financial investment, were more 
warmly received by the Chinese side, sustainability was limited by the short 
cooperation mandate. 591  Moreover, clean energy is closely associated with 
environmental issues implying that the coordination and approval of China–EU clean 
energy initiatives involves different governmental departments. As a result, an 
administrative burden is created. As mentioned in Chapter 3, China has a fragmented 
energy governance structure with overlapping roles among different energy-related 
departments. Embedding energy with climate change and science tends to cause 
confusion in China’s governmental management. Besides, technology transfer brings 
out a variety of frictions in China–EU energy trade, such as intellectual property rights, 
market competition and differences in business culture that hinder the operation of 
China–EU energy cooperative initiatives. As a result, most of the cooperative initiatives 
in China–EU energy cooperation come and go and are merely sustained by official 
meetings at different time intervals. Ineffective cooperative initiatives indicate a low 
degree of appropriation and legitimacy of idea that multilateralism is practised via the 
physical structure. 
 
Secondly, the Chinese side prefers bilateral cooperation with EU Member States to 
multilateral cooperation with the EU as a whole. Chinese cooperation with multiple EU 
Member States via platforms established under the EU is classified as part of 
multilateralism. Yet, if China approaches an EU Member State outside these 
multilateral platforms, then it is considered to be a bilateral interaction. As reflected in 
the energy cooperation mechanism outlined in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, China’s 
partner can be the EU as a whole, the central government or the local government of 
each member, or companies and academic institutes with headquarters situated in 
these Member States. Facing a group of diversified stakeholders allows China to have 
various options in choosing its cooperation target and to enjoy better leverage in 
negotiation. China can maximize its advantages by switching between multilateral 
China–EU cooperation and bilateral China–EU Member State cooperation. 592 
Moreover, different EU Member States have their own specific strengths and business 
                                                                                                                                         
September 24, 2014 Beijing. July 18, 2013. Interview with a project coordinator at a Shanghai-







interests in regard to renewable energy.593 Also, China has a clear view of the exact 
partners that are suitable for particular projects.594 Another reason that China prefers 
bilateral agreements with EU Member States is their flexibility and effectiveness. In 
state-to-state deals, China finds it easier to proceed with concrete actions.595 Such a 
pragmatic approach hinders the level of Chinese participation in multilateral channels. 
 
Thirdly, the contemporary world is highly interdependent. China and the EU share 
common strategic interest in international cooperation responsive to their changing 
energy needs. However, Kerr and Yanzhuo point out that when confronted with a range 
of governance issues in either traditional or non-traditional security, in general, China 
and the EU have limited experience working together, as they hold different core 
assumptions.596 In China-EU energy cooperation, China prefers state-to-state bilateral 
cooperation to multilateral cooperation platform within EU.597 China is also reluctant to 
make use of the mechanisms and rules of the WTO to properly solve trade disputes 
with the EU in the clean energy sector. Although China has developed much in the way 
of bilateral relations, international cooperation and government policies to support and 
protect its FDI, China lacks confidence in the capability of international institutions to 
protect its national interests.598  
 
In sum, information collected through interviews with Chinese officials and researchers 
reflect that, during Hu Jintao’s era, there had not been much progress in EU–China 
energy cooperation, and most cooperation remained at the discussion level. Although it 
was a common goal to support China’s sustainable development, there were different 
objectives and interests among EU Member States. There was no clear plan for EU–
China sustainability collaboration, and the mandates of some joint energy projects 
lasted for a few years only. Moreover, some Chinese officials think that the EU 
unilaterally initiated the project on a voluntary basis and the Chinese merely agreed to 
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try, taking on no responsibility to maintain the cooperation. Most importantly, energy 
cooperation relied on energy companies, which were concerned with revenue first. 
Fierce competition in the clean energy market was an obstacle to China–EU energy 
cooperation.  
 
This chapter shows that China’s ideas of energy and energy security in its cooperation 
with the EU expanded to include ideas like environmental issues, sustainable 
development, technology transfer and clean energy. Yet, traditional concepts such as 
“energy as a fuel of the country’s economy” and “securing a reliable energy supply” 
remained in China’s blueprint; hence, the change in China’s energy paradigm is 
considered to be an expansion instead of a profound change. China had adjusted its 
policy goal by adding technology transfer and energy efficiency, which could be seen in 
its energy cooperation with the EU. The change in the goal of policy is also considered 
to be an expansion instead of a profound change. There were clear changes in policy 
instruments and physical structures in different paradigms reflected by the 
establishment of a variety of clean energy cooperation initiatives and multilateral 
platforms after the mid-2000s, particularly 2007. While there were multilateral forms of 
cooperation and high-level exchanges between China and the EU, the bilateral 
diplomatic approach remained an important form of cooperation. China remained 
reluctant to pursue multilateralism in energy cooperation because of obstacles like lack 
of mutual trust, weak IPR, differences in business cultures and interests, high levels of 
competition in the clean energy market, trade friction and operational limitations of joint 
research projects. In terms of the physical structure of governance, the Chinese 
approach during Hu Jintao’s era was far from global energy governance, mainly 
because the functions of the joint platforms were limited, as discussed above. The 
degree of appropriation and legitimacy of the idea of enhance multilateralism via joint 
platforms was low.  
 
Although there were changes in the form of expansion, the degree of change was not 
high in China’s understanding of energy security, policy goals, physical structures and 
policy instruments in China–Europe energy cooperation. In other words, first-order 
change and second-order change with respect to policy instruments and change in 
physical governance structure occurred in energy cooperation between China and the 
EU. A third-order change regarding ideas and policy goals towards global energy 
governance was not obvious. This section concludes that China’s energy security 
strategy towards the EU during the era of Hu Jintao did not undergo a profound change 







This chapter reviews the China–EU energy relationship and analyses whether China’s 
energy strategy was moving towards global energy governance. Two key elements in 
China–EU energy cooperation were top official exchange platforms and cooperation 
initiatives. China and the EU supported their energy cooperation bilaterally and 
multilaterally via platforms like the China–EU Energy Conference, the China–Europe 
High-Level Energy Working Group, the China–Europe Energy Dialogue and the EU-
China Summit. On the other hand, to facilitate the plans agreed to in these meetings, 
China and the EU have preliminarily established a structured cooperation mechanism 
with official promotion, involving personnel exchange and training, technology transfer 
and joint R&D and financial investment in the energy industry in both bilateral and 
multilateral approaches. A number of joint initiatives have been launched in China, 
including the China–EU Energy Training Programme, the Joint Energy and 
Environment Programme, the Europe–China Clean Energy Centre (EC2), the Near 
Zero Emission Coal Project and the China-EU Institute for Clean and Renewable 
Energy. However, the function of the above mechanisms during Hu Jintao’s era was 
limited, and Chinese authorities preferred to conduct energy cooperation bilaterally. 
Key obstacles included the lack of mutual trust in technology cooperation, friction in 
clean energy trade and insufficient cooperation between the public of Europe and 
China. Therefore, this chapter concludes that energy cooperation between China and 
the EU during Hu Jintao’s era did not undergo a profound change from a paradigm of 





Chapter 6 - China-African energy cooperation 
 
This chapter discusses the development of and changes in energy cooperation 
between China and Africa in the 21st century. Energy cooperation plays an important 
role in China’s relationship with Africa. Two key elements in their energy cooperation 
are Chinese energy investment in Africa and the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. 
They do not merely indicate the development and changes in the energy cooperation 
mechanism between China and Africa, but also reveal the rationales underpinning 
Chinese energy security in the region. By studying the case of China–Africa energy 
cooperation, this chapter aims to answer the question of whether China’s energy 
security has undergone a policy transition which has resulted in a paradigm shift away 
from the going-out energy diplomacy paradigm to the global energy governance 
paradigm during Hu Jintao’s era. 
 
Firstly, this chapter introduces the background to the Sino-African energy relationship 
and the foundation of their cooperation. It then provides a review of China’s energy 
diplomacy towards Africa as well as the ideas and rationales behind it. This is followed 
by an overview of the mechanisms which underpin energy cooperation between China 
and Africa in terms of Chinese energy investment in the region and multilateral 
platforms, particularly the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The above 
sections lay the foundation for analysis of the paradigm shift in China’s energy strategy, 
which is fully developed in the next section. This section includes a discussion of the 
impact of Chinese energy investment in Africa, China’s aid to Africa and the role of 
FOCAC in China’s energy security strategy in Africa. The last section of this chapter 
examines whether there has been a policy paradigm shift in China’s energy 
cooperation with Africa by applying the framework of five levels of energy policy 
aspects against which change can be measured. The discussions in the last two 
sections are based on a systematic analysis of official documents and communications 
and original primary data collected from interviews with senior Chinese energy experts 
who are involved in or witnessed the Sino-African energy cooperation. The method 
employed to analyse Chinese energy security in this chapter is original and departs 
from existing methods.  
 
6.1 The foundation of Sino-African energy cooperation 
 
The African continent is one of the key energy players in the world, and its oil industry 
has developed rapidly since the 1990s. Traditional oil producers, such as Nigeria, 
Algeria, Angola and Libya, are increasing petroleum exploration, while other new 
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developers, such as Sudan, Chad and Equatorial Guinea, aim to increase their output. 
New emerging producers such as Kenya, Namibia and Madagascar are expected to be 
joining the traditional ones. Meanwhile, Chad, Sudan, Namibia, South Africa and 
Madagascar are gas producers, while Mozambique and Tanzania are potential gas 
producers.599 It is notable that African oil producers, except for Nigeria, Algeria and 
Libya, are not Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member 
states,600 which means that there is great potential for development and exploration 
without the production restriction of cartels. African petroleum exploration has been 
accelerating, with a group of emerging oil producers spectacularly rising in prominence, 
which provides a broad space for China–Africa energy cooperation. 
 
According to the BP Statistical Energy Survey 2012, at the end of 2011, Africa had 
proved oil reserves of approximately 132 billion barrels, equivalent to around 8% of the 
world’s reserves, with an average production rate of approximately 8.8 million barrels of 
crude oil per day, equivalent to around 10.4% of what the world produces.601 These 
figures reflect not only the abundance of African natural resources, but also their 
importance to the regional economy in Africa. Almost 30% of African GDP and over 
70% of import–export revenue comes from natural-resource revenues.602  
 
In recent years, African economic development has had a close relationship with its 
blooming regional resources economy. However, the expansion of multiple sectors 
other than agriculture and natural resources contributes to GDP growth. While most 
foreign capital is attracted by Africa’s natural resources, it has also flowed into other 
sectors, such as construction, textiles, telecommunications and tourism. Since 2000, 
these sectors have generated around 70%603 of Africa’s GDP. According to a report 
from the African Development Bank, African countries have GDP growth rates above 
the global average level. One-third of Africa’s countries have GDP growth rates of more 
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than 6%.604 Out of the 20 countries with the fastest GDP growth rate in the world, 13 
are African. Compared to 2011, inflation in African countries has also been slowing 
down.605 Africa has become the continent with the fastest GDP growth rate in the world.  
 
While international oil firms have a long history of a dominant role in the African energy 
market, African energy producers are vigorously implementing the strategies of 
diversification of oil exploration.606 This offers a favourable environment for China’s oil 
enterprises to enter the African market and enhance China–Africa energy cooperation. 
In Africa, China became a competitor of other Western countries who had arrived a few 
centuries earlier. The early cooperators faced many obstacles in the continent, and 
China took advantage to create room for cooperation with African countries. 
 
Firstly, Chinese business models are more welcomed in Africa because China 
prioritises property over liberal concerns. Western companies are obligated to operate 
with high Western benchmarks relating to environmental damage, business 
transparency and human rights. In contrast, Chinese overseas investments always 
follow the mentality of non-interference in domestic affairs, and hence there are no 
political conditions in business contracts between China and Africa. 607  Although 
Western involvement brings positive values, such as human rights protection and 
business transparency, the Chinese offer more flexibility in doing business.608  
 
Secondly, China, as a new partner, gave Africa a more friendly impression in that it has 
no history of intervention in Africa.609 While China extracts resources from Africa, it also 
offers generous aid projects and development assistance. In addition to the notable 
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Tanzam Railway project, Beijing delivers a number of grants, interest-free loans and 
concessional loans on a bilateral level. Although China prioritises resource-rich 
countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia, “China’s approach has been 
one of mutual respect, also awarding small African countries with relatively little 
economic and political significance, with aid and investment support.”610  
 
Thirdly, Chinese labour is more economically competitive than Western labour. Most 
importantly, Chinese labourers and equipment are much cheaper, charging unbeatable 
prices. 611  China’s economic reform has created a frenzy of ambition among the 
Chinese to make a profit and send money home by working in Africa. Chinese 
labourers are very diligent, effective and disciplined, but ask for less, for example in 
connection with matters such as human rights protection, compared with Western 
labourers. They can tolerate living together in packed barracks and seldom 
complain.612 Senior staff from Chinese national oil companies in Africa also made the 
point that government and companies in Africa welcome the presence of the Chinese 
because of their low cost. 613  However, the perception of economically competitive 
Chinese labour is believed to be positive merely at company or government level, 





6.2 China’s energy strategy in Africa  
 
China started importing oil from Africa in 1992.614 The China–Africa energy relationship 
can be viewed within the broader picture of the China–Africa relationship, which started 
as a strategic partnership. Before the 1990s, political diplomacy was the main focus of 
the relationship between China and Africa. With the changes in the domestic and 
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international situations, multidirectional diplomacy was gradually instigated between 
China and Africa. China’s oil imports have increased year by year, levelling external 
dependency since the beginning of the new century. The stability of overseas oil supply 
is of great significance to China’s economic growth and social development. To 
maintain energy safety, diversification of overseas energy supply will be one of the 
important measures where energy-rich Africa could potentially fit in. To further develop 
the energy relations with Africa, China is committed to promoting bilateral and 
multilateral regional cooperation. In the bilateral cooperation, China attaches 
importance to developing economic, trade and security relations with the countries in 
Africa and enhancing their oil security interests. In addition, the multilateral cooperation 
is the seeking of regional economic and security integration in the framework of the 
FOCAC.   
 
6.2.1 China’s diplomatic principles towards Africa 
Since the establishment of China in 1949, its core diplomatic principles towards Africa 
have been elucidated by the Chinese authorities.615 Meanwhile, major meetings or 
summits between Chinese and African leaders are also key channels for setting the 
core diplomatic tone towards Africa. These channels have established direct exchange 
and communication at the highest official level since the 1960s. Mutual trust and 
respect are demonstrated between China and African countries.  
 
In 1955, when China was establishing its relationship with African countries, it 
proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Emphasising equality and 
mutual support, the Five Principles were well recognised by African countries.616 In 
1960, Chairman Mao Zedong met the leaders of 12 African countries and regions and 
said: “We are friends and we must all stand together on the same battlefront with the 
common opposition to imperialism and colonialism … The anti-colonial struggle of 
African countries has a worldwide significance … All our sympathy and support are with 
you. At the meantime, we think that your struggle gives support and help to us.”617 
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Premier Zhou’s visits to Africa in the early 1960s are regarded as the start of the Sino-
African diplomatic relationship because he won the friendship of many African nations 
and expanded China’s diplomatic reach. 618  He put forward the eight principles of 
foreign economic and technological assistance in early 1964.619 When African leaders 
visited China in return in the same year, Chairman Mao declared them to be close 
friends again.620  
 
In the 1980s, while China was expanding its economic partnership globally, its leaders 
visited Africa more frequently to reassure African leaders of the committed friendship 
between the two nations, as stated publicly: “We will not forget old friends when making 
new friends, or forget poor friends when making rich friends.”621 Meetings and summits 
have continued to be an important channel for applying China’s diplomatic principles 
and maintaining confidence in the Sino-African relationship. In the 1990s, China’s 
foreign ministers visited African nations as their first official stop abroad every year,622 
reflecting a symbolic respect for their African friends. In the 21st century, President Hu 
Jintao summed up the relationship between China and Africa as that of “good friends, 
good partners and good brothers”623. The FOCAC, a multilateral platform, has also 
been established to provide a mechanism for Chinese and African leaders to meet to 
promote Sino-African cooperation.  
 
6.2.2 China’s energy diplomacy towards Africa 
Africa has been one of China’s key targets in its energy diplomacy strategy. The 
Chinese government supports the investment of its Chinese national oil companies 
(CNOC) in Africa bilaterally and multilaterally. China’s energy diplomacy towards Africa, 
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with oil as a focus, can be divided into three stages: 1950–1979, 1980–1999 and 2000 
onwards. 
 
This first stage, 1950–1979, was the foundation stage. It established diplomatic 
relations with African countries, such as Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt and other major 
oil-producing countries, which laid a political foundation for the future petroleum 
diplomacy. Between 1950 and 1979, the newly established China developed friendly 
relations with independent African countries, such as Libya, Egypt and Ethiopia. The 
close political cooperation with these countries was a prelude to Sino-African 
diplomatic relations. 624  Before 1979, China had little investment in Africa, and the 
investment was limited to companies which were set up to implement specific projects, 
such as the China–Tanzania shipping joint venture. However, the political foundation 
was developed for future oil cooperation and exploration.625  
 
In the 1980s, China and African countries moved beyond political diplomacy and began 
to embark on economic cooperation. At this stage, Chinese direct investment in Africa 
had only just begun. It had a political aim and was the main way to promote the export 
of engineering equipment, raw materials and other Chinese products to Africa. 626 
Insisting on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, economic benefits and mutual 
development, China and a few oil-producing countries in Africa, such as Angola and 
Sudan, began petroleum cooperation. At this stage, petroleum diplomacy between 
China and Africa demonstrated three characteristics: firstly, there were no mature 
regulations and standards; secondly, the form of cooperation was monotonous and 
was not abundant; and, thirdly, there were few countries in Africa that were engaged in 
petroleum diplomacy with China. Nevertheless, China accumulated practical 
experience of independent investment in energy programmes and increased its 
competitiveness in international petroleum. 627  In general, before the 21st century, 
China’s energy shortage problems were not so obvious, and its oil imports from Africa 
accounted for only 20% of its total oil imports. Therefore, both African energy and its 
policy were not attractive to China, and the China-Africa cooperation policies were not 
carefully drawn up and implemented.628  
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Entering the 21st century, the Chinese economy had developed rapidly and the 
demand for petroleum was increasing. In order to ensure Chinese petroleum safety 
and to promote the diversification of energy imports, China accelerated African oil and 
gas cooperation. With the political foundation created and experience accumulated 
over five decades, China’s energy diplomacy towards Africa has become comparatively 
mature during this stage, reflected in three areas. First of all, according to Table 6.1, 
the amount of oil imported from Africa has been increasing, from 610,000 tons in 1992 
to 16,160,000 tons in 2002, and then up to 64,700,000 tons in 2012. After 10 years’ 
effort, China signed agreements on 27 large oil and gas programmes with 14 countries, 
including Sudan, Angola and Libya.629 Secondly, the oil cooperative field for China has 
become wider in the 21st century. China and African countries have started to move 
beyond oil trade and cooperate in other energy fields, such as oil exploration and 
development, extraction and transport. 630  Thirdly, based on the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence proposed in 1955, China has further improved the principles 
underpinning its energy diplomacy towards Africa. On 12 January 2006, in order to 
maintain long-term supply, exploration and investment, China issued China’s African 




Table 6.1: Imported Crude Oil from Africa to China (Years 1992–2012) (10,000 tons) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Algeria / / 1 13 / / / / / / / 
Egypt / / / / / 29 20 11 12 / / 
Angola 20 122 37 100 166 384 111 288 864 380 571 
E. Guinea / / / / / 20 24 81 92 215 178 
Congo / / / / / 98 38 38 145 64 105 
Gabon / 13 12 9 0 38 / 65 46 15 / 
Cameroon / / / / / / / 25 43 82 35 
Libya 30 71 / 21 14 7 14 13 13 25 / 
Nigeria / / / 39 / / 12 137 119 77 49 
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Sudan / / / / / 0 / 27 331 497 643 
Chad / / / / / / / / / / / 
Others 11 7 / 3 13 36 24 50 119 96 35 
Total 61 213 50 185 193 612 243 735 1784 1451 1616 
% of Yearly 
Total Crude Oil 
Import 
4% 14% 4% 11% 9% 17% 8% 20% 24% 22% 23% 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  
Algeria 13 68 82 26 161 90 161 175 217 257  
Egypt 8 / 8 / / / / 69 104 77  
Angola 1010 1621 1746 2345 2500 2989 3217 3938 3115 4016  
E. Guinea 146 348 384 527 328 271 222 82 176 200  
Congo 339 478 553 542 480 437 409 505 563 537  
Gabon / / / / 89 87 27 42 17 /  
Cameroon / / / / / 47 58 36 47 58  
Libya 13 134 226 339 291 319 634 737 259 731  
Nigeria 12 149 131 45 90 35 139 129 107 94  
Sudan 626 577 662 485 1031 1050 1219 1260 1299 251  
Chad / 83 55 55 / / 14 96 32 /  
Others 52 73 / 215 334 71 42 16 79 249  
Total 2219 3531 3847 4579 5304 5396 6142 7085 6015 6470  
% of Yearly 
Total Crude Oil 
Import 
24% 29% 30% 32% 33% 30% 30% 30% 24% 24%  
 
Source: International Petroleum Economics 1992 to 2013 published by CNPC 
Economics and Technology Research Institute 
 
 
6.2.3 China’s oil diplomacy towards Africa 
In general, China’s energy policy towards Africa aims to strengthen the oil cooperation 
with African countries and form closer ties, diversify energy supply sources to enhance 
energy security, reduce oil dependence on the Middle East region, help African 
countries to turn resource advantages into competitive advantages, and promote and 
realise the sustainable development of African countries and regions.632  
 
Realistically speaking, one of the key objectives of China’s oil diplomacy towards Africa 
is to strengthen the diversification of energy supply sources to enhance energy security 
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and reduce oil dependence on the Middle East.633 Meanwhile, close economic ties can 
be transformed into political mutual trust, which will deepen exchanges between China 
and Africa and build strong relationships. Establishing diplomatic ties is the first key 
step in this approach; therefore, Chinese leaders have attached great importance to 
Africa, especially in the past two decades. In order to encourage energy cooperation 
with the African oil-producing countries, Chinese leaders frequently visit Africa. In May 
1996, former President Jiang Zemin visited Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, achieving a series of energy cooperation results.634 Former Premier Wen 
Jiabao visited the oil producer Libya in 2003, and former President Hu Jintao visited 
Egypt, Gabon and Algeria in 2004.635 In 2006, leaders of 48 African countries gathered 
in the China–Africa Cooperation Forum in Beijing. They reached a consensus and 
made plans on energy cooperation. 636  To further consolidate the partnership with 
African countries, former Chinese President Hu Jintao visited five African countries in 
2009 and gave a speech entitled “Work Together to Write a New Chapter of China–
Africa Friendship” to promote China’s energy diplomacy towards Africa.637 
 
Since the establishment of China, Chinese and African leaders have visited each other 
frequently. From 2009 to 2012, over 20 Chinese top leaders visited African countries, 
and, in return, 32 heads of state, 17 vice presidents or deputy prime ministers and 10 
representatives from African countries visited China for different events. 638  China’s 
energy diplomacy has reached the major oil-producing countries in Africa. Whenever 
the Chinese leaders visited an African country, CNOCs, like CNPC, Sinopec and 
CNOOC, signed oil agreements with that country.639 
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Under the going-out strategy, China promoted various types of Chinese companies 
which had the reputation, strength and advantages to take part in the energy 
cooperation in Africa. In 2000, the Chinese government officially relaxed requirements 
for overseas investment in enterprises. It increased the proportion of assembly 
manufacturing and processing of components and equipment abroad, and also 
encouraged companies to build factories in Africa. Upon the request of the Chinese 
government, CNOC made a great effort to provide work opportunities and tax revenue 
for the local area, to pay attention to environmental protection and to actively 
participate in local public service during the process of investment and production in 
Africa.640 Up until the year in which China’s African Policy was formed, China had 
signed a bilateral trade agreement with 41 African countries, a bilateral encouragement 
and investment security treaty with 28 African countries, and an agreement on 
avoidance of double taxation with eight African countries.641  
 
Attaching great importance to promoting the investment in Africa, the Chinese 
government has decided to support relevant Chinese banks in setting up the China and 
Africa Development Fund, with a total amount of 500 million US dollars to be released 
gradually. 642  Creating favourable trade and investment conditions, China also 
encourages and supports strong and reputable Chinese companies to invest in projects 
that are conducive to improving the technology level, increasing employment and 
promoting the sustainable development of local economies and societies in Africa.643 
Pledging to further open the market to African countries, China will enhance the tax 
items of zero-tariff products exported from the least developed African countries that 
have diplomatic relations with China from 190 to over 440 and consult with relevant 
countries as soon as possible to sign agreements and put this into practice.644   
 
On 12 October 2000, the FOCAC’s Ministerial Conference 2000 was held in Beijing, 
and the Programme for China–Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social 
Development was signed in the closing ceremony. This multilateral platform further 
strengthened China’s diplomatic ties and hence energy relationship with African 
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countries. Under the commitment to social and economic cooperation, the programme 
pointed out that China and Africa realised the importance of natural resources and 
agreed to develop cooperation over their use. China agreed to invest in metallic 
resource exploration and use in Africa. The exploration and use of these resources was 
to be accelerated on the basis of equality and environmental protection.645 China and 
Africa were to establish a new type of strategic partnership in various fields, especially 
in the field of economic and social development, to revitalise, develop and expand 
cooperation in the 21st century. They also recognised the necessary efforts required to 
balance and expand trade and the need to help Africa improve its production capacity 
and realise export diversification, and they determined to cooperate and share 
experience to change Africa’s dependence on exporting primary and single products 
and raw materials.646 
 
6.3 The energy cooperation mechanism between China and Africa 
 
As the energy initiative has progressed with official promotion, China and Africa have 
preliminarily established a structured cooperation mechanism. Such a mechanism 
involves joint energy projects between the two big powers in both bilateral and 
multilateral approaches. CNOC investment, aid and the FOCAC are the main national 




6.3.1 The investment of CNOC in Africa 
The Chinese government’s reform of the management system of oil companies in the 
1990s created an opportunity to engage in overseas business. China’s national energy 
companies recognised that they must “change from using domestic resources to using 
both domestic and international resources and transform to adjust to the international 
operation of domestic and international markets”647. In early 1993, approved by the 
State Council, China United Oil Company was jointly founded by the Ministry of 
Economy and Trade, CNPC and China National Chemicals Import and Export 
Corporation, based on the principle of combining industry and trade. The purpose was 
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to maximise the advantages of both sides; wholly manage and operate the exploration, 
development, production, sales, import and export of oil and natural gas in the world; 
and participate in international competition.648  
 
In September 1995, CNPC signed contracts over six oil blocks with the Sudanese 
government and developed the oil industry in the region. The Sudan project is regarded 
as an important breakthrough for CNOCs’ global investment.649 In November 1996, the 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company was formed by CNPC and several other 
international oil corporations to develop oil resources in blocks 1, 2 and 4 in Sudan.650 
In March 1997, CNPC signed an agreement with Sudan to jointly construct the 
Khartoum refinery. By the end of 2003, with a total investment of 2.7 billion dollars in 
Sudan, CNPC had constructed 1,506 kilometres of pipelines, a crude oil refinery with 
an annual output of 2.5 million tons and several gas stations, creating an entire oil 
industry system integrating exploration, production, refining, transportation and 
sales.651 In the mid-2000s, the oil cooperation between China and Africa made great 
progress. Other notable achievements were the cooperation agreement on energy, 
mineral resources and infrastructure signed by China and Angola in February 2005; 
Sinopec’s acquisition of Angola’s exploration district in the same year; and CNOOC’s 
purchase of 45% equity in Nigeria’s No. 130 deep-sea block.652 
 
Regarding recent direct investment, CNOOC has completed the purchase of 66.67% of 
the Ugandan licences of Tullow Oil plc for 2.9 billion dollars.653 The two parties have 
been working closely since March 2011, and based on their timetable, major production 
should commence in 2016. CNOOC has obtained 33.33% of the licence for Exploration 
Areas 1, 2 and 3A in the Lake Albert Basin and will share the operating responsibilities 
with other partners. In mid-2013, CNPC completed its purchase of a 28.57%654 stake in 
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Eni East Africa, which held a 70% interest in the Area 4 gas block in offshore 
Mozambique before the deal. CNPC secured its interest with 4.21 billion dollars to 
participate indirectly in the Mozambique Rovuma Basin, where Eni has discovered at 
least 75 Tcf of gas. There have since been further gas discoveries in the gas-rich 
Rovuma Basin in offshore Mozambique, so the East African country could be one of 
the world’s largest LNG exporters in the future. CNPC’s entrance into the Mozambique 
LNG sector is strategically significant for extending Sino-African energy cooperation to 
a new domain. Following the new discovery and production of oil and gas in Africa, 
China is expected to increase its investment in the continent.655  
 
In the meantime, energy cooperation between China and Africa is not limited to gas 
and oil. Both sides have a long history of coal cooperation, and this partnership has 
become more mature and diversified in the 2000s. In the area of coal exploitation, 
China Africa Sunlight Energy Private Limited (CASECO) launched an integrated coal-
mining and electricity-generation project in north-west Zimbabwe.656 According to the 
contract, CASECO will invest in the mining of coal, the extraction of coalbed methane 
and the construction of a 600-megawatt power station in Zimbabwe. In the area of coal 
investment, Haohua Energy International Hong Kong Resource Cooperation (HEI) 
reached a deal with Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL).657 In the deal, CoAL agreed to sell 
the company’s shares to HEI. With the funds, CoAL can upgrade its processing plant 
and boost coal production for international and domestic markets. HEI will become the 
largest shareholder in the African coal industry.  
 
Renewable energy is another highlight of Sino-African cooperation. Since 2012, African 
renewable energy has undergone rapid development due to governmental support. For 
example, South Africa has launched a solar water-heater project for 128,000 citizens, 
and plans to build a 5,000-megawatt power plant and to invest 90 billion dollars in 
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renewable energy in the next 20 years. 658  Although African renewable-energy 
development lacks experience, technological support and regional demand, there is 
still great market potential with considerable possible revenue. Therefore, transnational 
companies, including Chinese companies, have expressed interest in entering the 
African renewable-energy market. In 2012, they remained at a discussion level and 
attitudes were positive. Some interested Chinese renewable-energy companies, such 
as Trony Solar Holdings Co. Ltd, even set up offices in Africa in advance to facilitate 
business expansion to African countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan. 
As China’s close partners, African countries also welcome Chinese companies. In the 
China PV Summit 2012,659 18 African delegates visited China to promote renewable-
energy investment opportunities in their countries. In addition, the National 
Development and Reform Commission also encouraged Chinese solar companies to 
get on board and invest in Africa.  
 
By observing the above cases, it can be seen that China’s oil companies, in their 
overseas business, take the bilateral approach of national oil strategies, become 
involved in oil construction projects in oil export countries directly and obtain a certain 
share of the oil production of cooperation projects through production sharing, joint 
ventures, rent, services and in other ways. The share of oil gained can be either 
shipped back to China directly or resold on the international oil market. In addition, by 
mergers and acquisitions, China’s oil companies also expand overseas business, while 
the mergers and acquisitions mainly focus on the upstream sectors of the oil and gas 
industry.  
 
6.3.2 Official humanitarian aid 
Africa is the poorest area in the world with the lowest economic development level, and 
34 of the 50 least developed countries in the world are in Africa.660 Based on this 
situation, China has provided precious support and aid within its capabilities to African 
peoples since 1956. For the next 50 years, China’s aid to Africa will be around 44.4 
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billion yuan in total along with the implementation of about 900 infrastructure and social 
public welfare projects.661 
 
Chinese aid to Africa can be divided into two stages. The first stage was from 1949 to 
1978, in which China established the policies and guidelines regarding aid to Africa. 
During this stage, China’s policy towards Africa focused mainly on politics, fully 
supporting the independence movements in Africa, which went beyond mere moral 
support and extended to the provision of weapons and human assistance to cultivate 
military and political power for the movement.662 In line with the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence 663  and the Eight Principles for Foreign Economic and 
Technological Assistance,664 the purpose of foreign aid is equality and mutual benefit, 
respecting the sovereignty of the recipient, practically assisting countries’ self-reliance 
and striving to benefit the recipient. Nowadays, both sets of principles still have guiding 
significance in aid to Africa. The second stage was from 1978 onwards. Slight changes 
were made to China’s aid to Africa from an originally politically oriented policy to one 
which encouraged and supported the developing countries’ economic development. 
Since neither China nor African countries are economically well developed, the growth 
of the national economy is a top priority for both of them.  
 
In the first stage, from 1949 to 1978, project construction, which comprised material 
assistance as well as sending experts, was the main form of Chinese aid to Africa. 
After China’s economic system reform, there has been a diversification in the type of 
aid, including donations, interest-free loans, discount loans, technical assistance, 
project construction, direct factory construction, expert guidance, labour services, 
personnel training, technical training, technical management guidance, preferential 
loans, investment and trade, construction, heavily indebted poor countries’ debt relief, 
training for trade officials, natural disaster emergency aid, etc. The Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce stated that, up until 2012, China’s total direct investment in Africa was more 
than 15 billion US dollars in over 50 countries. China has built more than 100 schools, 
30 hospitals, 30 resistance centres and 20 centres of agricultural technology 
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demonstration for African countries, and it plans to send more doctors to the continent. 
In addition, China is expected to increase financial support to African countries to 20 
billion dollars, which is double that of 2012.665 China’s aid does not only support African 
political independence and the economic development and social progress of countries; 
it also promotes the development of China–Africa economic and trade relations and 
bilateral relations, expanding the extent of China’s diplomacy and international 
influence.  
 
Chinese scholars argue that Chinese aid to African countries is not a “plundering oil” 
aid, as Western countries perceive. Rather, it is mutually beneficial for China to invest 
money and technology in helping African countries develop oil and construct public 
facilities, and for the recipient to sell oil to China through the international market.666 For 
example, in 2002, when Angola suffered severe economic development difficulties, 
China first offered a commercial loan of public services, which would be repaid with oil, 
and signed a framework agreement. This pattern promotes the economic development 
of the recipient countries and alleviates the present pressure of China’s oil shortage.667 
China’s African policies made it clear that the Chinese government will, according to 
their own financial resources and economic development, continue to offer aid to 
African countries and gradually increase this with no conditions attached.668 Aid to 
Africa has played an important role in defending China’s sovereignty and unity and 
supporting its economic development. More importantly, providing aid to Africa, directly 
or indirectly, not only promotes the economic development of African countries but can 
also keep China’s oil supply stable.  
 
As a developing country, China’s economic aid to African countries is regarded as 
“South-South cooperation”. Other than general supplies and financial loans, China 
helps African countries to build roads, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure, and 
contributes to the provision of urban water supplies and social welfare projects.669 In 
this “South-South cooperation”, China provides development opportunities to African 
countries, and Africa does the same in return, becoming involved in economic 
cooperation projects. For example, China combined aid to Sudan with an oil 
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development project. In 1995, Sudan signed an agreement with China to enjoy 
preferential government loans at a discounted rate.670 After that, the CNPC used the 
Chinese government’s preferential loans to sign an agreement over oil production 
involving six blocks (Muglad), sharing with the Sudanese government and participating 
in oil cooperation over blocks 1, 2 and 4. 
 
Some Chinese scholars believe that aid to Sudan, particularly that invested in its oil 
industry, is an important factor as to why the African oil producer became the source of 
Africa’s largest oil exports to China.671 By the end of 2006, 53 countries had accepted 
China’s aid without political conditions. Due to China’s aid and guidance, more than 
800 projects have been set up and implemented in African countries. China provided 
concessional loans for 33 projects involving construction of infrastructure in 22 
countries in Africa.672 At the same time, CNPC cooperated with African producers of oil 
in offering to build infrastructure free of charge, for example providing assistance with 
the construction of local hospitals and roads to promote the economic development of 
the recipient countries and improve their living standards. According to the Institute of 
West Africa at CASS, in nearly a decade, CNPC invested 32.28 million dollars in total 
in Sudanese local infrastructure, not only solving employment problems for local 
residents, but also improving their living standards.673  
 
6.3.3 China’s energy cooperation via the FOCAC 
Established in 2000, the FOCAC is a multilateral platform for exchange and 
cooperation between China and African countries that have formal diplomatic 
relationships with China, and covers various aspects of politics, economy, trade, 
society and culture. 674  The FOCAC represents a new strategic partnership model 
between China and Africa in solving global issues, including those to do with energy. 
According to an official FOCAC document, the basis of the forum is “political equality 
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and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and two-way cultural exchanges, 
opening a new chapter in China–Africa relationship”675. There is a common perception 
that the Chinese government initiated the FOCAC,676 and some even argue that the 
forum is part of China’s grand strategy. 677  However, Africa has also been heavily 
involved in promoting the establishment of the FOCAC. As discussed in previous 
sections, China’s foreign policy in Africa is important for its energy security, in that 
China’s investment in Africa is also determined by its growing need for energy 
resources. 678  This section first discusses the progress of the FOCAC in energy 
cooperation. 
 
6.3.3.1 The progress of the FOCAC regarding energy cooperation 
There have been five FOCAC ministerial conferences to date, the third coinciding with 
the China–Africa Summit. FOCAC ministerial conferences are held every three years, 
and alternate between China and an African country. (See Table 6.2 for information and 
the key commitment of each conference.) After the first FOCAC, the Chinese 
government attached great importance to the follow-up work of the conference. In the 
same year, they established a follow-up action committee consisting of more than 20 
ministries and commissions so as to guarantee the implementation of the commitment 
made at the forum. After the first conference, China agreed to promote investment in 
and exploration and beneficiation of metallurgical resources.679 
 
The second conference in 2003 paid specific attention to the new measures that could 
be taken to deepen cooperation on human resource development, agriculture, 
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infrastructure, investment and trade. The conference passed the FOCAC Addis Ababa 
Action Plan (2004–2006), which mapped out a three-year programme for China–Africa 
cooperation in political, economic, trade and social development as well as other areas. 
The Chinese government made commitments to open up the market and grant tariff-
free market access to some commodities from the least developed countries in 
Africa.680 Both sides agreed to strengthen their consultations on cooperation in natural 
resources exploration, particularly energy development, and work out modalities to 
promote the objectives.681 
 
The conference was the first ministerial conference ever held in Africa, which is of great 
significance in China–Africa relations. The conference highlighted the cooperation 
between Chinese and African companies. The first China–Africa Business Conference 
was held in parallel with the Second Ministerial Conference. Over 500 Chinese and 
African entrepreneurs attended the conference. There were more than 600 talks. 
Seventeen Chinese companies signed cooperation agreements with those companies 
from Africa, covering 20 projects with a total value of 700 million US dollars.682 
 
The Third Ministerial Conference was held in 2006, which was the 50th year since 
China had started diplomatic relations with African countries. Forty-eight African 
countries, as well as 24 representatives from international and regional organisations, 
attended the opening ceremony. 683  The conference passed the Declaration of the 
Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation and the FOCAC Beijing 
Action Plan (2007–2009). These documents aimed to develop a new type of strategic 
partnership between China and Africa, characterised by the development of political 
equality and mutual trust, win–win cooperation and cultural exchanges, and, more 
importantly, with more focus on energy cooperation. 
 
Both sides also agreed to “promote joint exploration and rational exploitation of energy 
and other resources through diversified forms of cooperation”, let China “help African 
countries turn their advantages in energy and resources into development strengths”, 
and “step up scientific and technological cooperation in areas of common interest 
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including solar energy and mining”.684 Five key decisions influencing energy trade that 
were made by China during the conference were to double its 2006 assistance to Africa 
by 2009; to provide 3 billion US dollars of preferential loans and 2 billion US dollars of 
preferential buyer’s credits to Africa in the following three years; to set up a China–
Africa development fund which would reach 5 billion US dollars to encourage Chinese 
companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them; and to cancel debt in the 
form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by 
the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and the least developed countries (LDCs) 
in Africa that had diplomatic relations with China.685  
 
The second China–Africa Business Conference was held in parallel with the Third 
Ministerial Conference. Premier Wen Jiabao put forward five suggestions on 
strengthening China–Africa cooperation, which were to expand the size of China–Africa 
trade, to increase cooperation in investment, to upgrade assistance to Africa, to 
promote cooperation between the business communities and to increase assistance to 
Africa in human resources development. Chinese and African representatives from 
business communities had dialogue on economic and trade cooperation. The Beijing 
Summit not only marked the maturity of China–Africa relations, but was also a 
milestone in China–Africa friendship. Together with the China African Policy proposed 
in the same year, the above-mentioned steps fully demonstrated the Chinese 
government’s devotion to developing its new type of strategic partnership with Africa 
actively and pragmatically.  
 
The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC was held in Sharm el-Sheikh and 
passed the Declaration of Sharm el-Sheikh of the FOCAC and the FOCAC Sharm el-
Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012). The documents proposed eight new measures to 
strengthen China–Africa cooperation, and at least four of them were related to energy. 
The first of these four was the establishment of a China–Africa partnership in 
addressing climate change, to hold senior officials’ consultations with African countries 
from time to time and enhance cooperation on satellite weather monitoring, 
development and utilisation of new energy sources, prevention and control of 
desertification, and urban environmental protection. China decided to build 100 clean-
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energy projects for Africa covering solar power, bio-gas and small hydropower.686 The 
second of these measures was to enhance cooperation with Africa in science and 
technology. China proposed to launch a China–Africa science and technology 
partnership including those in the energy field. China would carry out 100 joint 
demonstration projects on scientific and technological research, receive 100 African 
postdoctoral fellows to conduct scientific research in China, and assist these fellows in 
going back and serving their home countries.687 The other two measures were to help 
Africa build up financing capacity, including in the area of energy, and to open up 
China’s market to African products.688 
 
The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC was held in 2012, again in Beijing, and 
passed the Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on 
China–Africa Cooperation and the Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015). The document 
included more proposals on energy cooperation, including prioritising infrastructure in 
China–Africa cooperation in energy, supporting joint development and proper use of 
their energy and resources through enterprises, helping African countries translate their 
energy and resources strength into development strength, and advancing cooperation 
in clean energy and renewable resources projects in keeping with the principles of 
mutual benefit and sustainable development.689 
 
All previous FOCAC ministerial conferences and their follow-up actions have had a 
great impact and deepened bilateral cooperation between China and Africa. The 
FOCAC functions as a mechanism to promote diplomatic, trade, security and 
investment relations between China and African countries, institutionalising support for 
Chinese oil companies that have become the new economic vanguard of China’s 
diplomatic thrust into the continent. Through the FOCAC process, China has cancelled 
Africa’s debt, facilitated expanded market access, provided a wide range of new 
opportunities for positive engagement and expanded their energy cooperation. Based 
on the data in Table 6.1, following the establishment of the FOCAC in 2000, oil export 
from Africa to China soared from 17,840,000 tons to approximately 45,790,000 tons in 
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2005, which is a twofold increase in five years. The top 11 African countries exporting 
oil to China were Algeria, Egypt, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and Chad. 
 
Table 6.2: The History of FOCAC Conferences 




2000 Beijing Declaration 
of the FOCAC; 
Guideline of China–
Africa Cooperation 
in Economic and 
Social Development 
• Promote political cooperation, create a 
favourable environment for China–Africa business 
affiliation and trade; 
• Provide assistance to African countries; 
• Give preference to importing African products; 
• Establish China–Africa Joint Business Council 
and China– Africa Products Exhibition Centre to 
promote bilateral trade and to facilitate access for 
African products to the Chinese market; 
• Provide special funds to support well-established 
Chinese enterprises to invest in African countries; 
• Cancel RMB10 billion in HIPC and LDC debts; 
and 





2003 FOCAC – Addis 
Ababa Action Plan 
(2004–06) 
• Enhance cooperation in the development of 
human resources, train 10,000 African personnel; 
• Open up market and grant free tariff access for 
some commodities from the LDCs in Africa; 
• Strengthen their consultations on cooperation of 
natural resources exploration, particularly energy 
development, and work out modalities to promote 
the objectives; 
• Sponsor the “Meeting in Beijing”; and 
• Increase people-to-people exchanges with Africa 







2006 Declaration of the 
Beijing Summit of 
the FOCAC; 
FOCAC – Beijing 
Action Plan (2007–
09) 
• Double the 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009; 
• Provide US$3 billion of preferential loans and $2 
billion of preferential buyer’s credits; 
• Set up CADF, the funding to reach $5 billion to 
encourage Chinese companies to invest in African 
countries and support them; 
• Build an AU conference centre; 
• Cancel debts owed by HIPCs that matured at the 
end of 2005; 
• Increase the number of export items from 190 to 
over 440, offer zero-tariff treatment to the 30 
African LDCs; 




• Promote joint exploration and rational 
exploitation of energy and other resources through 
diversified forms of cooperation; 
• Help African countries turn their advantages in 
energy and resources into development strengths; 
• Step up scientific and technological cooperation 
in areas of common interest, including agricultural 
bio-technology, solar energy utilisation, geological 
survey, mining and development of new medicine; 
• Train 15,000 African professionals and send 100 
senior agricultural experts to Africa. Set up 10 
special agricultural centres; 
• Build 30 hospitals, provide artemisinin (anti-
malaria drug) to the value of RMB300 million and 
build 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres 
in Africa; 
• Dispatch youth volunteers to Africa; and 
• Build 100 rural schools in Africa and increase 
Chinese scholarships for African students from 




2009 Declaration of 
Sharm el-Sheikh of 
the FOCAC; 
FOCAC – Sharm el-
Sheikh Action Plan 
(2010–12) 
• Establish a China–Africa partnership to respond 
to climate change and build 100 clean-energy 
projects for Africa; 
• Enhance cooperation with Africa in science and 
technology: launch a China–Africa science and 
technology partnership, carry out 100 joint 
scientific and technological research 
demonstration projects and accept 100 African 
postdoctoral fellows to conduct scientific research 
in China; 
• Provide $10 billion concessional loans to African 
countries and set up a $1 billion special loan for 
small and medium African businesses; 
• Cancel debts associated with interest-free 
government loans due to mature by the end of 
2009; 
• Give zero-tariff treatment to 95% of products 
from African LDCs; 
• Increase Chinese-built agricultural technology 
demonstration centres in Africa to 20 and send 50 
agricultural technology teams to Africa to train 
2,000 African agricultural technicians; 
• Provide medical equipment and anti-malaria 
equipment worth RMB500 million to hospitals and 
196 
 
malaria prevention and treatment centres, and 
train 3,000 doctors and nurses for Africa; 
• Build 50 China–Africa friendship schools, train 
1,500 school principals and teachers, and 
increase Chinese scholarships to Africa to 5,500 
by 2012; and 





2012 The Beijing 
Declaration of the 
Fifth Ministerial 
Conference of the 
FOCAC and the 
Beijing Action Plan 
(2013–2015) 
• Tap its advantages in railway technology to 
support Africa’s efforts in developing and 
modernising its railway networks;  
• Make active use of grants, interest-free loans 
and concessional loans to help the development of 
African countries; 
• Train 30,000 African professionals in various 
sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and 
take measures to improve the content and quality 
of the training programmes; 
• Launch the “science and technology for a better 
life” campaign in Africa and implement the joint 
research and technology demonstration projects; 
• Prioritise infrastructure in China–Africa 
cooperation and strengthen cooperation in 
transport, telecommunications, radio and 
television, water conservancy, electricity, energy 
and other areas of infrastructure development; 
• Support joint development and proper use of 
Africa’s energy and resources by enterprises; 
• Help African countries translate their energy and 
resources strength into development strength; 
• Advance cooperation in clean energy and 
renewable resources projects in keeping with the 
principles of mutual benefit and sustainable 
development; 
• Offer US$20 billion of credit to African countries; 
and 
• Launch cooperation projects in science and 
technology, as well as information and 
communication technology, which will further help 
strengthen Africa’s industrialisation processes. 
 
Source:  
FOCAC Archive (2000) Programme for China–Africa Cooperation in Economic and 
Social Development 
FOCAC Archive (2004) Forum on China–Africa Cooperation – Addis Ababa Action Plan 
197 
 
FOCAC Archive (2006) Forum on China–Africa Cooperation – Beijing Action Plan 
(2007–2009) 
FOCAC Archive (2009) Forum on China–Africa Cooperation – Sharm el-Sheikh Action 
Plan (2010–2012) 
FOCAC Archive (2012) The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015). 
 
6.4 Analysis of paradigm shift of China–Africa energy cooperation 
 
With increasing cooperation between China and Africa in the field of energy, several 
obvious features and obstacles have appeared. This section analyses these features in 
relation to the framework of five aspects of energy policy against which change can be 
measured to answer the question of whether there is a policy paradigm shift from 
bilateral-based energy diplomacy to multilateral-based global energy governance in 
China’s energy cooperation with Africa. It is notable that Chapter 3 marked 2007 as the 
watershed year in the development of Chinese energy security and policy. While the 
period before 2007 can be regarded as the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy 
relying on bilateralism, the period after can be viewed as the policy paradigm of global 
energy governance relying on multilateralism.  
 
6.4.1 Policy goal 
It is not surprising that in such a broad economic context, Africa has turned into a major 
energy supplier for China. Of particular interest to the West is China’s growing 
expansion into Africa’s energy markets, particularly oil. Nevertheless, with China’s 
rapidly expanding activities in Africa, international concerns over Chinese behaviour 
are deepening, and calls for Beijing to be a more responsible world power are 
increasing. Much has been debated about China’s growing influence in Africa and 
around the world. China’s rapidly developing ties to Africa are a result of the following 
combined factors.  
 
As discussed in Section 6.2, China’s interests within its relations with Africa regarding 
resources intimately combine its energy demands and diplomacy towards the continent. 
In summary, there is one short-term goal and one long-term goal behind Chinese oil 
diplomacy in Africa. In the short term, China has to secure oil supplies to feed its 
growing domestic economy, and in the long term, China is aiming to grow as a global 
player in the international oil market. The need to secure natural resources is the 
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driving component behind China’s foreign policy towards Africa. 690  China’s 
manufacturing sector has created an enormous demand for aluminium, copper, nickel, 
iron ore and oil. The dramatic energy investments discussed in Section 6.3.1 are the 
clearest sign that Africa figures prominently in China’s overall energy strategy. David 
Zweig pointed out that China has linked its foreign policy to its domestic development 
initiatives via the going-out strategy to an unprecedented level by encouraging state-
controlled companies to seek out exploration and supply contracts with commodity-
producing countries.691 An interviewee argues that maximisation of profit is the ultimate 
purpose of CNOCs’ investment in Africa692. However, a number of interviewees pointed 
out that the Sino-African energy relationship is increasingly defined by a combination of 
economic and political considerations, which can be seen through CNOCs’ major 
investments in acquiring African oil and gas.693  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, China is one of the key global economic players, 
with a high economic growth rate. Any slowdown or collapse of such a growth regime 
will have an impact on its domestic political stability. China’s economic reform in the 
1980s and entry into the WTO in 2002 further opened the door for trade, making 
Chinese investment abroad easier. Africa, with huge resource potential, has become a 
major destination for Chinese overseas expansion. Section 1 also points out two 
factors: that while African developing countries have hopes that their experience with 
China will be more positive than their past experiences with Western powers, the 
decreasing influence of Western power in Africa provides room for China to make 
inroads into the continent. In considering the aforementioned factors, it is important to 
avoid drawing overly simplistic conclusions regarding China’s policies in Africa. While 
China’s going-out strategy is driven primarily by the energy demand that is needed for 
its own economic development, it does not have a well-planned agenda for taking over 
the resources in the continent. The fragmented governance of China’s energy sector, 
discussed in Chapter 3, results in the lack of a single and linear Chinese policy for all 
the African countries. It is also difficult for Chinese energy authorities to control the 
outcome of its engagement with a rapidly expanding network of African state and 
private actors who have entered the energy markets.694 Some interviewees claim that 
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both the Chinese government and CNOC are still in the learning stage of the going-out 
strategy and are learning from bad experiences, such as investment in Sudan.695 
 
Although the leadership of CNOC has a close connection with the Chinese government, 
some analysts and US policymakers caution against conflating China’s foreign policy 
goals with the actions of its energy firms. James Swan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs, noted in a June 2008 Congressional testimony: “There are 
often exaggerated charges that Chinese firms’ activities or investment decisions are 
coordinated by the Chinese government as some sort of strategic gambit in the high-
stakes game of global energy security. In reality, Chinese firms compete for profitable 
projects not only with more technologically and politically savvy international firms, but 
also with each other.”696 It is reasonable that the Beijing authority may have an overall 
strategic concept about its role in Africa, but China is not a monolithic polity. CNOCs 
are, in some cases, politically stronger than the government departments responsible 
for regulating them, given that China’s overseeing agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, do not always have authority over 
Chinese corporations overseas. 697  In some cases, for example China’s pipeline 
construction in Sudan, the leadership of CNOCs even criticised officers from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not offering swift diplomatic assistance in the region. 
Meanwhile, CNOCs are often criticised for unfair labour practices, human rights 
problems and poor management in their energy business in Africa, and these difficult 
situations reflect that in the energy sector, the Beijing authority lacks the capability to 
control these powerful companies so that they remain aligned with the official strategy 
in Africa of a win–win situation. 
 
The discussion in Section 6.2.2 highlights that China’s energy diplomacy towards Africa 
is an evolving strategy. Moreover, due to the lack of a linear African policy, a pan-
African approach was not possible for China until 2006, when the Chinese government 
issued the China African Policy. The document claims that “China is ready to enhance 
consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and financial 
institutions” and “will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African 
countries … in bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve 
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understanding and expand cooperation”.698 Since energy resources are regarded as a 
key component in Sino-African trade, the above claims laid down the multilateral 
foundation for both sides to “encourage and support competent Chinese enterprises to 
cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual 
benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources”699. 
This also echoes the analysis in Chapter 3 that 2007 was the watershed for China’s 
energy strategy in shifting from a bilateral to a multilateral approach.  
 
6.4.2 Policy instruments 
In order to achieve its policy goal on energy security regarding Africa, China has 
adopted a series of instruments, including a variety of joint projects and energy 
diplomacy on both bilateral and multilateral levels. These instruments are 
complementary to each other and reveal the change in Chinese policy instruments in 
Africa. Based on the existing energy cooperation between China and African countries 
listed in Section 6.3.1 and counter-examination with former overseas staffs from 
CNOC,700 the major cooperation mechanisms of the two sides are resource-backed 
development loans, special trade and economic cooperation zones, and aids based on 
non-interference policy. 
 
Resource-backed development loans 
Resource-backed development loans offered by China to African countries are an 
initiative to exchange energy resources for loans. In the late 1970s, China leveraged its 
natural resources, including oil and coal, to attract loans from Japan, together with 
technology and infrastructure for railway, port and hydropower projects, and power 
grids. It did not qualify as official foreign aid but did help development. China applied 
the same model in its energy cooperation with African countries and concluded similar 
deals in which China offered loans or infrastructure construction services in exchange 
for natural resources.701 For example, under this initiative, Chinese companies have 
built roads, railways, hospitals and schools for Angola; offered financial support for 
electricity projects in Nigeria; and built one hydropower project for Congo. Most of 
these loans are issued by the Export-Import Bank of China, a Chinese export credit 
agency. Poor but resource-rich countries often fall under the “energy curse”, but 
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resource-backed development loans can function as an “agency of restraint” to make 
sure the wealth from natural resources is spent on the development of the country.702 
 
Special trade and economic cooperation zones 
China has built seven special trade and economic cooperation zones in African 
countries, including Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Zambia and Algeria.703 Building 
special trade and economic cooperation zones is an initiative which can promote 
industrialisation and employment in Africa’s least developed countries. 704  Special 
economic zones were an important feature of China’s early development and are 
designed to be sustainable in the long term. Chinese companies have been setting up 
businesses or factories in Africa, but a project-based approach is not sustainable for 
development because the Chinese company might leave if the benefits decline or the 
host governments lose interest. 705  In contrast, in a special trade and economic 
cooperation zone, Chinese companies have to take responsibility for both designing 
the zone and managing it as their own business.706 A Chinese-initiated special trade 
and economic zone indicates a long-term local presence as strategic positioning for the 
future.  
 
Aid based on non-interference policy  
China is willing to get into “troubled zones” not only with bold investment, but also with 
aid packages in exchange for energy. Aid from China can be attractive for developing 
countries because China attaches no conditions, in contrast with aid from Western 
countries or institutions like the World Bank, which is often tied up with economic or 
political penalties as well as promotion of democracy or human rights concerns.707 
Chinese loan policies also tend to be less transparent, and hence recipients may have 
more flexibility in using such loans. As an African newspaper put it: “Chinese aid is as 
likely to subsidize profligate and/or dictatorial governments as it is to advance the 
welfare of ordinary Africans.”708 The contradiction was well illustrated in 2006 when 
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China attempted to secure an important oil exploration agreement, and, on the same 
day, the Dutch government suspended almost 150 million US dollars of aid to Kenya 
because of concerns over corruption.709 Moreover, linked with aid, China can promote 
economic projects or infrastructure projects in areas of Africa which other governments 
perceive to be risky or unfeasible.  
 
The above three initiatives are crucial to China–Africa cooperation, as they intensify it 
and result in a structural leap, if not transformation, in how China approaches Africa 
regarding energy issues. As discussed in Section 6.2, for over half a century, China 
and African countries have had close political and economic ties, with frequent 
leadership-level exchanges, a massive amount of investment and intensifying 
cooperation. The bilateral trade and economic cooperation between China and Africa 
has grown rapidly, and cooperation has expanded in a variety of fields relevant to 
policy, economy, science, education, culture, public health, social affairs, and peace 
and security. 710  Therefore, both parties have attempted to look for “redoubled 
cooperation” to deal with international or regional affairs, having adopted a policy 
document aimed at strengthening their ties. 711  Therefore, China issued the China 
African Policy in 2006, which put Sino-African cooperation forward in a multilateral way. 
The above initiative has laid down a solid foundation which has transformed the policy 
instrument from bilateral to multilateral. 
 
6.4.3 Physical structure of the energy policy 
The FOCAC is the lynchpin of Sino-African relations. Driven by a joint ministerial 
conference held every three years since 2000, the FOCAC emphasises the planned 
cultivation of a long-term relationship based on solidarity and cooperation. This 
platform has strengthened Sino-African cooperation in all spheres. Through the 
FOCAC, China has facilitated and expanded market access, promoted a variety of 
engagement and cancelled Africa’s debt, providing a wide range of new opportunities 
for positive engagement. The FOCAC has provided China with a platform to strengthen 
its economic interests as well as offering humanitarian aid in Africa. As discussed in 
Section 3.3, although China is well aware that Africa is rich with resources, the main 
driver of the FOCAC is not linked to energy. Instead, the key initiative of the FOCAC is 
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to do with the overall development of the developing world, the tie between developing 
countries and the promotion of a just and equitable new international order. It functions 
as a regular platform for meetings and exchange between leaders from China and 
Africa.  
 
The engagement of the FOCAC is multifaceted, encapsulating mainly trade and related 
economic ties. Therefore, although the original initiative of FOCAC was not about 
energy, it is closely related to energy because China has increasing energy trade and 
investment in Africa. China will promote effective measures to facilitate market access 
and duty-free treatment of commodities, expanding and balancing bilateral trade and 
optimising trade structure. It also intends to settle trade disputes via bilateral and 
multilateral means in the FOCAC. Another key theme in the FOCAC conference 
concerns the multilateral consultation and coordination mechanism with which China 
and Africa can deal with practical situations. As commodities traded between China and 
African countries, oil, gas and other minerals are also promoted via the FOCAC.  
 
China’s overseas investment in Africa has been protected by bilateral agreements, but 
when trade between the two increased tremendously within a short period, China 
realised that the bilateral approach was not sufficient or effective enough to protect its 
investment. Moreover, in order to expand its cooperation with Africa, China needed a 
broader platform. Together with the fact that China’s energy investment in Africa was 
increasing tremendously in the 2000s, China proposed in both its China African Policy 
and in the FOCAC conference to manage energy issues and initiate energy projects in 
a multilateral way. As well as establishing a multilateral trade system and dispute 
settlement which includes oil investment, China also extended its energy cooperation 
to clean-energy cooperation. As listed in Section 6.3.3.1, China has decided to be 
involved in joint clean-energy projects and research covering solar power, bio-gas and 
small hydropower712 with African countries. Meanwhile, under the framework of the 
FOCAC, China has steadily been offering aid to Africa which has also been linked to 
new energy. In the joint clean-energy projects, China cooperates with 11 African 
countries on new energy programmes to help them deal with the multiple effects of 
climate change. As a developing region, Africa needs funding as well as technology. 
China’s aid in new energy functions as a package covering technology, funding, 
management, knowledge, etc.  
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It is notable that since China lacks confidence in the capacity of international 
institutions led by the West to protect its national interests, it is very cautious about 
joining major international energy frameworks. Such conservative behaviour reflects its 
scepticism towards international systems and insistence on state sovereignty.713 In this 
sense, the FOCAC can be more attractive for China, as it is an international platform 
designed and led by developing countries. Hosting the FOCAC in Beijing every six 
years is also very important for the cautious Chinese authorities. Without the 
ideological belonging to and physical controlling of the entity, China will not see any 
advantage in participating in an international organisation.714 In short, including energy 
cooperation in the framework of the FOCAC indicates an expansion in the physical 
structure of China’s energy policy towards multilateralism in Africa. 
 
 
6.4.4 Conclusion: No profound change towards multilateralism 
The previous sections in this chapter explained the energy cooperation mechanism 
between China and Africa. This final section explores whether there was a profound 
change in China’s energy strategy towards Africa from bilateral to multilateral during 
the era of Hu Jintao. Section 6.2 and Section 6.4.1 have explained the Chinese 
understanding of energy security and the rationale of its oil diplomacy towards Africa. 
Section 6.3 and Section 6.4.2 have also illustrated the bilateral channel of Sino-African 
energy cooperation, particularly in the oil and gas sectors. The expansion of this 
cooperation laid down the important foundation for multilateral cooperation. Moreover, 
Section 6.3.3 and Section 6.4.3 have explained that both sides have made use of a 
physical body, the FOCAC, to facilitate multilateral trade activities that push Sino-
African energy cooperation forward.  
 
However, when multilateral cooperation like the FOCAC has been implemented, it has 
not always been effective. There are three elements which are important in 
understanding China’s attitude towards multilateral cooperation with Africa. First, while 
the China African Policy issued by China in 2006 is the most complete and systematic 
outline of China’s policy towards Africa, the FOCAC Action Plans list follow-up plans to 
facilitate cooperation between China and Africa. These documents, particularly the 
ones issued in and after 2006, introduce the objectives and measures to be taken 
under the policy and address multilateral cooperation between China and Africa 
covering various fields. However, the documents do not elaborate on the methods or 
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scale of the cooperation, and the duration of the cooperation is not set, nor is the 
department in charge introduced. Moreover, the FOCAC lacks a well-organised 
structure, and its legitimate status and influence are limited. In addition, the policies 
originating from the forum often have difficulty in being implemented. In other words, 
although there is new physical governance established for multilateral cooperation, the 
degree of appropriation and legitimacy of new ideas regarding multilateralism is low. 
 
Second, as discussed in previous sections, China has established trade relations with 
over 50 countries and regions in Africa and has signed bilateral trade agreements with 
over 40 countries. Since 2005, China has granted tariff-free treatment to the 29 least 
developed African countries on 190 types of commodity. These mutually beneficial 
agreements and policies have undoubtedly contributed to China–Africa trade relations. 
In the meantime, an increasing number of energy projects have been included in the 
mechanism of the FOCAC. However, these agreements and proposals were signed 
under the guidance of governments rather than under a legal framework between the 
governments. China has not yet introduced legal regulations concerning China–Africa 
economic and trade relations. Therefore, FOCAC lacks the legal basis to ensure 
China’s energy investment and energy security in Africa.  
 
Third, member states’ perception of the FOCAC is complicated, and China’s ultimate 
goal in the FOCAC has strong bilateral characteristics. The background of the China–
Africa relationship provides a unique opportunity for China. The influence of Western 
countries in Africa has been weakening, and China is in a better ideological position 
given its rich experience in “South-South cooperation” with Africa. With its present 
rising international status, China is in a favourable position to put forward energy 
investment, set policy agendas and formulate new system rules, by promoting 
multilateral cooperation with African countries. However, since China and African 
countries proposed multilateral cooperation in 2006, they have had many ideas about 
what methods and practices to employ in such cooperation. While some advocate 
keeping the country-to-country bilateral model, others support multilateral cooperation. 
The former have little interest in international multilateral projects. 715 As discussed, 
China considers bilateral cooperation arrangement to be the most effective 
mechanism. As a result, although the multilateral diplomacy carried out through the 
FOCAC provides China with an additional promising channel through which to develop 
its oil diplomacy, China tends to utilise the FOCAC as a platform to strengthen the 
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bilateral relations between China and African countries rather than to shift its focus to 
multilateral cooperation.  
 
Although there were expanding cooperation projects and physical platforms in 
multilateral forms in the structure of the FOCAC, particularly after 2006, the extent of 
change was limited. The bilateral approach remained the key form of cooperation, so 
the Chinese approach was far from one of global governance. As a number of Chinese 
experts have pointed out, the multilateral mechanism in the FOCAC was ineffective, 
and China lacked the willingness to make a change, using the platform to strengthen 
existing bilateral ties.  
 
First order change and second order change in policy instruments and physical 
governance structure did occur in energy cooperation between China and Africa, but 
third order change in ideas and policy goals was not obvious. Therefore, the degree of 
change in China–Africa energy cooperation during the period of President Hu Jintao 
was not great enough to be claimed as a profound break from the past. Looking at the 
long-term prospects for economic globalisation and regional integration trends, 
multilateral energy cooperation between countries has become increasingly frequent, 
but progress will take decades, and is likely to be an extension of the bilateral 
mechanism instead of a profound change. This chapter concludes that China’s energy 
security strategy in Africa during the era of Hu Jintao did not undergo a profound 





This chapter reviews the China–Africa energy relationship and analyses whether 
China’s energy strategy towards the region is moving towards global energy 
governance. Key mechanisms in China–Africa energy cooperation include the 
investment of CNOC in Africa, official humanitarian aid and FOCAC. In terms of 
instruments, resource-backed development loans, special trade and economic 
cooperation zones, and a non-interference aid policy facilitate China–Africa energy 
cooperation. China and African countries also support their energy cooperation 
bilaterally and multilaterally via platforms like FOCAC. While China–Africa energy 
cooperation is strongly characterised by oil diplomacy, including energy cooperation in 
the framework of the FOCAC, there are strong indicators of an expansion of the 
physical structure of China–Africa energy cooperation towards multilateralism. Such an 
expansion echoes both the pan-Africa strategy in the 2006 China–Africa Policy and the 
207 
 
2007 watershed of China’s energy strategy moving from bilateral to multilateral. 
However, multilateral cooperation via FOCAC was not always effective. Instead, 
China’s ultimate goal in the FOCAC had strong bilateral characteristics. Although 
multilateralism appeared in new policy instruments and goals, it was not a key element 
in the new physical governance structure and ideas of China’s top leaders. Therefore, 
this chapter concludes that energy cooperation between China and Africa during Hu 
Jintao’s era did not undergo a profound change from the paradigm of energy diplomacy 










This thesis has verified the following hypothesis: Despite calls by Chinese authorities 
for good global energy governance, China’s energy security during Hu Jintao’s era did 
not undergo a paradigm shift away from the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy to a 
policy paradigm of global energy governance. To a large extent, this is due to a lack of 
change in ideas regarding mechanisms of energy cooperation. China relies on bilateral 
cooperation plus multilateral hedging in achieving its goal(s) in energy security. This 
thesis has answered the three questions identified in the first chapter: 
 
1. What are the rationales underpinning the two policy paradigms of China’s energy 
security – the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy and the policy paradigm of 
global energy governance – during Hu Jintao’s era? 
2. Is there a profound change in China’s energy security? Can the degree of change 
in energy policy represent a break from the past?  
3. What are the reasons and causes of the policy transition, or lack thereof, in 
China’s energy security? 
 
Although energy is one of the key issues in academia, Chapter 2 pointed out that 
limited attention has been paid to energy policy transition. Applying a revised version of 
Hall’s theory of paradigm shift, this thesis has studied energy policy transition in a 
systematic way, providing a more dynamic account of how energy security is 
constructed and how energy policy is transformed over time. Chapters 2 and 3 argued 
that although a large body of research has paid attention to how well China’s overseas 
energy investment could fit in the liberal system, less empirical research has been 
conducted to examine the rationale for and mechanisms of China’s energy security. An 
examination of possible transitions of the current Chinese energy policy could enrich 
the literature on international energy systems, and hence this issue needs to be 
addressed seriously. The original data about China’s energy security collected in this 
thesis offers an observation of the Chinese mindset from a Chinese perspective, which 
is crucial to understanding China’s international behaviour. The findings in this thesis 
are understood to have filled the above gaps. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis has conducted three cases studies to examine China’s 
international energy cooperation with Central Asia, the EU and Africa. By studying 
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these cases alongside the energy policymaking of China, this thesis improves our 
understanding of the rationale for and mechanisms of China’s international energy 
cooperation and why there is no paradigm shift away from the “going out” energy 
diplomacy paradigm to the global energy governance paradigm, in spite of calls for 
global energy governance among Chinese authorities. 
 
7.2 Five levels of policy paradigm analysis 
 
This thesis has applied the idea-goal-instrument-physical structure framework, based 
on Hall’s concept of policy paradigm shift, to analyse whether there was any change of 
ideas regarding Chinese energy security. In this framework, ideas of political elites, 
rationale for policy goals, mechanisms of policy instruments and physical structure of 
energy governance are studied to analyse change. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a “policy paradigm shift” is considered to be a change in the 
ideas and standards associated with policy, resulting in “a dramatic departure in policy 
goals, based on a new theoretical and ideological framework”716. There are three kinds 
of change, namely ‘first order’, ‘second order’ and ‘third order’ change 717. First order 
change refers to changes in the basic instruments of policy. Second order change 
refers to changes in the basic techniques in policy goals. Third order change refers to 
changes in the ideas and goals informing policy; its legitimacy and appropriateness can 
be reflected in related physical governance structures. First- and second order change 
are considered as mere “process(es) that adjust policy without challenging the overall 
terms of a given policy paradigm”718. In contrast, third order change is the key to policy 
paradigm shifts, as it is a change in the ideas and rationales behind the policy, with 
adjustment in policy goals and techniques in response to new perspectives and past 
experiences.  
 
Chapter 2 points out that a policy paradigm shift could occur when there is a crisis 
representing shock or insecurity and to which the authorities decisively intervene. The 
understanding of crisis in this thesis refers not only to an abrupt change in external 
circumstance, new evidence in science or innovation of knowledge, but a moment that 
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could lead to “decisive intervention”719. Triggered by crisis, a policy paradigm shift 
occurs when “the historical context changes to a sufficient degree making it 
increasingly hard to reconcile the existing mindset of policy-makers with the evidence 
leading eventually to new objectives and new policy instruments”720. In the context of 
energy, the Fukushima incident and the abrupt cut of the Russian gas supply to Europe 
are considered “crises” that resulted in policy paradigm shifts. It is notable that the 
processes of change are not necessarily linear or clean cut, but could be messy and 
contingent. The change in a policy paradigm shift could be revolutionary or evolutionary 
depending on the continuity, pace and degree of change. The shift could take place 
over a period of time, and an evolutionary change could lead to a revolutionary change.  
 
Taking the case of Central Asia as an example, this thesis has compared two policy 
paradigms of China’s energy security approach towards Central Asia. More explicitly, 
this thesis has studied the ideas, policy goals, policy instruments and physical 
governance structures in China’s energy security in Central Asia in two different 
paradigms and measured change against these five levels of variables. Policy 
instruments of China’s energy security in Central Asia have been studied to see if there 
has been first and second order change. Ideas of Chinese authorities on energy 
security in Central Asia have been interpreted to test if there has been a third order 
change. Changes in physical governance structure have also been observed to 
examine the legitimacy and appropriateness of the ideas. In order to claim a paradigm 
shift, profound changes from previous policy paradigms are expected to be seen at 
each level, especially the level of ideas, because a third order change is crucial. In 
other words, if changes are found in policy instruments and physical energy 
governance, but not in ideas, then a paradigm shift cannot be claimed. 
 
It is notable that the existence of a particular bilateral approach in the global energy 
governance paradigm is normal practice and hence the presence of bilateral behaviour 
does not represent sufficient evidence that there has not been a paradigm change. The 
ideas of Chinese authorities on global energy governance and multilateral energy 
cooperation are more important in the analysis of policy paradigm shifts. Therefore, if 
evidence of a multilateral approach is obvious in the policy paradigm of global energy 
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governance, the existence of a bilateral approach does not negate the possibility that 
there has been a profound change in policy unless it remains a key approach. 
 
7.3 Chinese energy security and energy policy paradigms 
 
This thesis has offered a comprehensive study of Chinese energy security to improve 
our understanding of its historical background, governing structure, key actors and 
strategy. We can also better understand the energy policymaking process and rationale 
of Chinese authorities. The thesis emphasised the role of ideas and non-material 
interests in shaping Chinese energy security in the international system and, more 
importantly, in influencing changes in Chinese international energy behaviour. Before 
looking into China’s energy security, this thesis also discussed the concept of energy 
security. 
 
Scholars discuss energy security – including geopolitics, economy and science – in 
different dimensions and interdisciplinarily. In this thesis, energy security refers to “the 
availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at 
affordable prices” 721 . The IEA points out that there are five “basic strategies” for 
enhancing energy security: “developing domestic resources to the maximum possible, 
creating strategic reserves, seeking foreign technology and investment, establishing 
reliable and secure oil trading channels, and making strategic investments in upstream 
production facilities abroad”722. The actual practice of the above strategies inevitably 
relies on international cooperation, which could be in the form of energy diplomacy (a 
bilateral approach) or global energy governance (a multilateral approach). 
 
There has been a long debate over whether China’s international energy behaviour 
would move from bilateralism to multilateralism. This distinction is not only about the 
number of actors involved, but also about the institutions and principles in policy 
coordination. Such discussion also underpins the theme of this thesis. In order to 
answer this question, this thesis has enriched the existing literature of Chinese energy 
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security with a comprehensive study of its historical background, governance structure, 
key actors and strategy. 
 
This thesis has pointed out that China’s energy governance has a fragmented structure 
because of constant changes, overlapping duties, decentralisation and bureaucratic 
ineffectiveness. Chinese authorities have been trying to establish a suitable and 
effective governance structure. However, repeated structural reformations have had 
little effect. Instead, constant change has resulted in instability and inconsistency in 
governance. China’s energy administration system is facing serious problems of 
overlapping duties, decentralisation and bureaucratic ineffectiveness, because more 
than 20 ministries, government agencies and national oil companies are involved in the 
governance of the sector. Policy planning, decision-making, instruction delivery and 
operations in the Chinese energy sector are processed ineffectively. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Chinese energy security has been traditionally associated 
with strategic and geopolitical considerations, with oil security as an important 
component, because of China’s increasing reliance on “foreign oil” and desire for self-
sufficiency throughout its history. Since 1949, three concepts have dominated the 
rationales of Chinese energy security in different periods: the mentality of self-reliance 
(1949 to 1992), the energy supply-oriented concept (1993 to 2002) and the concept of 
source opening up and flow regulating concept (2002 to present). 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, China relied heavily on imported oil. Chinese authorities were 
anxious about supply interruptions, such as oil trade embargoes or sudden supply cuts; 
hence, they developed a self-sufficiency-oriented energy security strategy. In the next 
few decades, supply security, particularly against political interruption by hostile 
powers, remained the core concern in China’s energy security.  
 
When China became a net oil importer in 1993, Chinese authorities put forward a goal 
to “ensure a stable long-term oil supply”723. Since increasing domestic production failed 
to stop the growing dependence on foreign oil, China continued to import oil. In 
alignment with China’s going-out strategy, Chinese energy companies made huge 
investments overseas. 
 
In the 2000s, Chinese energy security was facing the fierce energy competition among 
major countries, the Chinese-energy-threat discourse in the Western world and the 
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strategic constraints to Chinese overseas energy investment. Limits on the energy 
supply were caused by instability in energy supply regions in China. What concerned 
Chinese authorities were not just geopolitical factors, but also the means by which 
China could be integrated into the global energy cooperation system. Chinese energy 
policy was expanded to include elements such as supply diversification, strategic oil 
reserves, energy efficiency, environmentally friendly considerations and international 
cooperation in energy policy planning, indicating that the Chinese authorities were 
adopting a more comprehensive understanding of energy security. From 2003, source 
opening up and flow regulating became the core concept in energy security. These 
concepts laid out the ideological foundation of energy security during the Hu Jintao era. 
 
According to Chapter 3, a common characteristic throughout the above periods is that 
international energy cooperation was adopted as a key mechanism to enhance energy 
security. Since the late 1990s, China’s overseas energy approach has been dominated 
by the going-out strategy. China’s international interactions with both developing and 
developed countries in accessing energy resources include strengthening cooperation 
with countries that produce, transport and consume oil. 
 
In the analysis of the international approaches of Chinese energy security during the 
Hu Jintao era, this thesis has considered two policy paradigms based on different 
rationales, namely the paradigm of energy diplomacy and the paradigm of global 
energy governance. The policy paradigm of energy diplomacy is underpinned by the 
strategy of “going out and bringing in” via bilateral energy cooperation. In contrast, the 
policy paradigm of global energy governance is underpinned by the Chinese emphasis 
on multilateral energy cooperation that leads to global energy governance.  
 
2007 has been identified as the turning point between these two paradigms. While the 
period 2003 to 2006 involved the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy, 2007 to early 
2013 saw a shift to the policy paradigm of global energy governance. Discussion of 
multilateral energy cooperation as a means to enhance energy security first appeared 
in official policy documents in the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2007 and in 
China’s Energy Policy (2007) White Paper. It was addressed again in the White Paper 
on China’s Diplomacy 2008, and the concept of global energy governance was 
emphasised in China’s Energy Policy (2012) White Paper. Chinese top leaders called 
for global energy governance publicly in 2011 and 2012. China has also modified its 
policy instrument from a traditional bilateral approach to a multilateral one. These acts 
reflect how Chinese authorities have changed their understanding of energy and 




Chinese authorities have a complicated attitude towards multilateral energy 
cooperation and global energy governance, although they call for its adoption. As 
analysis in this thesis has shown, Chinese authorities have a strong preference for a 
bilateral approach in international energy cooperation. 53 interviewees agreed that, if 
conditions allow, in general, China prefers a bilateral approach to a multilateral one in 
energy cooperation. Another common viewpoint shared in Chinese academia and 
among the political elite is that China should follow its own way instead of the Western 
one in how it participates in the international community. Since the current institutions 
in global energy governance are considered by Chinese authorities to be led by the 
West, China appears hesitant in joining them. Moreover, Chinese authorities consider 
that it would be fine for China not to join international energy organisations such as the 
IEA, as there is no urgent need.  
 
Chinese authorities consider China to be accountable for its contributions to global 
energy governance. A few interviewees emphasised the importance of China’s 
participation in global energy governance and the need to learn to play the game of 
multilateralism. Instead of joining an existing international institution, Chinese 
authorities are keener to establish their own international or regional energy institution 
in which China could set its own rules. The findings in this thesis also indicate that 
there is a lack of common consensus on global energy governance among Chinese 
academia and energy elites because of limited knowledge; global energy governance 
is a relatively new idea in the country. 
 
There is a gap in knowledge between how Western academia and Chinese energy 
elites understand multilateral cooperation. Almost 17 out of the 53 interviewees from 
China’s government, energy industry and think tanks misunderstood multilateralism, 
presuming that participation in more than one international bilateral cooperation 
agreement was equivalent to multilateral cooperation. This misperception among 
Chinese energy elites is considered to be an important finding that could help explain 
China’s unfamiliarity with global energy governance, its ineffective multilateral 
approach and the different expectations held by China and the West. 
 
Chinese authorities’ complicated attitudes towards global energy governance raise the 
question of whether ideological change has occurred in China’s energy policy in 
different paradigms. This thesis continued the discussion with three empirical case 




7.4 Case studies of China’s international energy cooperation 
 
7.4.1 1 Case study 1: China–Central Asia energy cooperation 
The first case study analysed in this thesis, Chinese energy security towards Central 
Asia, confirms the hypothesis already outlined. China–Central Asia energy cooperation 
started in the early 1990s. China has a strong interest in energy cooperation with 
Central Asia mainly because of the rich oil and gas resources in the region and the 
need to diversify its energy supply. There is a solid foundation for a China–Central Asia 
energy relationship that can be viewed through the broader lens of the China–Central 
Asia strategic relationship.  
 
The policy goal of China’s energy security in Central Asia during Hu Jintao’s era was 
multileveled, and both policy paradigms shared the same goal. Economically, Central 
Asia is one of China’s key economic cooperation partners, and oil and gas business 
could play an important role in this. Politically, China is concerned with regional security 
issues such as terrorism, separatism and extremism. In general, China’s foreign policy 
in Central Asia aims to create an “amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood”724 
and develop friendly bilateral relations with the Central Asian countries. Energy security 
has become a key goal in China’s relations with Central Asia, with an emphasis on the 
establishment of political, economic and infrastructure links with the Central Asian 
countries. More importantly, Chinese authorities consider Central Asian oil and gas to 
be helpful for China in facing its energy security challenges. China needs Central Asian 
oil and gas to maintain the sustainable development of the economy and to diversify its 
supply sources.  
 
Key instruments of the above policy goals during Hu Jintao’s era included energy 
diplomacy joint energy projects and SCO, and there were obvious changes from 
bilateral to multilateral mechanisms in the instruments. China’s top leaders attempted 
to promote China–Central Asia energy cooperation via diplomatic means, such as 
strengthening relations with Central Asian countries and supporting the activities of 
CNOCs in Central Asia. Chinese diplomatic support was carried out in at least four 
ways, including visits by top leaders, strong bilateral economic and trade ties, 
intergovernmental agreements with a legal basis, and multilateral platforms. The first 
three ways are mainly bilateral and appear in both policy paradigms. In contrast, the 
fourth refers to SCO and appears mainly in the policy paradigm of global energy 
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governance. Such differences indicate that, in the second policy paradigm, China 
modified its policy instrument by handling China–Central Asia energy cooperation via 
SCO, a multilateral platform, instead of relying only on bilateralism. 
 
Chinese energy diplomacy is believed to have renewed the momentum of energy 
cooperation with Central Asia, particularly through another policy instrument: joint 
energy projects. Similar to the broader China–Central Asia cooperation,  energy 
cooperation between the two sides is hindered by the lack of adequate infrastructure 
and by trade barriers. Yet, under the support of both governments, China’s energy 
cooperation with Central Asia proceeded with a series of projects including equity 
mergers and acquisitions, oil and gas pipeline networks, and clean-energy investment. 
Major cooperation mechanisms in these projects include the production sharing model, 
the joint management model and the technology service model. These three 
cooperation models are crucial in tackling obstacles in China–Central Asia cooperation. 
They reduce trade barriers regarding taxes, provide technological development for the 
infrastructure linking the two sides, such as transportation pipelines, and facilitate 
cooperation between both parties in joint energy management in the region. 
 
Among these projects, the Central Asia–China transnational pipeline, announced in 
2007, is considered to be one of the greatest achievements in China–Central Asia 
energy cooperation. This transnational gas pipeline is China’s first and largest cross-
border gas pipeline. The initial plan was a gas pipeline between China and Kazakhstan, 
but the involvement of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 2007 expanded the pipeline 
project from a bilateral to a multilateral arrangement.  
 
By exporting gas from Turkmenistan to China, the pipeline physically connects four 
countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China. This transnational gas 
pipeline project set the foundation for a multilateral instrument between China and the 
Central Asian countries, because the need for transnational transit management 
encouraged China to look into better energy governance from a multilateral approach. 
The possibility of working multilaterally is further reflected by the attention paid by 
Chinese authorities to the potential for a multilateral regulatory platform like ECT in 
protecting CNOCs’ interests in the region. However, the materialisation of such an 
agenda was believed to be beyond Hu Jintao’s reach, limiting the multilateral impact of 
the transnational pipeline, which ended in early 2013. 
 
Physical governance structure change is observed in how China enhances China–
Central Asia energy cooperation via SCO in both policy paradigms. The findings in this 
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thesis indicate that although there was a new physical governance structure in China–
Central Asia energy cooperation during Hu Jintao’s era, the degree of appropriation 
and legitimacy of the idea of multilateralism was low.  
 
SCO was established by China, Russia and Central Asian countries in 2001 to tackle 
security issues including terrorism, separatism and extremism in Central Asia. In the 
mid-2000s, SCO started to pay more attention to economic cooperation, including the 
energy business, and drew the attention of Chinese energy authorities. Eventually, 
SCO was developed as a multilateral energy platform to facilitate energy cooperation in 
the region. Since 2003, over 100 energy projects have been placed under the 
multilateral framework of SCO, with a series of agreements regarding multilateral 
energy cooperation being signed. It appeared that SCO offered an ideal multilateral 
platform for China to enhance China–Central Asia energy cooperation.  
 
Yet it is notable that China had limited involvement in those projects. More importantly, 
although those projects were placed under SCO, they were conducted bilaterally. In 
other words, they did not really belong to SCO’s multilateral framework. In the policy 
paradigm of global energy governance, the construction of a Central Asia–China 
pipeline plus Russia’s proposal of establishing an “Energy Club” in 2006 reignited 
Chinese interest in using SCO as a multilateral platform to promote energy cooperation. 
However, the implementation of energy cooperation via SCO during the Hu Jintao era 
was ineffective. Key multilateral projects like the transnational oil and gas pipelines 
were not coordinated under SCO. In practice, China–Central Asia energy cooperation 
relied on bilateral approaches during Hu Jintao’s era. 
 
In sum, although multilateral elements appeared in all policy goals, policy instruments 
and the physical structure of China–Central Asia energy cooperation, they were not 
solid enough to lead to profound change within Hu Jintao’s era. More importantly, 
changes in ideas regarding multilateralism were very limited, and hence a third-order 
change did not occur. Therefore, this case study indicated that energy cooperation 
between China and Central Asian countries during Hu Jintao’s era did not undergo a 










Table 7.1: Summary of China–Central Asia energy cooperation 
Levels in 
paradigm 
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7.4.2 Case study 2: China–EU energy cooperation 
The second case study analysed in this thesis, Chinese energy security towards the 
EU, confirms the hypothesis already outlined. China–EU energy cooperation has a 
strong focus on clean energy. In the Hu Jintao era, China attempted to increase the 
use of renewable energy in its energy mix and improve its energy efficiency. Advanced 
energy technologies are crucial for such an ambition. China needs a partner with 
advanced energy technologies due to its lack of advanced technology in green energy 
and energy efficiency. Therefore, although China and the EU do not have a direct 
supply-and-demand relationship for oil and gas, there is still a solid foundation for a 
China–EU energy relationship in clean energy. Note that in the term “China–EU energy 
cooperation” in this thesis, “EU” refers to a group of diversified stakeholders including 
the EU as a whole, the central government or local governments of each Member State, 
or companies and academic institutes whose headquarters are situated in Member 
States. This thesis has focused in particular on how China engages with the EU and its 
Member States via platforms set up under the EU. 
 
The policy goal of China’s energy cooperation with the EU during Hu Jintao’s era was 
multileveled, and both policy paradigms shared the same goal. In general, China 
enjoys abundant renewable energy resources, which provide for China’s clean energy 
industry development, particularly in the fields of wind power, solar power generation 
and bioliquid fuel. However, the share of renewable energy in China’s total energy mix 
remains low. Energy cooperation with the EU, particularly in the form of technology 
transfer, could help China develop its renewable energy industry. In the long term, the 
promotion of renewable energy is more about maintaining the capability of the 
renewable energy sector for future energy security. On the policy level, China had 
published a series of supporting policies to promote the development of clean energy in 
order to tackle issues like climate change and sustainable development. The Chinese 
government also played a key role in leading its clean-energy market and promoting 
industrialisation. International energy cooperation was a way for China to break the 
development bottleneck in technology to achieve this long-term goal. Economically, the 
EU is one of China’s key partners, and the energy business could play an important 
role in this. While the EU is leading in clean-energy experience and technology, from 
which China can learn, China offers a huge market through which European 
companies can expand their businesses. China was also promoting investment in the 
renewable energy industry and the transmission of energy infrastructure through a 
variety of financial and economic incentives, representing a giant market for China’s 




Key policy instruments of the above policy goals include official energy channels and 
joint project initiatives. The findings in this thesis indicate that there were no obvious 
changes from bilateralism to multilateralism in the instruments between the two 
paradigms. Official channels include platforms like the China–EU Energy Conference, 
the China–Europe High-Level Energy Working Group, the China–Europe Energy 
Dialogue and the EU-China Summit. Over the past two decades, official energy 
dialogues between China and the EU covered a wide range of energy issues, 
particularly sustainable development. They also increased in terms of government 
level, number of actors and variety of issues involved. Among them, the annual China–
EU Energy Dialogue is the only ongoing process. Although most of these 
communication platforms are organised on an ad hoc basis, China and the EU have 
promoted their energy cooperation by signing cooperation agreements on renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. 
 
Energy cooperation between China and the EU, agreed in the above official energy 
channels, activated another policy instrument during Hu Jintao’s era: joint project 
initiatives. Over 100 events and projects were jointly carried out under the framework of 
the EU by China and EU Member States from 1990 to 2010. A number of joint 
initiatives have been launched, including the China–EU Energy Training Programme, 
the Joint Energy and Environment Programme, the Europe–China Clean Energy 
Centre EC2, the Near Zero Emission Coal project, and the China–EU Institute for 
Clean and Renewable Energy. These cooperative projects have concentrated on areas 
related to clean energy, energy efficiency and sustainable energy development and are 
mainly carried out in three categories: personnel exchange and training, technology 
transfer and joint R&D, and financial investment in the energy industry. Such evolution 
and expansion in cooperation mechanisms indicate that, in the second policy paradigm, 
China modified its policy instruments by creating more multilateral platforms for energy 
cooperation instead of relying on previous bilateral methods. 
 
Physical governance structure change is observed in how China enhanced China–EU 
energy cooperation via physical institutes under the framework of the EU in both policy 
paradigms. The findings in this thesis indicate that although there was a new physical 
governance structure in China–EU energy cooperation during Hu Jintao’s era, the 
degree of appropriation and legitimacy of the ideas regarding multilateralism was low. 
While there were energy programmes and exchanges between China and the EU from 
the 1980s onwards, physical institutes, such as the Joint Energy and Environment 
Programme in 2004, the NZEC project in 2006, the Europe–China Clean Energy 
Centre EC2, and the China–EU ICARE in 2010, were established to facilitate 
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technology transfer and clean-energy development in the mid-2000s. These projects 
established a physical platform for China’s governmental departments, companies and 
institutes to cooperate with the EU.  
 
However, the effectiveness of these initiatives was limited for three reasons. First, there 
were misunderstandings and misperceptions generated in China–EU energy 
cooperation because of a lack of trust between China and the EU, as reflected in 
technology transfer and business ideology. Chinese authorities expect a ‘magic button’ 
to solve the energy problem promptly; they pay less attention to R&D. Moreover, 
Chinese companies were criticised for having a weak mentality regarding contracts and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) in general. Therefore, due to a lack of trust, the 
Europeans were not always willing to transfer their advanced technology to China. 
Second, trade friction exists in China–EU energy cooperation because of interest 
competition at both economic and strategic levels. The solar panel trade dispute is an 
example of these competing interests. The lack of openness in the energy market and 
technology export restrictions has hindered China–EU energy cooperation in 
technology transfer. Third, energy cooperation between the public and business circles 
is limited. Joint research and development in the field of clean energy between China 
and the EU remains at an early stage. Energy cooperation relies on energy companies 
that are concerned with revenue first. Without government subsidies, European 
companies remain inactive in project investment in China. 
 
More importantly, there is no clear long-term plan for the above China–EU energy 
initiatives. Some joint energy projects have short mandates without renewals. Some 
Chinese officers involved with these projects consider the initiatives to be voluntary 
proposals of the EU, and therefore believe the Chinese side has no responsibility to 
maintain them. This reflects that Chinese authorities have limited willingness to work 
with EU Member States via the multilateral platforms set up under the EU. Instead, in 
cooperation with the EU, China is more accustomed to a bilateral cooperation method 
and appears cautious about the multilateral cooperation method. China finds a bilateral 
approach with EU Member States to be more flexible and efficient, and would even 
allow China to enjoy greater leverage in negotiation. 
 
In sum, although multilateral elements appeared in all policy goals, policy instruments 
and the physical structures in China–EU energy cooperation, they were not solid 
enough to lead to profound change within the Hu Jintao era. More importantly, change 
in ideas regarding multilateralism was very limited, and hence a third order change did 
not occur. Therefore, this case study concluded that energy cooperation between 
222 
 
China and the EU during Hu Jintao’s era did not undergo a profound change from the 
paradigm of energy diplomacy to the paradigm of global energy governance.  
 
Table 7.2: Summary of China–EU energy cooperation 
Levels in 
paradigm 
Policy paradigm of 
energy diplomacy  








A vital element for 
sustainable economy, 
political stability and 
military fuel 
A vital element for 
sustainable economy, 













relies on bilateral 
approaches 







relies on bilateral 
approaches 
No No 
Policy goal Develop renewable 
energy industry  
Increase the capability of 
the renewable energy 
sector for future energy 
security  
Break the development 
bottleneck in technology  
Tackle issues like climate 
change and sustainable 
development  
Develop renewable energy 
industry  
Increase the capability of 
the renewable energy 
sector for future energy 
security  
Break the development 
bottleneck in technology  
Tackle issues like climate 













Joint projects and centers 
under the framework of 
the EU  
 




Bilateral economic and 
trade ties 
Establish more multilateral 
platforms and joint 
cooperation initiatives 
Joint projects and centres 






Relies on bilateral 
mechanism 
More joint physical 
initiatives created under 





7.4.3 Case study 3: China–Africa energy cooperation 
The third case study analysed in this thesis, Chinese energy security towards Africa, 
confirms the hypothesis already outlined. China–Africa energy cooperation started in 
the early 1990s. China has a strong interest in energy cooperation with Africa mainly 
because of rich oil and gas resources in the region and the need to diversify its energy 
supply. There is a solid foundation for a China–Africa energy relationship that can be 
viewed through the broader picture of the China–Africa strategic relationship.  
 
The policy goal of China’s energy security in Africa during Hu Jintao’s era was 
multileveled, and both policy paradigms shared the same goal. There was one short-
term goal and one long-term goal for Chinese energy cooperation with Africa, intimately 
combining its energy demands and diplomacy for the continent. In the short term, 
China aimed to strengthen the diversification of energy supply sources and reduce oil 
dependence on the Middle East in order to enhance its energy security. In the long 
term, close economic ties could promote trust between China and Africa. China was 
aiming to grow as a global player in the international oil market. Chinese energy 
investment in Africa is also considered part of China’s going-out strategy, which linked 
the country’s foreign policy with its domestic development. CNOCs were encouraged to 
invest in the energy sector in Africa. While Africa, with huge resource potential, became 
a major destination for Chinese overseas expansion, energy resources, particularly oil, 
were regarded as a key component of Sino-African trade. In 2006, a pan-African 
approach was proposed in the China African Policy, which aimed to “encourage and 
support competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various 
ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to 
develop and exploit rationally their resources”725. Energy cooperation is considered to 
be a key means to further enhance the China–Africa relationship multilaterally. This 
echoes the analysis in chapter 3 that 2007 was the turning point for China’s energy 
strategy in moving from a bilateral to a multilateral approach. 
 
Key policy instruments of the above policy goals included energy diplomacy, joint 
energy projects and FOCAC, and there were obvious changes from bilateral to 
multilateral mechanisms in the instruments, shifting from a policy paradigm of energy 
diplomacy to a policy paradigm of global energy governance. Africa is one of China’s 
key targets in its overall energy diplomacy strategy. The Chinese government supports 
the investment of its CNOCs in Africa bilaterally and multilaterally. Whenever top 
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Chinese leaders have visited an African country, CNOCs have signed oil agreements 
with that country. Since 2000, the Chinese government has also created favourable 
trading conditions and lowered the requirements for CNOCs to invest overseas. Until 
the year in which China issued its African Policy, China had signed bilateral trade 
agreements with 41 African countries and investment security treaties with 28 African 
countries. Other than bilateral means, energy cooperation is also carried out via 
multilateral platforms like FOCAC by not only further strengthening China’s diplomatic 
ties with African countries, but also addressing the importance of natural resources and 
agreements to develop cooperation over their use. 
 
Chinese energy diplomacy is believed to have activated the momentum of energy 
cooperation with Africa through another policy instrument: joint energy projects. Most of 
the energy projects between China and Africa were carried out in bilateral form. 
CNOCs had been involved in oil construction projects in oil export countries directly, 
and obtained a certain share of the oil production of cooperation projects through 
production sharing, joint ventures, rent, services, and in other ways. While China’s oil 
companies could expand overseas business by upstream mergers and acquisitions, 
the share of oil gained could be shipped back to China directly or resold on the 
international oil market. These energy cooperation initiatives were mainly facilitated by 
three mechanisms: resource-backed development loans, special trade and economic 
cooperation zones, and a non-interference policy regarding aid. China–Africa 
cooperation was intensified via the above three mechanisms. They became a solid 
foundation when China attempted to push forward its energy cooperation instruments 
via the multilateral platform of FOCAC. 
 
Physical governance structure change can be observed in how China enhanced 
China–Africa energy cooperation via FOCAC in both policy paradigms. The findings in 
this thesis indicate that although there was a new physical governance structure in 
China–Africa energy cooperation during Hu Jintao’s era, the degree of appropriation 
and legitimacy of the idea of multilateralism was low. FOCAC, which was established in 
2000, is a joint ministerial conference held every three years to cultivate a long-term 
China–Africa relationship with solidarity and cooperation. It is a regular platform for 
meetings between top Chinese and African leaders. This platform has strengthened 
Sino-African cooperation in all spheres, mainly trade and related economic ties. 
Although energy cooperation was not the initial objective of FOCAC, it has gradually 
become a key focus, because China has increasing energy trade and investment 




China’s overseas investment in Africa had been relying on bilateral agreements, and 
China realised that these agreements were insufficient in protecting its investment 
when trade between the two increased tremendously within a short period. China 
needed a broader platform to expand its cooperation with Africa. China proposed in 
both its China African Policy in 2006 and in the FOCAC conference to carry out energy 
cooperation via a multilateral platform. Through FOCAC, China attempts to facilitate 
market access, promote duty-free treatment of commodities, optimise trade structures, 
offer aid and settle trade disputes. FOCAC also provides the multilateral consultation 
and coordination mechanisms with which China and Africa can handle practical 
situations. Commodities traded between China and African countries, such as oil, gas 
and other minerals, are also promoted via the FOCAC. More importantly, FOCAC is 
established and led by developing countries, and is hosted in Beijing every six years, 
giving China more ideological influence and physical control of the process. It appears 
that FOCAC offers an ideal multilateral platform for China to enhance China–Africa 
energy cooperation. 
 
Yet, when it comes to implementation, FOCAC is not always effective. First, although 
FOCAC Action Plans issued in and after 2006 listed follow-up plans to facilitate 
multilateral cooperation between China and Africa, the documents do not elaborate on 
the details, such as methods, scale, responsible department and duration of 
cooperation. FOCAC lacks a well-organised structure and its legitimate status and 
influence are limited. In addition, policies originating from the forum often have difficulty 
in being implemented. Second, FOCAC lacks the legal basis to ensure China’s energy 
investment in Africa. Although there are more and more energy projects included in the 
mechanism of the FOCAC, the agreements were signed under the guidance of 
governments rather than within the legal framework of FOCAC. China still relies on 
bilateral trade agreements signed with over 40 African countries to protect its 
investments in Africa. Third, Chinese authorities consider bilateral cooperation to be the 
most effective mechanism in China–Africa energy cooperation and tend to rely on it. 
Meanwhile, although FOCAC could be a channel for oil diplomacy, FOCAC is 
understood by Chinese authorities to be a multilateral platform to strengthen bilateral 
relations between China and African countries instead of enabling it to shift its focus to 
multilateral cooperation. 
 
In sum, although multilateral elements appeared in all policy goals, policy instruments 
and the physical structures in China–Africa energy cooperation, they were not solid 
enough to lead to profound change within the Hu Jintao era. More importantly, changes 
in ideas regarding multilateralism were very limited, and hence a third-order change did 
226 
 
not occur. Therefore, this case study concludes that energy cooperation between 
China and African countries during Hu Jintao’s era did not undergo a profound change 
from a paradigm of energy diplomacy to a paradigm of global energy governance. 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of China–Africa energy cooperation 
Levels in 
paradigm 
Policy paradigm of 
energy diplomacy  








A vital element for 
sustainable economy, 
political stability and 
military fuel 
A vital element for 
sustainable economy, 













relies on bilateral 
approaches 
National interest, including 
supply diversification, 





relies on bilateral 
approaches 
No No 
Policy goal Enhance energy security 
Diversification of  supply  
Reduce oil dependence 
on the Middle East 
Promote trust 
Enhance energy security 
Diversification of  supply 
Reduce oil dependence on 
the Middle East 
Promote trust 







Top-leader visits  
Bilateral economic ties, 
and legal agreements, 





special trade and 
economic zones, and aid 
Energy diplomacy 
(bilateral) 
Top-leader visits  
Bilateral economic ties, 
and legal legal 
agreements, 
Joint energy projects 
(bilateral + multilateral) 
Energy projects supported 
by development loans, 
special trade and economic 







Relies on bilateral 
mechanism 





7.5 Analysis: No policy paradigm shift 
 
Based on the findings of the above three case studies, this thesis concludes that 
China’s energy security did not undergo a policy transition that resulted in a shift away 
from the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy to a policy paradigm of global energy 
governance. 
 
Ideas about Energy 
The findings in Section 3.2 and the three case studies indicate that in both policy 
paradigms during Hu Jintao’s era, Chinese authorities considered energy to be a vital 
element for a sustainable economy, political stability and military fuel. China needs a 
stable and sufficient energy supply to support its rapid economic growth, socio-political 
stability and sovereignty. 726  Therefore, there was no change in how energy is 
understood across the policy paradigms. 
 
Ideas about Energy Security 
In both policy paradigms during Hu Jintao’s era, Chinese authorities considered energy 
security to be a top national interest. Traditionally, Chinese energy security has 
essentially been equated to oil security because of China’s increasing reliance on 
“foreign oil” and desire for self-sufficiency. It is indicated in Section 3.2 and echoed in 
the three case studies that, in Hu Jintao’s era, although oil supply security remained 
important, the concept of Chinese energy security expanded to other energy issues like 
international pricing mechanisms, sustainable environment, solutions for energy-related 
pollution and low-carbon economies. Although international energy cooperation was 
emphasised in Chinese energy security, it relied on a bilateral approach and 
multilateralism was limited. Therefore, there was no change in the understanding of 
energy security across the two policy paradigms.  
 
Policy Goal 
In both policy paradigms and across the cases examined during Hu Jintao’s era, the 
policy goals of Chinese international energy cooperation varied but were ultimately 
similar. Common policy goals included enhancing energy security by diversifying 
energy supply sources and reducing oil dependence, as discussed in Section 3.2. 
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There were also goals that depended on circumstances, such as regional security and 
infrastructure construction in China–Central Asia energy cooperation, clean-energy 
development and technological bottleneck breakthrough in China–EU energy 
cooperation, and trust promotion and a pan-Africa strategy in China–Africa energy 
cooperation. Other than the case of China–Africa energy cooperation, which points to a 
pan-Africa strategy, there was no clear appearance of multilateralism in the policy 
goals. In short, there was no change in the policy goals of international energy 
cooperation across the two policy paradigms. 
 
Policy Instrument 
A change in policy instrument can be observed across the two policy paradigms during 
Hu Jintao’s era. In the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy, key policy instruments 
included energy diplomacy (bilateral) and joint energy projects. All three case studies 
indicate that policy instruments based on a multilateral approach are adopted in the 
policy paradigm of global energy governance. In China–Central Asia energy 
cooperation, while joint energy projects were expanded, such as transnational pipelines 
including multilateral parties, SCO was introduced as a multilateral platform to 
coordinate energy cooperation. In China–EU energy cooperation, more energy 
initiatives, including joint projects and joint centres, were established under the EU 
framework. In China–Africa energy cooperation, FOCAC was introduced as a 
multilateral platform to coordinate energy cooperation. Therefore, in the policy 
paradigm of global energy governance, there were new policy instruments in China’s 
international energy cooperation.727 
 
Physical governance structure 
A new physical governance structure can be observed across the two policy paradigms 
during Hu Jintao’s era. However, it is not considered to be a change, because the 
degree of appropriation and legitimacy of the understanding of multilateralism in the 
physical multilateral platform was low. SCO, new China–EU joint centres and FOCAC 
were established to facilitate China’s energy cooperation with Central Asia, the EU and 
Africa respectively. However, the findings in Sections 4.5, 5.5 and 6.5 indicate that 
although there were new cooperation projects and/or physical platforms in multilateral 
form, particularly since 2006, the extent of the change was limited. On the one hand, 
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the effectiveness of the multilateral mechanisms was low. On the other hand, China 
either lacked the willingness to make a change or merely utilised the multilateral 
platform to strengthen its existing bilateral ties. The bilateral approach remained the 
key form of cooperation, and a profound change in terms of physical governance 
structure towards multilateralism could not be claimed.  
 
Policy paradigm shift 
The above analysis indicates that obvious change from bilateralism to multilateralism 
only occurred in policy instruments. Ideas about energy and energy security and policy 
goals remained the same. There was no obvious change in physical governance 
structure that reflected the legitimacy and appropriateness of a new idea.  
 
Table 7.4: Summary of changes from bilateralism to multilateralism between policy 
paradigms in each case study 









Idea about energy No No No 














Policy goal No No Yes 






No, although new 
structure (SCO) 
appears 
No, although new 
structure (China-
EU joint project 
initiatives) 
appears 






NO NO NO 
 
In other words, first order change and second order change in regard to policy 
instruments was obvious. A new physical governance structure appeared, but the 
degree of appropriation and legitimacy of the idea of multilateralism in the physical 
multilateral platform was low. Yet a third order change regarding ideas was missing. 
Therefore, the degree of change in China’s international energy cooperation during the 
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period of President Hu Jintao was not high enough to be claimed as a profound break 
from the past. 
 
The above conclusion is not in alignment with the aims asserted in Chinese official 
energy documents and the messages delivered by top authorities, as discussed in 
Section 3.3.2. The  White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2007, China’s Energy Policy 
(2007) White Paper, White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2008, and China’s Energy 
Policy (2012) White Paper address the importance of and China’s effort in multilateral 
approaches to international energy cooperation. China’s Energy Policy (2012) White 
Paper further asserted China’s contribution to global energy governance, which has 
also been addressed by the former Deputy Premier of the State Council, Zeng Peiyan, 
and former Premier, Wen Jiabao, publicly. Despite a call for a multilateral approach 
from Chinese authorities, the findings in this thesis indicate that there has been a 
change in policy instruments, but not in ideas regarding multilateralism. These findings 
reflect that there was an inconsistency between policy planning and implementation in 
China’s energy security during Hu Jintao’s era. This thesis points out at least four 
reasons why a policy paradigm shift from bilateralism to multilateralism did not occur, 
despite calls by Chinese authorities for good global energy governance. 
 
Reason 1: Fragmented Chinese energy governance 
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, China has a fragmented energy governance structure, 
with constant changes, decentralisation and bureaucratic ineffectiveness. Table 3.5 
shows that there are over 20 agencies and institutions with overlapping functions and 
responsibility in China’s energy governance structure. The authority over China’s 
energy sector is decentralised to different actors, and the disintegration of policymaking 
is unavoidable. A policy could be made by several government sectors and carried out 
by different actors. The formulation and implementation of energy policy has become a 
process in which different parties struggle for or even corrupt their own interests. 
Moreover, in China’s energy governance structure, central authorities are not always 
influential enough to control and manage the whole energy industry; therefore, local 
production relies on local government. The same logic applies to central authorities’ 
influence on CNOCs that go abroad. Ineffectiveness in energy governance hinders the 
implementation of energy policy.  
 
According to the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy and China’s Energy Policy, NDRC, 
NEA and MFA are the key institutes in planning Chinese strategy regarding 
international energy cooperation. However, instead of these central authorities, CNOCs 
are the key actors carrying out the strategy. In such a fragmented governance structure, 
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CNOCs could alter the policy guidelines from the central authorities if they have other 
considerations in actual operation. As discussed in the case studies presented in 
Sections 4.5, 5.5 and 6.5, in general, actors on the frontline prefer bilateral approaches 
over multilateral approaches in energy cooperation, because a bilateral approach is 
relatively flexible and straightforward. Therefore, although central authorities like MFA, 
NDRC and NEA have published white papers encouraging multilateral forms of energy 
cooperation, in actual operation energy projects are still carried out via bilateralism. 
Similarly, multilateral platforms such as SCO have been set up to facilitate energy 
cooperation; but key energy projects, such as transnational pipelines, are not 
negotiated within the multilateral platform.  
 
Reason 2: Misperceptions of multilateralism 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, there is a “gap of knowledge” between how Chinese 
authorities and Western academia understand multilateral cooperation and multilateral 
institutions. 17 out of the 53 interviewees from government, the energy industry and 
think tanks in China misunderstood multilateral cooperation as participation in more 
than one international bilateral partnership, which means multiple bilateral partnerships. 
A common consensus is lacking among Chinese academia and energy elites, 
hindering proper discussion. The case of personnel exchange with ECT discussed in 
Section 3.3.3 reflects that while Chinese officers are sent abroad to learn from the 
experience of multilateral cooperation, they are too junior in China’s energy 
governance structure. Senior officers are often reluctant to depart from the tradition of 
the bilateral approach. Although the interviewees did not reject the definition of 
multilateralism used in this thesis once it had been properly explained to them, their 
loose understanding of the concept helps explain China’s ineffective multilateral 
approach and the different expectations between China and the West. 
 
Multilateralism or global energy governance includes the establishment of an institution. 
A loose understanding of the concept means that Chinese authorities might lack 
recognition of the legal functions of such an institution. This lack of understanding is 
reflected in how Chinese authorities hesitate to join international energy organisations 
such as the IEA or the ECT to avoid being legally bound. Due to the loose 
understanding of multilateralism, multilateral platforms are not well established. In the 
two cases of China’s energy cooperation with Central Asia and Africa, the SCO and 
FOCAC are criticised for lacking mature legal frameworks to coordinate energy 
investment. In the case of China–EU energy cooperation, the EU is concerned with the 
weak Chinese mentality towards contracts in joint initiatives. As a result, the 
effectiveness of multilateral platforms established in China’s international energy 
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cooperation is reduced, and any changes towards multilateralism remain at the policy 
instrument level. 
 
Reason 3: Lack of an urgent need for multilateralism 
Chapter 2 pointed out that a policy paradigm shift is triggered by crisis, referring to a 
moment when “the historical context changes to a sufficient degree making it 
increasingly hard to reconcile the existing mindset of policy-makers with the evidence 
leading eventually to new objectives and new policy instruments” 728  and “decisive 
intervention”.729 In mid-2000, Chinese authorities were concerned about China’s sharp 
increase in energy demand and oil dependency. China’s “going out” energy investment 
and entry into the WTO meant that China began to deal with regional and global oil 
markets. A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is understood to be insufficient in protecting 
China’s overseas energy investments, particularly in terms of national treatment 
standards and arbitration mechanisms. High oil prices in the mid-2000s further 
triggered China’s concerns about its international strategy with respect to energy 
security.  
 
In other words, other than geopolitics, the Chinese authorities recognise the 
importance of integration into the global energy cooperation system and 
comprehensive measures to ensure energy security. China opted for a multilateral 
approach when it realised that bilateral approaches were insufficient to coordinate 
international energy issues. In the White Paper on China’s Diplomacy 2007, multilateral 
cooperation is discussed in a special case explicitly addressing high oil prices. Similarly, 
due to the impact of the global financial crisis on global energy markets in the late 
2000s, China realised the importance of a stable market and further called for global 
energy governance.  
 
Yet whether the crisis is of sufficient severity to make a change depends on the 
perceptions of Chinese authorities. The 53 interviewees shared the view that, if 
conditions allow, Chinese authorities prefer a bilateral approach to a multilateral one in 
energy cooperation. An official from NEA, who was responsible for the coordination 
work with international energy cooperation and international energy organisations over 
the past two decades, explicitly claimed that China is feeling very comfortable about its 
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decision to decline membership in international energy organisations. He thinks there is 
no urgent need to join the international energy organisations. Such a claim, which is 
not unique among Chinese authorities, reflects that there has not been a crisis of 
sufficient severity to trigger a change in the mindsets of policymakers. 
 
Reason 4: Paradigm shift as an evolutionary process that requires time 
Chapter 2 pointed out that processes of change are not necessarily revolutionary but 
could be evolutionary. Change is not always linear or clean cut, but can be messy and 
contingent. Therefore, processes of change from bilateralism to multilateralism take 
time.  
 
The findings in this thesis indicate that Chinese authorities consider bilateral strategies 
to be efficient and flexible. With fewer parties involved, coordination costs are lower 
and clarity of interest is easier to attain. Moreover, there are different histories, cultures, 
domestic politics and economic development levels in different regions, which a 
bilateral approach could address more directly.730  Since processes of change from 
bilateralism to multilateralism are not necessarily linear and clean cut, a bilateral 
approach is expected to remain a part of China’s international energy cooperation, 
even if multilateral approaches are introduced. In the short to mid term, it is believed 
that China will continue to balance both approaches to maximise opportunities, 
because “national interests seem to explain much of China’s devotion to multilateralism 
or, where relevant, the lack thereof”731. As a hedge, China uses a multilateral approach 
as a cover for its bilateral energy diplomacy where possible, and vice versa. In other 
words, China’s international energy strategy uses multilateral approaches designed to 
benefit from the current liberal system. 
 
Section 3.3.3 pointed out that China has not closed its doors to multilateralism, as 
reflected in China’s interest in the multilateral legal framework, like ECT and the 
growing importance of transnational infrastructure like the Central Asia–China gas 
pipeline. Over the long term, these multilateral elements in China’s energy security will 
link China more closely to the international energy system. However, the time required 
for such a process is so long that it could not be accomplished within the period of Hu 
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Jintao. First and second order changes regarding policy instruments are considered to 
be easier than a third order change regarding the idea and the policy goal. Therefore, 
while a change in policy instruments in the case studies can be observed to be in 
alignment with the official Chinese statements about multilateral energy cooperation, 
there was not enough time during Hu Jintao’s era for a change in ideas towards 
multilateralism to occur. 
 
7.6 Future research to stem from this thesis 
  
This thesis has given answers to three issues related to energy security strategy during 
Hu Jintao’s era. Firstly, the thesis has explained the rationales underpinning the two 
policy paradigms of China’s energy security – the policy paradigm of energy diplomacy 
and the policy paradigm of global energy governance. Secondly, this thesis has 
answered the question of whether the degree of change in the case studies of China’s 
energy cooperation in different regions represents a profound change in China’s 
energy security. Thirdly, this thesis has explained the decisions made by Chinese 
authorities regarding policy transitions in China’s energy security. 
 
The idea-goal-instrument-physical structure framework, based on Hall’s concept of 
policy paradigm shift, was used to analyse if there was any change of ideas regarding 
Chinese energy security. In the three case studies, the ideas of political elites, rationale 
for policy goals, mechanisms of policy instruments and physical structure of energy 
governance were studied to analyse change.  
 
From this research, two projects in the discipline of international relations can be 
developed. The idea-goal-instrument-physical structure framework could be applied in 
other time periods and regions to demonstrate its general applicability. More 
specifically, the model could be applied to study the change in energy security during 
Xi Jinping’s era. The approach would be the same as used in this thesis. If the call for 
global energy governance by the end of Hu Jintao’s era is seen as progress towards 
multilateralism, energy cooperation in Xi Jinping’s grand strategy, the “One Belt One 
Road” initiative, is considered to be more ambitious in multilateral cooperation. 
Although the official announcement of the “One Belt One Road” initiative was made in 
March 2015, Xi Jinping proposed the concept in 2013. The origin of this initiative can 
be traced back to the early 2000s. There is sufficient data to test the model. Secondly, 
the model can be applied to different regions in which energy policy paradigm shifts will 
necessarily differ. For example, Japanese energy security before and after the 
Fukushima incident, Russian energy security before and after the Ukraine crisis, and 
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American energy security before and after the shale gas revolution will obviously show 
different results in policy paradigm shift.  
 
The use of the idea-goal-instrument-physical structure framework to study change in 
energy policy assists us in addressing several issues. Among them, one stands out. 
This approach can help redress the isolated focus of energy security on a single aspect, 
such as geopolitics, market or science. The slippery and changing definition of energy 
security implies a continuous change in the focus of energy security from one 
perspective to another over time. Other than transiting among traditional perspectives, 
lists of additional dimensions, aspects and elements, ranging from environmental 
issues to efficiency, have been included in energy security in recent years. An isolated 
study from a single discipline is insufficient for energy policy advice, and the idea-goal-
instrument-physical structure framework allows different aspects of energy to 
intermingle within the same system. This approach is not unique in analysis change, 
but it offers a more sophisticated account of policy change that takes ideas of 
policymakers as a central element. The idea-goal-instrument-physical structure 
framework can explain how an energy policy paradigm changes and the reasons for 
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